M.M. Dutt and; Ranganath Misra, JJ.
1. The short point involved in the appeal is as to whether the suit instituted by the present appellant challenging the order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was barred by limitation on the date of its institution. Admittedly to this suit Article 47 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied and that prescribed a period of three years from the date of the final order for the purpose of instituting the suit. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was passed on September 8, 1960 and the cause of action in the plaint was rightly shown to have accrued on that date. It is not disputed that a revision petition had been preferred to the Additional District Magistrate and a further revision was taken to the High Court when the first revision was not successful. If the order of the High Court is taken as the relevant date the same having been passed alter the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force, the plaintiff would be entitled to 12 years to institute the suit. Learned counsel for the respondents rightly contends that the cause of action had become barred under the old Limitation Act and the benefit of the new Article 65 would not be available. Courts below have taken the view that the suit was barred by limitation as the final order must be taken to be the order of the learned Magistrate in this case. We agree with the view taken in the courts below that unless there be a variation or reversal, the order of the Magistrate would be final order and if there be a variation or alteration, the varied order would be the final order. In the instant case, the original order of the Magistrate was not varied or reversed. Therefore, the courts were right in their view that limitation of three years under Article 47 of the repealed Limitation Act was to be counted from the date of final order of the learned Magistrate. Upon such calculation the suit was rightly found to be barred by limitation. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.