THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 229 of 2009 Rajesh Mohan (Ex. Staff No. 3312) S/o Sri Ganesh Mohan, R/o Bhola Panda Path, Deoghar, PO and PS Deoghar, DistDeoghar, Jharkhand …..... Appellant Vs. 1. State of Jharkhand ….......Respondent 2. M/s. Hyderabad Industries Ltd., Industrial Area, PO and PS Jasidih, District Deoghar, through its Personnel Manager, Sri R.K.Sinha, S/o Late B.K.Sinha, having h is office at M/s Hyderabad Industries Limited, Industrial Area, PO and PS Jasidih, District Deoghar, Jharkhand. .......... Respondent (original petitioner) CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.N.PATEL : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RATNAKER BHENGRA ---------- For the appellant :Mr. S.N.Das,Adv. For the respondent no.2 :Mr. K.B.Sinha, Sr.Adv. Mr. Vijay Gopal,Adv. Mr. Amitabh,Adv. ---------- 09/Dated:
2. November, 2015 nd Per D.N. Patel, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 16th April, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) no. 2911 of 2004 whereby the petition preferred by the respondent no. 2 was allowed by the learned Single Judge, by quashing and setting-aside the award passed by the Labour Court, Deoghar, in a Reference Case no. 01 of 2002 dated 4.12.2013.
2. Counsel for the appellant submitted that appellant was initially appointed for six months as Stock Loading Assistant on 22nd May, 1997 and, thereafter, his period of probation was extended for one year vide letter dated 3 rd December, 1997. Again services of the appellant were extended for six months vide order dated 30th November, 1998 and, thereafter, his services have been terminated with effect from 31st May, 1999. Meanwhile, two letters were also issued by the respondent – Management marked as Ext. 5 and 5/a which were placed before the Labour Court, Deoghar as confidential report about this appellant which were found satisfactory and, therefore, a recommendation was made for his regularization -2- in the services. This aspect of the matter has not at all been appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 2911 of 2004 dated 16th April, 2009 deserves to be quashed and set-aside. It is further submitted by counsel for the appellant that never any letter was written by the respondent- Management about dissatisfaction of the management due to the work of this appellant. On the contrary, the respondent - Management was fully satisfied with the work of this appellant and, therefore, there was recommendation for confirmation. Even in the termination order dated 31st May, 1999 (Annexure-4 to the memo of this L.P.A.) also it has not been mentioned by the respondent -Management that the work of this appellant was not up to the satisfaction. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) no. 2911 of 2004 dated 16th April, 2009 deserves to be quashed and set-aside. Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries Limited reported in (2014)11 SCC85 On the basis of the aforesaid decision it is submitted by counsel for the appellant that non-renewal of the contract of employment of this appellant tantamounts to the retrenchment of the services of this appellant under Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, the procedure of retrenchment has to be followed under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, but, the same has not been followed and complied with. It has also been submitted by counsel for the appellant that no error has been committed by the Labour Court, Deoghar in passing an order of reinstatement with back wages. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge hence, order impugned deserves to be quashed and set-aside. -3- 3. Counsel for the respondent no.2 submitted that the termination of the services of this appellant is a termination simpliciter and not termination punitive. The appellant was a probationer, his probation period was also extended and during this extended period of probation his services were terminated vide order dated 31st May, 1999, and there was no obligation on the part of the respondent no.2 to assign any reason for termination of the services of this appellant. If any reason will be given by the management then it may be converted into termination punitive , for which, an inquiry may be necessary, but, it is rightly appreciated by the learned Single Judge that during contract of services of a probationer, if his services are not extended such termination cannot be tantamount to retrenchment as per Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it is covered by an exception carved out under Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Under this exception the case of this appellant is falling and, hence, termination of this appellant is not a retrenchment. Therefore, there is no question of procedure whatsoever arises under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.It is however, submitted by respondent no.2 that merely because appellant has completed 240 days of the services that does not mean that the employee has right to continue in the services. In fact, during the period of probation management is always watching the working style of the probationer and management has all power, jurisdiction and authority to terminate the services of the probationer without assigning any reason. