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Agriculture Market Committee, Rajam and anr. Vs. Rajam Jute and Oil Millers Association, Rajam - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation

Subject

Other Taxes

Court

Supreme Court of India

Decided On

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 1495 of 1993

Judge

Reported in

AIR2003SC1742; 2003(4)ALD41(SC); JT2003(2)SC482; 2003(2)SCALE397; (2003)4SCC187; [2003]2SCR320; [2003]131STC472(SC)

Acts

Andhra Pradesh Agricultural (Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 - Sections 2, 4, 4(3), 4(4), 12, 12(1), 14, 14(1) and 15; Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960; Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961; Constitution of India - Article 226

Appellant

Agriculture Market Committee, Rajam and anr.

Respondent

Rajam Jute and Oil Millers Association, Rajam

Advocates:

K. Amreswari and; R.F. Nariman, Sr. Advs.,; T.V. Ramam,;

Disposition

Appeal allowed

Cases Referred

In Sreenivasa General Traders and Ors. v. State

Prior history

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.8.93 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.A. No. 517 of 1993

Excerpt:


.....when the funds are in any caseto be utilized for specified purposes, the observation in puri'scase to the effect that a good and substantial portion of it must beshown to be expended, does not have much significance. it has clearly emergedfrom the evidence of dw 1 that steps were being taken forextending the services and facilities in the market area. the law is well settled that though quid proquo is required in relation to a fee which is charged and collectedby a market committee, the quid pro quo cannot be in exactproportion to the fee levied. we are thusunable to agree with the finding of the high court that the marketcommittee had failed to provide any services or amenities in thenotified market area......ordered dismissal ofthe suit, accepted that such facilities had been made available inthe notified market area and this entitled the committee to levymarket fee in terms of section 12 of the act. the learned districtjudge noted from the evidence of dw 1 that no suggestion hadbeen put to him in the cross-examination that by 1982 the marketyard was not having all the basic amenities. according to thelearned district judge, it was clear from the evidence of the saidwitness that amenities were being provided in the notified marketarea and the construction of building was in progress. anotherfact which emerged from the evidence of dw 1 was that marketcommittee was giving loans to the growers or ryots by way ofcash, loans or by way of supply of manures on credit. thus themarket committee was discharging its functions.12. the question is whether the market committee was notentitled to levy, demand and collect market fee till all the facilitiesand amenities are fully and completely in place. the facilitiesalready provided for in the notified market area in the presentcase have been enumerated hereinbefore. what remains to beconsidered is the extent to which services, facilities and.....

Judgment:


Arun Kumar, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 20thFebruary, 1992 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Courtallowing the second appeal and decreeing the suit filed by theplaintiff-Association, respondent herein. Briefly, the facts arethat respondent filed a suit for declaration and injunction in thecourt of Subordinate Judge, Rajam, District Srikakulam, AndhraPradesh. The plaintiff sought a declaration to the effect that thedefendant - Market Committee had no right to levy, demand andcollect any market fee from the members of the plaintiff -Association. An injunction was also sought to restrain thedefendant - Committee from collecting market fee from themembers of the plaintiff - Association. The case set up by theplaintiff as per the plaint was that Rajam Sub-Taluk was under thejurisdiction of the Ponduru Agricultural Market Committee. OnRajam Sub-Taluk being upgraded as a Taluk, a separateAgricultural Market Committee was constituted for the RajamTaluk with effect from 24th December, 1979. The MarketCommittee was constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural(Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred toas the 'Act'). The primary object of the Act is to establish amarket within a notified area. The market committees which areconstituted under the Act have to provide facilities like sheds,storage, accommodation, platforms, facilities for weighing andgrading of the agricultural produce etc. The Committee has alsoto engage staff to supervise operations of the traders in themarket area. The market committee is to ensure that transactionsin the specified commodities are for the benefit of purchasers andsellers of such commodities. In the process the committees aresupposed to regulate the purchase and sale of agriculturalproduce by providing a market place and all the facilitiesnecessary for proper conduct of the trade in agricultural producein the market place so as to eliminate the middleman and toensure healthy trade practices. By eliminating the middleman thecommittee tries to protect the purchasers of such agriculturalproduce, live stock etc. from exploitation and to ensure to them afair price for their produce.

