S.N. Variava, J.
1. This Appeal is against a Judgment dated 25th April, 1988.
2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:
The Appellant claims that by Registered Deed of Settlement dated24th April, 1954 the land was settled in favour of one Dev NarayanPrasad. On 19th February 1955, by virtue of Section 3(1) of the BiharLand Reforms Act, the land vested in the State of Bihar. The Appellantclaims that the State has been receiving rent from the said DevNarayan Prasad. On 9th February, 1962 the said Dev Narayan Prasadsold the said land to the Appellant by a registered Sale Deed.
3. On 18th May, 1979 a notice was issued to the Appellant underSection 3 of the Bihar Land Encroachment Act. The Appellant repliedto the Notice. Whilst these proceedings were pending, on 16thJanuary 1982 a Notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the said Act). This wasfollowed by a Declaration under Section 6 on 25th May, 1982. TheAppellant filed a claim under Section 9 of the said Act. Similarly, theCircle Officer, on behalf of the State, filed a claim under Section 9 ofthe said Act. An Award came to be passed in favour of the Appellanton 19th February, 1985. The State filed a Reference under Section 30of the said Act for determination of the title. The State claimed thatthey were entitled to receive compensation. On 6th September, 1986the Land Acquisition Judge held in favour of the Appellant. The Statethen filed an Appeal which was dismissed on 25th April, 1988.
4. The State then filed a Letters Patent Appeal before the DivisionBench. This Letters Patent Appeal was allowed by the impugnedJudgment dated 1st May, 1996. The case has been remanded back tothe single Judge for decision in the light of the observations made bythe Division Bench.
5. When this matter reached hearing on 31st January, 2002 thefollowing Order has been passed by this Court:
'One of the questions that arises for consideration in thiscase is as to whether Letters Patent Appeal wasmaintainable before the Letters Patent Bench against thejudgment and decree of the learned Single Judge of theHigh Court passed in an appeal preferred under Section 54of the Land Acquisition Act. In Civil Appeal Nos. 1663-1968of 1982 (Baljit Singh and Ors. etc. v. State ofHaryana and Ors.), a Bench of two Judges of this Courtheld that no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable againstthe judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Courtwhereas in the case of Basant Kumar v. Union of India : (1996)11SCC542 , a Bench of three Judges,without adverting to the decision in Baljit Singh and Ors.etc. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (supra) held that suchan appeal is maintainable.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
On a plain reading of Section 54 of the LandAcquisition Act, we are, prima facie, of the view that noLetters Patent Appeal is maintainable. However, since noreason has been assigned in the case of Basant Kumarv. Union of India (supra) for holding that the LettersPaten Appeal is maintainable against the judgment of aSingle Judge of the High Court passed in an appeal filedunder Section 54 of the Act, we are of the view that thiscase requires to be decided by a Bench of three Hon'bleJudges.
Let this matter be placed before Hon'ble the ChiefJustice of India for appropriate orders.'
Hence the Appeal has been placed before us.
6. In the case of Baljit Singh and Ors. etc. v. State of Haryana andOrs., two Judges of this Court have held as follows:
'The short question raised is whether the Letters PatentAppeals were maintainable under the law. The learnedCounsel for the appellants agreed that such appeals didnot lie on the authority of a Judgment of this Court in AsiaIndustries v. Sarup : [1965]2SCR756 where a fourJudge bench has clearly held that such an appeal does notlie. On this authority the Judgment of the Division Benchof the High Court has to be vacated and consequently thedecision of the learned Single Judge has got to berestored.'
7. The Judgment in Baljit Singh's case is based on a concession. Itis also based on the judgment in Asia Industries case. The judgmentin Asia Industries case does not deal with Section 54 of the said Act.In Asia Industries case, the question was whether a Letters PatentAppeal would lie against a decision of the single Judge Bench passed inan Appeal filed under Sections 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Whilstconsidering this question it was observed as follows:
'The following legal position emerges from the saiddiscussion : A statute may give a right of appeal from anorder of a tribunal or a Court to the High Court without anylimitation thereon. The appeal to the High Court will beregulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in theHigh Court. Under the rules made by the High Court inexercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 108 of theGovernment of India Act, 1915, an appeal under Section 39 ofthe Act will be heard by a single Judge. Any judgmentmade by the single Judge in the said appeal will, under Clause10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to thatCourt. If the order made by a single Judge is a judgmentand if the appropriate Legislature has, expressly or bynecessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal,the conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie fromthe judgment of a single Judge under Clause 10 of the LettersPatent to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act hadnot taken away the Letters Patent appeal, an appeal shallcertainly lie from the judgment of the single Judge to theHigh Court.'
