Chander Bhan Vs. Bal Mukund and anr. - Court Judgment |
| Limitation |
| Supreme Court of India |
| Jan-20-1972 |
| Civil Appeal No. 1664 of 1970 |
| K.K. Mathew,; K.S. Hegde and; P. Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ. |
| AIR1972SC2125; (1972)74PLR672; (1973)2SCC52; 1972(4)LC593(SC) |
| Limitation Act - Sections 5 |
| Chander Bhan |
| Bal Mukund and anr. |
| D.N. Mukherjee,; B.P. Maheshwari, Advs |
| O.N. Mohindroo, Adv. |
| From the Judgment and Order dated December 18 1969 of Delhi, High Court, in S.A.O. 166 of 1969 |
.....to be kept in mind by the compounding authority. the test is as follows - is the applicant candid in the matter of placing of materials and facts before the compounding authority without in any way trying to hoodwink the authority is bound to discharge the statutory duty of making proper enquiry by examining with care and caution the materials that have been made available. the said compounding authority must be satisfied that the applicant has done all he could or need to do in the matter. the applicant has to be one time evader. he has to make clean breast of his affairs. in the instant case accused was found with 2 pairs of diamond earrings after alighting from british airways flight and was charged with offences under sections 132 and 135(1)(a). in application filed for compounding of offence he stated that he had no intent to smuggle as he had entered into green channel through oversight, whereas earlier in his first bail application he stated that he was forcibly taken by dri officers to walk through green channel. thus, contradictions in the two versions given by accused per se made the application for compounding liable to be rejected - thereafter,..........was july 14, 1969. as mentioned earlier, the decree and judgment of the first appellate court had not been produced by that time. hence the appeal was prima facie barred. no application under section 5 of the limitation act had been made and no reason had been shown as to why there was a delay in filing those documents. hence, the high court was fully justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the same is barred by limitation.2. it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that though his client had applied for the copies of the decree and judgment of the first appellate court as well as that of the trial court on the very date, it decided the appeal, that court made available only the decree and judgment of the first appellate court and not that of the trial court. hence, the appellant was entitled to file the second appeal after the same was made available to. this plea is an entirely new plea. no such plea appears to have been taken before the high court. this plea is not founded on any material before us. hence, it cannot be sustained.3. in the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. no costs.
K.S. Hegde, J.
1. There is no substance in this appeal. The Appellant claims to be a sub-tenant under the first Respondent who is a tenant under the second Respondent. The second Respondent filed a petition for evicting the appellant and the first Respondent from the suit premises on certain grounds. His application was rejected by the Rent Controller. But in appeal, the Rent Control Tribunal reversed the order of the Rent Controller and decreed the second Respondent's claim. Thereafter, the appellant filed a second appeal before the High Court of Delhi on April 28, 1969. Under the rules of the High Court the Appellant was required to file along with his appeal memo, the judgment and decree appealed against as well as the judgment of the Trial Court. At the time of the filing of the appeal, none of these documents were filed, but an application was made to the High Court to dispense with the production of those documents. The High Court ordered that those documents should be produced within the time prescribed for filing the appeal. It appears that the judgment and decree of the first: Appellate Court was produced before the High Court on July 15, 1960 though the High Court had re-opened after summer recess on July 14, 1969 but the judgment of the Trial Court was not produced at all. No explanation appears to have been given before the High Court as to why the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court was not produced in time. The last date for filing the appeal admittedly was July 14, 1969. As mentioned earlier, the decree and judgment of the first Appellate Court had not been produced by that time. Hence the appeal was prima facie barred. No application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been made and no reason had been shown as to why there was a delay in filing those documents. Hence, the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the same is barred by limitation.
2. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that though his client had applied for the copies of the decree and judgment of the first Appellate Court as well as that of the Trial Court on the very date, it decided the appeal, that Court made available only the decree and judgment of the first Appellate Court and not that of the Trial Court. Hence, the Appellant was entitled to file the second appeal after the same was made available to. This plea is an entirely new plea. No such plea appears to have been taken before the High Court. This plea is not founded on any material before us. Hence, it cannot be sustained.
3. In the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.