2. According to the plaintiff, the Market Committee had failedto provide any facilities in the market area so much so even amarket yard had not been set up, no services or amenities werebeing provided to the traders in the market area and therefore theMarket Committee was not entitled to levy, demand and collectthe market fee or cess from the members of the plaintiffs. In thewritten statement filed on behalf of the market committee, it waspointed out that the market committee was in its nascent stage, ithad come into existence on the declaration of Rajam as aseparate Taluk only on 24th December, 1979. It had alreadytaken possession of the site comprising 8.50 acres on 28thNovember, 1981 for establishment of a market yard at Rajam byincurring an expenditure of about Rs. 28,000/-. The process wason for construction of godowns, weighing sheds, platforms etc.The Market Committee had appointed corporate to attend to thework of grading of the market produce. Supervising staff hadbeen appointed to inspect the premises of the traders to ensureproper weighment. Thirteen persons had been licensed for theweighment job. Thus, according to the market committee, it hadalready started various services in the market area and theprocess for providing further services was already on. The levy,demand and collection of market fee by the defendant was soughtto be justified on this basis. The defendant also raised a plea thatthe plaintiff--Association had filed a Writ Petition in the HighCourt challenging increase in the market fee. The Writ Petitionhad been dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the Writ Petition,an argument was raised by the learned counsel for the MarketCommittee that the suit was barred by the principles of resjudicata. Although the issue raised in the Writ Petition was onlywith respect to enhancement of the market fee, yet it wassubmitted that the plaintiff could have agitated the question of levyof market fee in the said petition and since it failed to do so, theprinciple of constructive res judicata would come into play. Itwould be deemed that the point which was availableto the plaintiff - Association for being raised at that stage, wasgiven up. The said question therefore, could not be agitated inthe present suit. The learned counsel for the plaintiff did not haveany convincing reply to this argument. However, while goingthrough the record, we find that the earlier Writ Petition beingW.P. No. 1184/78 was filed when Rajam was under the erstwhilePonduru Agricultural Market Committee. It is possible that theargument regarding non-availability of facilities and amenities inthe market area was not available then because PonduruAgricultural Market Committee which had jurisdiction over RaamSub-Taluk, might have been in existence since long and therequisite facilities in the notified on record, in this connection,we are not inclined to non-suit the plaintiff on this ground. Theonly question left for decision in the present appeal is as towhether there has to be quid pro quo for the levy of fee in thesense that services and facilities ought to be available in themarket area before a fee can be levied and if so the extent towhich such services and amenities be available. In other words,it is to be decided as to whether the fee levied by a MarketCommittee in pursuance of power conferred on it under therelevant statute i.e., A.P. Agricultural (Produce & Livestock)Markets Act, 1966, is to commensurate with or in proportion to theservices and facilities provided by the Market Committee to thetraders and purchasers in the market area. To facilitateconsideration of this question, it will be appropriate to noticerelevant provisions of the Act.

3. Section 2(vi) defines market to be a market establishedunder Sub-section (3) of Section 4 and includes market yard andany building therein.

4. Sub-section (vii) defines a Market Committee as aCommittee constituted or reconstituted under the provisions of theAct. Notified market area according to Sub-section (xii) of Section2 means any area declared to be a market area by notificationunder Section 4.

5. Section 4 of the Act contains provision for constitution of aMarket Committee and for declaration of a notified market area.The Government is required to constitute by a notification aMarket Committee for every notified area. The Market Committeeso constituted shall be a body corporate having perpetualsuccession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold anddispose of property. It is the duty of the Market Committee toenforce the provisions of the Act and the rules and the bye-lawsthereunder in the notified area. A Market Committee under Sub-section (iii)is required to establish such number of markets as theGovernment may from time to time direct for the purchase andsale of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products oflivestock. The Market Committee is required to provide suchfacilities in the market as may be specified by the Governmentfrom time to time by a general or special order.

6. Section 12 contains provision regarding levy of fee by theMarket Committee. It is reproduced as under:

'12(1). The market committee shalllevy fees on any notified agricultural produce,livestock or products of livestock purchasedor sold in notified market area [at such rate,not exceeding [two rupees] as may bespecified in the bye-laws] for every hundredrupees of the aggregate amount for which thenotified agricultural produce, livestock orproducts of livestock is purchased or sold,whether for cash or deferred payment or othervaluable consideration.'