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. It is further submitted by counsel for the respondent no.2 that the award passed by the Labour Court, Deoghar in Reference Case no. 01 of 2002 dated 4.12.2003 is fully based upon the presumptions and surmises. Ext.5 and 5/a which were referred extensively by the Labour Court, Deoghar are of no -4- help to this appellant because it is an internal communication. Secondly for the reason that there was only recommendation for confirmation, but, the fact remains that this appellant was never confirmed and his probation period was extended from time to time. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Labour Court, Deoghar. If the work of this probationer would have been found satisfactory, there was no need to extend the period of probation and hence, letters and Ext. 5 and 5/a which were referred by the Labour Court, Deoghar cannot give any presumption that work of this appellant was found satisfactory. Counsel for the respondent no.2 has relied upon the following decisions: • (1997)8 SCC461{Life Insurance Corporation of India & anr. Vs. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni} • (2005)5 SCC569{State of Punjab & Others Vs. Sukhwinder Singh} • (2007)1 SCC533{Gangadhar Pillai Vs. Siemens Ltd.} • [1963] 0 AIR (SC) 1552 {Ranendra Chandra Banerjee Vs.Union of India} • (1997)11 SCC521{Escorts Limited Vs. Presiding Officer and Another} • AIR2002SC300{M/s. Kalyani Sharp India Ltd. V. Labour Court No.1Gwalior and another} On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by counsel for the respondent no.2 that if the services of the probationer is terminated during the period of probation then such termination never tantamounts to retrenchment and hence, even though he has worked for more than 240 days in one continuous year and as this is a termination simpliciter such probationer cannot be ordered to be reinstated with back wages. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P.(L) No. 2911 of 2004 judgment dated 16th April, 2009 and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. -5- 4. Having heard counsel for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidences on record, we see no reason to entertain this Letters Patent Appeal mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) This appellant was appointed as a Stock Loading Assistant on 22nd May, 1997 for six months. Thereafter his period of services was extended vide order dated 3 rd December, 1997 for one year and again it was extended for further period of six months with effect from 30 th November, 1998 and, thereafter, the services of this appellant was terminated vide order dated 31st May, 1999 (Annexure 4 to the memo of this LPA). (ii) Looking to the evidences on record it appears that this is a case of termination simpliciter. If the work of a probationer is not found satisfactory his services can be terminated during the period of probation by the management, even though, the probationer has worked for 240 days in one continuous year . (iii) Counsel for the appellant submitted that looking to the evidences recorded before the Labour Court, Deoghar especially Ext.5 and 5/a, there was recommendation for confirmation of this appellant and, therefore, it was presumed by the Labour Court that the work of the appellant was upto the mark of satisfaction and, hence, termination of the services of the appellant was retrenchment and for this no procedure under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was followed as such, an order of reinstatement with back wages was awarded by the Labour Court, Deoghar in Reference Case no. 01 of 2002 vide order dated 24th December, 2003. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that Ext. 5 and 5/a never gives any presumption that the work of this appellant was found to be satisfactory. On the contrary, every extension of probation period gives presumption that the work of the probationer was not up to the mark of satisfaction. When the work of the probationer was not -6- found satisfactory with a view to give a chance to the employee his period of probation is extended. The period of probation is a period during which the employer is watching the work of the employee. If the work of the employee is not found satisfactory the period of probation may be extended or his services can also be terminated. (iv) Here, in the facts of the present case, initially, this appellant was appointed on 22 nd May, 1997 for six months thereafter, his services was extended for twelve months and again for six months as stated hereinabove as a probationer and, thereafter, his services were terminated vide order dated 31st May, 1999. Termination of the services of probationer is never covered by the definition of retrenchment as given under Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,looking to the exception carved out in the said definition. More particularly, looking to Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For the ready reference the definition of retrenchment under The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(oo) reads as under: “Section 2(oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c ) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health; (Emphasis supplied) Thus, looking