Ponnala Narsing Rao Vs. Nallolla Pantaiah and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

.....the notified persons. it provides for grant of full opportunity of hearing to the notified persons. notified persons have special knowledge of the facts relating to their assets and liabilities and, therefore, can always show that the have been notified wrongly or that their properties are not liable for sale either because their liabilities can otherwise be discharged or the quantum of liabilities projected by the custodian is not correct. in construing the statute of this nature the court should not always adhere to a literal meaning but would construe the same, keeping in view the larger public interest. for the said purpose the court may also take recourse to the basic rules of interpretation, namely, ut res magis valeat quam pereat to see that a machinery must be so construed as to effectuate the liability imposed by the charging section and to make the machinery workable. sections 3 & 4(1): [s.b. sinha & deepak verma, jj] applicability property purchased by notified parties themselves as members of group in name of one or other whether rigours of section 4(1) would apply held, sub-section (1) of section 4 applies to the third parties and not to any notified party...........land by improving it. but all these questions have to be pleaded and proved. surprisingly, no such contention was ever canvassed much less tried to be proved on any equitable ground by the petitioner. therefore, this second contention on the facts of the present case cannot be sustained. it has also to be noted that no plea of adverse possession was put forward by the petitioner in support of his case.4. so far as the third contention is concerned, it is the petitioner's own case that the respondents' predecessor had surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the ex-inamdar and from him he had purchased the lands. but before that the government had auctioned the land on one-year basis. consequently at the time when the petitioner entered the land, whether it had remained an inam land or not was an important question to be decided. no such contention was canvassed by the petitioner either before the appellate court or before the high court. hence this third contention cannot survive for consideration at this late stage.5. in the result, this special leave petition fails and is dismissed.

Judgment:

ORDER

1. We have heard learned advocates for the parties. Three main contentions were canvassed before us by learned counsel for the petitioner. Firstly, that the respondents' predecessor-in-interest who was admittedly protected tenant of the lands had orally surrendered his tenancy rights years back in 1951 and that, therefore, there was no question of their asking for restoration of possession from the petitioner who had purchased these lands after surrender, from the original owner inamdar years back in 1954 and prior thereto the petitioner was in possession on yearly leases from the Government. Secondly, the application under Section 32 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was filed after unreasonable delay and should have been dismissed on that ground. Thirdly, the land in question was inam land and, therefore, the provisions of Section 32 of the Act were not attracted.

2. So far as the first contention is concerned, it must be noted that only documentary evidence was produced before the authorities below on the basis of which judgments were rendered against the petitioner by the lower appellate court as well as by the High Court. The theory of 'oral surrender' has been disbelieved by the appellate court by relying on evidence in the shape of entry in tenancy register which shows that the respondents' predecessor was a protected tenant all throughout and that entry was never changed. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he relied upon a khasra entry which shows that in 1954 he was put in possession as an owner of this land and there was an endorsement that in prior years he was in possession since three years. In which capacity was he in possession prior to 1954 is a question which could have been examined only in the light of the petitioner's own evidence on oath. He did not think it fit to enter the box to prove that case. Under these circumstances it was rightly held by the lower appellate court and as confirmed by the High Court that the theory of oral surrender of protected tenancy rights prior to 1954 cannot be believed. The first contention, therefore, fails.

3. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is true that though no express period of limitation is provided for filing application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications have to be moved within reasonable time. It may be because of such belated applications, the other side may stand adversely affected. It may have changed its position in the meantime. Equities may have arisen in his favour, he may have spent large amounts on land by improving it. But all these questions have to be pleaded and proved. Surprisingly, no such contention was ever canvassed much less tried to be proved on any equitable ground by the petitioner. Therefore, this second contention on the facts of the present case cannot be sustained. It has also to be noted that no plea of adverse possession was put forward by the petitioner in support of his case.

4. So far as the third contention is concerned, it is the petitioner's own case that the respondents' predecessor had surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the ex-inamdar and from him he had purchased the lands. But before that the Government had auctioned the land on one-year basis. Consequently at the time when the petitioner entered the land, whether it had remained an inam land or not was an important question to be decided. No such contention was canvassed by the petitioner either before the appellate court or before the High Court. Hence this third contention cannot survive for consideration at this late stage.

5. In the result, this special leave petition fails and is dismissed.