7. Section 14(1) provides for Market Committee Fund:

'All moneys received by a MarketCommittee shall be paid into a fund to becalled 'The Market Committee Fund' and thesaid Fund shall be deposited, in a singlebanking account with the nearest Governmenttreasury, or with the sanction of theGovernment, in a Bank. All expenditureincurred by the market committee under or forthe purpose of this Act shall be defrayed outof the said Fund; and any surplus remainingafter such expenditure shall be invested insuch manner as may be prescribed.'

8. Section 15 enumerates the purposes for which the MarketCommittee funds may be expended which are as under:

'Section 15:

Subject to the provisions of Section 14, the MarketCommittee Fund shall be expended for all or any ofthe following purposes namely:-

(i) the acquisition of site for the market;

(ii) the establishment, maintenance andimprovement of the market;

(iii) the construction and maintenance of buildingsnecessary for the market and for the health,convenience and safety of the persons using themarket and maintenance of buildings under thecontrol of the market committee;

(iv) the provision and maintenance of standardweights and measures;

(v) the pay, pensions, leave allowances,gratuities compassionate allowances andcontribution towards leave allowances, pensions orprovident fund of officers and servants employedby the market committee;

(vi) the payment of interest on loans that myraised fit purposes of the market and the provisionsof sinking fund in respect of such loans;

(vii) the collection and dissemination ofinformation regarding all matters relating to cropstatistics and marketing in respect of notifiedagricultural produce, livestock and products oflivestock.

(viii) schemes for the extension of culturalimprovement of notified agricultural produce,livestock and products of livestock within thenotified area, including the grant, subject to theapproval of the Government, of financial aid to theschemes for such extension or improvement withinsuch area, undertaken by other bodies orindividuals;

(ix) propaganda for the improvement ofagriculture, livestock and products of livestock andthrift;

(x) .....

(xi) The promotion of grading services;

(xii) Measures for the preservation of goodgrains;

(xii) -a.....

(xiii) such other purposes as may be specified bythe Government by general of special order.'

9. It is the case of the plaintiff that the Market Committee hadfailed to establish a market yard within the notified market area.The Committee had also to provide facilities like weighing ormarket produce/commodities, laying road, providing storagespace, platforms for grading and displaying of the products.Inspite of passage of considerable time after its constitution, thedefendant -- Committee had not made provision for these facilitiesand amenities in the market area. On account of these failures,the Market Committee was not entitled to levy any fee or cess onthe members of the plaintiff Association. A fee or cess has anelement of quid pro quo which was missing in the present case.Therefore, the levy of fee was illegal according to the plaintiff.The immediate provocation for filing of the suit was the twonotices dated 25th May, 1982 and 8th December, 1982 issued bythe Market Committee to the members of the plaintiff--Associationdemanding market fee from the members. Asalready noted, the trial court accepted the case set up by theplaintiff. However, on appeal the learned District Judge,Srikakulam allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit filed by theplaintiff--Association vide his judgment dated 9th October, 1990.The plaintiff preferred a Second Appeal against the judgment ofthe District Judge. The High Court vide its impugned judgmentdated 20th February, 1992 accepted the appeal and decreed thesuit of the plaintiff upholding the allegation of the plaintiff that theMarket Committee had failed to provide necessary services andamenities in the notified market area and therefore it was notentitled to levy and collect the market fee.