to the aforesaid definition the termination of the services, of this appellant is not a retrenchment at all, even otherwise also he was a probationer -7- as stated hereinabove and during the period of probation there was more than one extension which is sufficient to point out that the work of this appellant was not up to the mark of satisfaction. Looking to Annexure-4 to the memo of this L.P.A., the termination of the services of the appellant was not at all punitive in nature, but, it was termination simpliciter and, hence, there is no need to hold any inquiry. (v) The Labour Court, Deoghar has also referred the fact that this appellant has worked for more than 240 days in a year and, therefore, the termination of the services of this appellant tantamounts to retrenchment. This is a wrong notion in the mind of this appellant. Even if a probationer completed 240 days in one continuous year during his period of probation and if his work is not found upto the mark of satisfaction by the management and if his services have been brought to an end, such termination is a termination simpliciter and never tantamounts to retrenchment and, therefore, no need to follow any procedure U/s 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and there is no need to hold any inquiry against this appellant. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the petition preferred by the respondent and we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition bearing W.P.(L) no. 2911 of 2004 judgment dated 16th April, 2009. (Vi) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of the Gangadhar Pillai Vs. Siemens Ltd. reported in (2007)1 SCC533in paragraph nos. 28,29 and 30 which reads as under:
“28. It is not the law that on completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year, the employee concerned becomes entitled to for regularisation of his services and /or permanent status. The concept of 240 days in a year was introduced in the industrial law for a definite purpose. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, the concept of 240 days was introduced so as to fasten statutory liabilities upon the employer to pay compensation to be -8- computed in the manner specified in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before he is retrenched from services and not for any other purpose. In the event a violation of the said provision takes place, termination of services of the employee may be found to be illegal, but only on that account, his services cannot be directed to be regularized. Direction to reinstate the workman would mean that he gets back the same status.
29. In Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. V. Anil Kumar Mishra this Court has categorically held: (SCC p.124,para
5) “ The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is difficult to envisage for them the status of work men on the analogy of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, importing the incidents of completion of 240 days' work. The legal consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are entirely different from what, by way of implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy. The completion of 240 days' work does not, under that law import the right to regularisation. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service. It is not appropriate to import and apply that analogy, in an extended or enlarged form here.”
30. In M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava this Court held:(SCC p.709 para 17)
“17. It is now well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. (See Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra; Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. v. Digambara Rao; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Bhola Singh ; Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani and Neeraj Awasthi.)” (emphasis supplied) (Vii) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab & Others Vs. Sukhwinder Singh reported in (2005)5 SCC569in paragraph nos. 8,15 and 20 as under:
“8. Termination of service of a probationer during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to. The period of probation, therefore, furnishes a valuable opportunity to the master to closely observe the work of the probationer and by the time the period of probation expires to make up his mind whether to retain the servant by absorbing him in regular service or dispense with his service. Period of probation may vary from post to post or master to master and it is not obligatory on the master to prescribe a period of probation. It is always open to -9- the employer to employ a person without putting him on probation. Power to put the employee on probation for watching his performance and the period during which the performance is to be observed is the prerogative of the employer. (See Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab).
15. In Krishnadevaraya Education Trust v. L.a. Balakrishna it was held that a probationer is on test and if his services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the services. The mere fact that in response to the challenge the employer states that the services were not satisfactory, would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were terminated by way of punishment.