Thus the Court holds that a Letters Patent Appeal will lie unlessthe concerned statute takes away the right to file Letters PatentAppeal. The Court then considered Sections 39 and 43 DelhiRent Control Act and held that a combined reading of the twoSections showed that the Order passed by the High Court, in anappeal under Section 39, was to be final. It was held that theprovision of finality was intended to exclude any further appeal.This decision is thus based on interpretation of Sections 39 and43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Section 54 of the said Act hasno similarity with Sections 39 and 43 of the Delhi Rent ControlAct. Asia Industries case does not lay down that a Letters PatentAppeal would not lie against a judgment passed in an appealunder Section 54 of the said Act. Thus the case has norelevance whilst deciding the question whether a Letters PatentAppeal is maintainable against a judgment passed in an appealunder Section 54 of the said Act. In our view the concessionmade in Baljit Singh's case was wrong.
8. A three Judge Bench of this Court, has in Basant Kumar's case(supra) held as follows:
'The next question is whether the LPA would lie against thejudgment of the learned Single Judge? It is a settled legalposition that under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act,the appeal would lie to the High Court; when the appeal onthe basis of the pecuniary value was decided by a SingleJudge necessarily, it being the judgment of the SingleJudge, an appeal would lie to the same Court in the form ofLPA to the Division Bench. The Division Bench was notright in holding that the LPA would not lie to the High Courtagainst the judgment of the Single Judge. To that extent,the view of the High Court is not correct.'
9. A Letters Patent is the charter under which the High Court isestablished. The powers given to a High Court under the LettersPatent are akin to the constitution powers of a High Court. Thuswhen a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of Appeal,against a judgment of a single Judge, the right to entertain the appealwould not get excluded unless the concerned statutory enactmentexcludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.
10. The question which thus arises is whether Section 54 of the saidAct excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent. Section 54 of the Said Act reads as under:
'54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.-Subject tothe provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,applicable to appeals from original decrees, andnotwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactmentfor the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in anyproceedings under this Act to the High Court from theaward, or from any part of the award of the Court andfrom any decree of the High Court passed on such appealas aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Courtsubject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of theCode of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLIV thereof.'
11. Mr. Sharan submits that Section 54 of the Said Act contains anon-obstante clause. He submits that the words 'notwithstandinganything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force'would also include the provisions contained in a Letters Patent. Weare unable to accept this submission. A Letter Patent is not an enactment. It is the charter of the High Court. A non-obstante clauseof this nature cannot cover the charter of the High Court.
12. Mr. Sharan next submits that Section 54 of the said Act uses thewords 'an appeal shall only lie'. He submits that the words 'anappeal' show that there can be only one appeal to the High Court. Hesubmits that the use of the word 'only' indicates that the Legislatureintended that there should be only one appeal in the High Court. Mr.Sharan submits that Section 54 also provides that from 'such anappeal an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court'. He submits that this makes it clear that Section 54 provides for only one Appeal to the High Court and then an appeal to the Supreme Court. He submits that on aplain reading of Section 54 it is clear that a Letters Patent Appealwould not lie against a Judgment passed by a single Judge of the HighCourt in an Appeal under Section 54.
13. On the other hand, Mr. Mathur has submitted that a LettersPatent Appeal would lie. He points out that almost all High Courtshave taken the view that a Letters Patent Appeal would lie against aJudgment of a single Judge passed in an Appeal filed under Section 54of the said Act. He relies upon the cases of Mahli Devi v. ChanderBhan reported in : AIR1995Delhi293 , Mohabbat Singh v. Crownreported in AIR (1923) Lah 274, Narayandas Daga v. Ganpatraoreported in and M. Srinivas v. JawaharlalNehru Technological University, Hyderabad reported in (1990) 3An L T 3.
14. In our view, Mr. Mathur is right. Section 26 of the said Actprovides that every award shall be a decree and the statement ofgrounds of every award shall be a judgment. By virtue of the LettersPatent 'an appeal' against the judgment of a single Judge of the HighCourt would lie to a Division Bench. Section 54 of the said Act doesnot exclude an Appeal under the Letter Patent. The word 'only'occurring immediately after the non-obstante clause in Section 54refers to the forum of appeal. In other words it provides that theappeal will be to the High Court and not any other Court e.g. theDistrict Court. The term 'an appeal' does not restrict it to only oneAppeal in the High Court. The term 'an appeal' would take within itssweep even a Letters Patent Appeal. The decision of the DivisionBench rendered in a Letters Patent appeal will then be subject toappeal to the Supreme Court. Read in any other manner there woldbe a conflict between Section 54 and the provision of a Letters Patent.It is settled law that if there is a conflict, attempt should be made toharmoniously construe the provisions.
15. We, therefore, hold that under Section 54 of the said Act there isno bar to the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal. We therefore agree with the view taken in Basant Kumar's case. The reference isanswered accordingly.
16. The case be now placed before a Division Bench forconsideration of the other aspects.