10. So far as the factual aspect of availability of facilities andamenities in the market is concerned, the plaintiff did not lead anyevidence at all. We are left with only the averments in the plaintabout the absence of facilities and amenities in the notified marketarea. There is nothing on record to support the plaint averments.On the other hand, apart from controverting the plea of theplaintiff regarding absence of facilities and amenities in the marketarea in the written statement and stating the necessary factstherein, the defendant led oral evidence on the point by examininga witness who was an employee of the Market Committee. Thewitness stated that after formation of the Market Committee,Government notified the market area as per Section 4(4) of theAct. He produced a copy of the notification as Exh. B.2.According to the witness, the members of the plaintiff-Associationmade applications regarding business in theirpremises. The Committee issued licenses to all the traders tocarry on business in their respective produce. All the traderswere sending monthly statements of the business carried on bythem from their respective premises. The traders had to pay amarket fee at the rate of 1% on the basis of their turnover in themarket. The market Committee had taken possession of a sitecomprising an area of 8.50 acres on 28th November, 1981 forestablishment of regulated market yard at Rajam. Tenders hadbeen called for construction of the market yard. The godowns,grain platforms, weighing sheds, grading platforms were inoperation. Wide publicity was being given about the benefit ofgrading. The Market Committee also appointed supervisory staffto inspect the premises and to ensure that there was properweighment of the commodities being traded in the market. Thesupervisors were, besides ensuring proper weights, verifying theproper payment to the ryots by the traders in respect of the goodssold by the ryots to the traders. The Market Committee wasexhibiting price list in respect of notified agricultural produce onthe notice board. He stated in the cross-examination that themarket yard was already under construction. The witness wascross-examined at length but nothing could emerge to show thathis statement about the services provided in the market was notcorrect.

11. Though according to the trial court and the High Court, theabove facilities or amenities available in the notified market areawere not sufficient so as to hold that facilities and amenities hadbeen made available by the Market Committee in the notifiedmarket area, the learned District Judge, who ordered dismissal ofthe suit, accepted that such facilities had been made available inthe notified market area and this entitled the committee to levymarket fee in terms of Section 12 of the Act. The learned DistrictJudge noted from the evidence of DW 1 that no suggestion hadbeen put to him in the cross-examination that by 1982 the marketyard was not having all the basic amenities. According to thelearned District Judge, it was clear from the evidence of the saidwitness that amenities were being provided in the notified marketarea and the construction of building was in progress. Anotherfact which emerged from the evidence of DW 1 was that MarketCommittee was giving loans to the growers or ryots by way ofcash, loans or by way of supply of manures on credit. Thus theMarket Committee was discharging its functions.

12. The question is whether the market Committee was notentitled to levy, demand and collect market fee till all the facilitiesand amenities are fully and completely in place. The facilitiesalready provided for in the notified market area in the presentcase have been enumerated hereinbefore. What remains to beconsidered is the extent to which services, facilities and amenitiesought to be available in the market area before the market fee canbe levied.

13. The validity of notifications declaring the market area andestablishing the market for notified agricultural produce and thelegality of the levy of market fee came up for consideration beforea Constitution bench of this Court in Lakhan Lal and Ors. etc.v. State of Bihar and Ors. etc. : [1968]3SCR534 . Thiswas a case under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act,1960. On the question of levy and collection of the market fee,this court observed that the fee collected by the MarketCommittee was not excessive and it formed part of the MarketCommittee fund which was set apart and earmarked for thepurposes of the Act such as elimination of unhealthy marketpractices, ensuring the correct weight and grading, disseminationof information regarding prices of agricultural produce etc. It wasobserved that there was sufficient quid pro quo for the levy.

14. Another Constitution bench judgment of this court in KewalKrishan Puri and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. : [1979]3SCR1217 while dealing with provisions of the PunjabAgricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, held that element of quidpro quo must exist for the payer of the fee for the special servicesrendered. The bench noted the well recognized distinctionbetween tax and fee. A fee is a charge for special servicerendered to individuals by the governmental agency and thereforefor levy of fee an element of quid pro quo for the servicesrendered was necessary. Service rendered did not mean anypersonal or domestic service. It meant service in relation to thetransaction, property or the institution in respect of which the feeis paid. The court noted the literal meaning of the phrase quid proquo as 'one for the other' meaning thereby 'you charge fee forthe service.' A significant observation contained in the saidjudgment which is relevant for our purposes is: 'the element ofquid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to beestablished with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly andevenly it must be established, with some amount of certainty,reasonableness or preponderance of probability that quite asubstantial portion of the amount of fee realized is spent for thespecial benefit of its payers. Each case has to be judged from areasonable and practical point of view for finding an element ofquid pro quo'.