20. In the present case neither any formal departmental inquiry or any preliminary fact-finding inquiry had been held and a simple order of discharge had been passed. The High Court has built an edifice on the basis of a statement made in the written statement that the respondent was a habitual absentee during his short period of service and has concluded therefrom that it was his absence from duty that weighed in the mind of the Senior Superintendent of Police as absence from duty is a misconduct. The High Court has further gone on to hold that there is direct nexus between the order of discharge of the respondent from service and his absence from duty and, therefore, the order discharging him from service will be viewed as punitive in nature calling for a regular inquiry under Rule 16.24 of the Rules. We are of the opinion that the High Court has gone completely wrong in drawing the inference that the order of discharge dated 16-3-1990 was, in fact, based upon misconduct and was, therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been preceded by a regular departmental inquiry. There cannot be any doubt that the respondent was on probation having been appointed about eight months back. As observed in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab the period of probation gives time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation. The mere holding of preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondent's absence from duty was the foundation of the order, which necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24 (ix) of the Rules.” (emphasis supplied) (Viii) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and another Vs. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni -10- reported in (1997)8 SCC461in paragraph nos. 5,6 and 12 as under:
“5. Clause 2 of the letter of appointment issued to the respondent reads as under: “You shall be on probation initially for a period of twelve months from the date of your joining duties as a probationer, but the Corporation may, in its sole discretion, extend your probationary period provided that the total probationary period including the extended period shall not exceed 24 months counted from the commencement of the probationary appointment. During the probationary period (Which includes extended probationary period, if applicable) you shall be liable to discharge from service of the Corporation without any notice and without any cause being assigned.” This clause clearly stipulates that the respondent could be discharged from service at any time during the period of probation or extended period of probation, without any notice or without assigning any cause.
6. The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause. This is based on the principle that a substantive appointment to a permanent post in a public service confers substantive right to the post and the person appointed on that post becomes entitled to hold a lien on the post. He gets the right to continue on the post till he attains the age of superannuation or is dismissed or removed from service for misconduct etc. after disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the rules at which he is given a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard. He may also come to lose the post on compulsory retirement.
12. The requirement to hold a regular departmental enquiry before dispensing with the services of a probationer cannot be invoked in the case of a probationer especially when his services are terminated by an innocuous order which does not cast any stigma on him. But it cannot be laid down as a general rule that in no case can an enquiry be held. If the termination is punitive in nature and is brought about on the ground of misconduct, Article 311(2) would be attracted and in that situation it would be incumbent upon the employer, in the case of government service, to hold a regular departmental enquiry. In any other case also, specially those relating to statutory corporations or government instrumentalities, a termination which is punitive in nature cannot be brought about unless an opportunity of hearing is given to the person whose services, even during the period of probation, or extended period, are sought to be terminated. (See: Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. -11- Union of India in which it was held that appointment to a permanent post on probation means that the servant is taken on trial. Such an appointment comes to an end if during or at the end of the probation, the person so appointed is found to be unsuitable and his services are terminated by notice. An appointment on probation or on an officiating basis is of transitory character with an implied condition that such an appointment is terminable at any time. See also : Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab.)” (emphasis supplied) (ix) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Kalyani Sharp India Ltd. V. Labour Court No.1 Gwalior and another reported in AIR2002SC300in paragraph nos. 5 and 6 as under:
“5. So far as the first contention raised on behalf of the respondent is concerned we may state that the argument emerges from the documents upon which the respondent has relied upon before the Labour Court to show about his employment and the termination of his service. No fresh investigation of facts is required. It is a case of simple application of law in the matter. Hence the preliminary objection is rejected.
6. The order of employment itself clearly sets out the terms thereafter which makes it clear that the facility of providing training to him could be put to an end to at any time without assigning any reason whatsoever and his services could be regularised only on satisfactory completion of his training. If these clauses are read together it is clear he was under probation during the relevant time and if his services are not satisfactory, the same could be put an end to. It is clear that the respondent had been appointed as a Trainee Service Technician and for a period he had to undergo the training to the satisfactory during that period the facility could be withdrawn at any time and he would be regularised only on completion of his training. Thus the respondent's services were terminated before expiry of the probationary period. In such a case question of issue of notice before terminating the service as claimed by the respondent does not arise. Escorts' case (supra) is identical with the present case. Following the said decision and for the reasons stated therein these appeals are allowed. The order made by the High Court affirming the award made by the Labour Court is set aside and the claim made by the respondent is dismissed.” (Emphasis supplied) (X) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Limited Vs. Presiding Officer and Another reported in (1997)11 SCC521in paragraph no.4 as under: -12-
“4. We do not consider it necessary to go into the question whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a year and whether Sundays and other holidays should be counted, as has been done by the Labour Court, because, in our opinion, Shri Shetye is entitled to succeed on the other ground urged by him that the termination of services of the workman does not constitute retrenchment in view of clause (bb) in Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Clause (bb) excludes from the ambit of the expression “retrenchment” as defined in the main part of Section 2 (oo) “ termination of the services of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein”. The said provision has been considered by this Court in M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC. The appellant in that case had been appointed on probation for a period of one year from 23- 5-1984 to 22-5-1985 and the said period of probation was extended for further period of one year from 23-5- 1985 to 22-5-1986. Before the expiry of the said period of probation , his services were terminated on 9-5-1986. It was held that since the termination was in accordance with the terms of the contract though before the expiry of the period of probation it fell within the ambit of Section 2 (oo)(bb) of the Act and did not constitute retrenchment. Here also the services of the workman were terminated on 13-2-1987, as per the terms of the contract of employment contained in the appointment letter dated 9-1-1987 which enabled the appellant to terminate the services of the workman at any stage without assigning any reason. Since the services of the workman were terminated as per the terms of the contract of employment, it does not amount to retrenchment under Section 2 (oo) of the Act and the Labour Court was in error in holding that it constituted retrenchment and was protected by Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) (xi) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Ranendra Chandra Banerjee Vs. Union of India reported in AIR (1963) SC1552in paragraph no.5 as under:
“5. The first question that falls for determination is whether the appellant is entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2); for if he is entitled to that protection it is not disputed that that provision was not complied with in this case before his services were terminated. It is now well settled that the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution applies to temporary government servants also where dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment. But it is equally well settled that where the services of a temporary government servant are terminated not by -13- way of punishment, Art. 311 will not apply and the services of such a servant can be terminated under the terms of the contract or by giving him the usual one months notice; [see, Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India(1)]. Further it is equally well settled that a government servant who is on probation can be discharged and such discharge would not amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) and would not attract the protection of that Article where the services of a probationer are terminated in accordance with the rules and not by way of punishment. A probationer has no right to the post held by him and under the terms of his appointment he is liable to be discharged at any time during the period of his probation subject to the rules governing such cases: [see State of Orissa v. Ram Narain Das,(1)]. The appellant in the present case was undoubtedly a probationer. There is also no doubt that the termination of his service was not by way of punishment and cannot therefore amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning of Art.
311. As probationer he would be liable to be discharged during the period of probation subject to the rules in force in that connection. The High Court therefore was right in holding that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions, even if, the probationer has completed 240 days, but, if the management was not satisfied with the work of the probationer and if the services of the probationer have been terminated during the period of probation the Labour Court or Industrial Court should not have passed an order of reinstatement with back wages. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent no.2. (xii) Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decisions reported in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries Limited reported in (2014)11 SCC85 Looking to the facts of the present case it appears that : (a) This appellant was appointed on 22nd May, 1997 for six months as Stock Loading Assistant. Thereafter, again his contract of services was extended for twelve months and again it was extended for six months. Looking to the -14- period of probation especially extension thereof it appears that the work of this appellant was not up to the mark of satisfaction. (b) The services of this appellant was terminated with effect from 31st May, 1999. Thus, looking to Annexure-4 which is a termination order, no misconduct has been alleged against this appellant. This is a termination simpliciter during the period of probation. These two facts make the present case different from the facts of the case upon which the reliance has been placed by the counsel for the appellant and, hence, judgment and order delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2014)11 SCC85is not helpful to this appellant.
5. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal as no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while allowing the W.P.(L) No. 2911 of 2004 judgment dated 16 th April, 2009 and we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge.
6. Copy of this judgment will be sent by Registrar General of this Court to : (a) All the Labour Courts in the State of Jharkhand. (b) All the Industrial Tribunals in the State of Jharkhand (C ) To the Director , Judicial Academy, Ranchi.
7. There is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and, hence, the same is hereby dismissed. (D.N.Patel, J.) (Ratnaker Bhengra,J.) Nibha