15. In Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwar and Ors. v.State of Maharashtra and Ors. : [1981]2SCR866 , thiscourt observed that a place ought not be notified as a marketunless it is ready for use as a market with all reasonable facilitiesand conveniences. A view was expressed that a notification maybe quashed if nothing had been done beyond publishing anotification. In cases where some facilities and conveniences havebeen provided for while some other remain to be provided, thecourt may instead of quashing the notification give appropriatetime bound directions for providing necessary facilities andconveniences. The present is not a case of total absence offaculties and amenities in the market area. It has come inevidence that steps are being taken to improve and extend theservices and the work was actually in progress in that behalf. Infact there is an admission on the part of the plaintiffs-associationthat after all the facilities were provided in the market they hadstarted paying the market fee as levied by the Market Committee.This is an admission of the fact that the steps for providing all therequisite facilities which were on when the suit was filed, came tobe completed during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, so faras the present case is concerned, the challenge to levy andcollection of market fee does not appear to be having any force.

16. In Sreenivasa General Traders and Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh and Ors. : [1983]3SCR843 , the challengewas to the constitutional validity of the increase in the rate ofmarket fee levied by the market committees in the State ofAndhra Pradesh under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act.There was no challenge to levy of market fee, only the increase inrate of the fee was under challenge. The challenge was based onthe argument that there was no quid pro quo for the increase inrate. We must note here that levy of market fee under Section12(1) is correlated to the purposes mentioned in Section 15 forwhich the proceeds of the Market Committee Fund are to beexpended. All the purposes are beneficial to the growers and thetraders. There was no material to show that the marketcommittees were rendering no service or were incurringunauthorized expenditure. The court also referred to earlierdecisions and discussed the same.

17. Regarding Kewal Krishan Puri's case (Supra), it wasobserved that the case did not lay down any legal principle ofgeneral applicability. The fact was that the Market Committees inPunjab were making money by way of collection of market feeand had huge surplus funds. The surplus funds were beingdiverted by the State Government to purposes other than thoseunder the statute. Though the funds were being utilized forlaudable public purposes, yet the utilization was outside thepurpose spelled out in the statute. It was observed:

'The traditional view that there must beactual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone asea change in the subsequent decisions. Thedistinction between a tax and a fee lies primarilyin the fact that a tax is levied as part of acommon burden, while a fee is of payment of aspecific benefit or privilege although the specialadvantage is secondary to the primary motive ofregulation in public interest. If the element ofrevenue for general purpose of the Statepredominates, the levy becomes a tax. Inregard to fees there is, and must always be,correlation between the fee collected and theservice intended to be rendered. In determiningwhether a levy is a fee, the true test must bewhether its primary and essential purpose is torender specific services to a specified area ofclass; it may be of no consequence that theState may ultimately and indirectly be benefitedby it. The power of any legislature to levy a feeis conditioned by the fact that it must be 'by andlarge' a quid pro quo for the services rendered.However, correlationship between the levy andthe services rendered (sic or) expected is ofgeneral character and not of mathematicalexactitude. All that is necessary is that thereshould be a 'reasonable relationship' betweenthe levy of the fee and the services rendered.'

18. While dealing with the question of difference between a taxand a fee, the Court observed:

'There is no generic difference between atax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions ofmoney by public authorities. Compulsion lies inthe fact that payment is enforceable by lawagainst a person in spite of his unwillingness orwant of consent. A levy in the nature of a feedoes not cease to be of that character merelybecause there is an element of compulsion orcoerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate ofa fee that it must have direct relation to theactual service rendered by the authority to eachindividual who obtains the benefit of the service.It is now increasingly realized that merelybecause the collections for the servicesrendered or grant of a privilege or licence aretaken to the consolidated fund of the State andnot separately appropriated towards theexpenditure for rendering the service is not byitself decisive. Presumably, the attention of theCourt in the Shirur Mutt cases was not drawn toArticle 226 of the Constitution. The Constitutionnowhere contemplates it to be an essentialelement of fee that it should be credited to aseparate fund and not the consolidated fund. Itis also increasingly realized that the element ofquid pro quo in the strict sense is not always asine qua non for a fee.'

19. On the question of increase in market fee, the Court had tosay:

'In the present case, there is no allegationanywhere by any of the petitioners, nor was anycontention advanced that there was anyunauthorized expenditure by any of the marketcommittees for purposes not authorized by theAct. There is only a bare assertion on their partthat there are surplus funds available with themarket committees and therefore the increase inthe rate of market fee from 50 paise per hundredrupees to rupee one was without lawfuljustification. From the material on record it isquite apparent that the income from the marketfee derived by some of the market committees isnot sufficient to meet the expenditure incurredby them. That apart, when the petitionersconcede that they do not challenge the levy ofmarket fee at 50 paise per hundred rupees inthe year 12972, there can be no basis forchallenging the increase in the rate of marketfee from 50 paise to rupee one in 1978. Surelythe cost of rendering services hascorrespondingly increased with the fall in thevalue of rupees. In the economic sense, 50paise of 1972 is certainly equivalent to at leastrupee one of today. If not more.'

There is no material placed on record bthe petitioners to show that the marketcommittees are rendering no service. Under thescheme of the Act, there are certain obligatoryduties of a market committee. Sub-section (3) ofSection 4 provides that every market committeeshall establish in the notified area such numberof markets as the Government may, from time totime, direct for the purchase and sale of anynotified agricultural produce, livestock orproducts of livestock and shall provide, suchfacilities in the market as may be specified bythe Government from time to time by a generalor special order. Chapter V provides for variousregulatory measures in Rules 54 to 73 for thecontrol of a market in that correct weighmentswould be secured, storage facilities providedand equal powers of bargaining assured so thatthe growers may bring their agricultural produce,livestock and products of livestock to the marketand sell them at a reasonable price. There wasnot a whisper during the course of thearguments that the market committees were notproviding the services as enjoined by Rules 54to 73.'

20. Another important aspect dealt with in this case in aboutwhen the services are to be completed. The followingobservations are pertinent:

'It will be notified that these facilities are tobe provided by the market committees in courseof time 'as and when funds permit'. It isneedless to stress that the question of providingthese facilities would depend on the financialcapacity of each market committee. That woulddepend on whether there are sufficient fundsavailable at its disposal in the market committeefund.'

21. The observations noted above in Sreenivasa's case havesimplified out task to a great extent. It follows that while quid proquo between levy of fee and facilities provided in the notifiedmarket area is necessary, exactitude in such matters is neitherrequired nor possible. The traditional view about actual quid proquo has undergone a sea change. The extent ofservice/amenities cannot have correlation with the fee levied.Secondly, the market committees can continue their efforts forproviding the amenities depending on availability of funds withthem. It is not that all the required services must be in placebefore a fee can be levied.

22. It was in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri (Supra) that thisCourt said that for a valid levy of market fee on the agriculturalproduce bought or sold by the licensees in a notified market area,the amount of fee realized must be earmarked for renderingservices to the licensees in the notified market area and a goodand substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended forthis purpose. However, gradually the concept of expending agood and a substantial portion of the market fee collected by themarket committee has been toned down. Most of the relevantstatutes have provision for creation of Market Committee Funds,All market fee which is collected goes into the Fund. The statutesalso contain provisions as to how the Fund is to be utilized. Thepowers of market committees to utilize the Funds are thuscircumscribed by the statutes. The Funds are utilized only for thefacilities in the markets and for the benefit of the members,producers, growers and traders. When the Funds are in any caseto be utilized for specified purposes, the observation in Puri'scase to the effect that a good and substantial portion of it must beshown to be expended, does not have much significance. InSreenivasa Traders and other later cases, it has been acceptedthat the market committees may keep on extending the servicesand facilities in the notified market area as per availability of fundswith them.

23. In the case in hand, the levy of market fee by the marketCommittee was challenged only on the ground that no basicamenities or services were provided in the notified market areaand therefore the Market Committee had no right to levy, demandand collect the market fee. We have noted from the evidence onrecord that the market Committee had made provision for certainservices and facilities in the notified market area and efforts werebeing made for extending the services. The market committeehad recently come into existence and completion of all theintended services and facilities takes time. It has clearly emergedfrom the evidence of DW 1 that steps were being taken forextending the services and facilities in the market area. Theplaintiff has led no evidence to contradict the defendant'sevidence. Whether particular services and amenities areavailable at a given place and the extent thereof are question offact which require to be proved or demolished on basis ofevidence to be led by the parties concerned. Since the plaintiffhas not led any evidence whether oral or documentary in supportof its case, the Court is left with no option but to accept theevidence of defendant which shows that some services andfacilities in the notified market area were already available whilearrangements were being made for various other facilities andservices. The foundation for the case set up by the plaintiff is notavailable on record. The law is well settled that though quid proquo is required in relation to a fee which is charged and collectedby a market committee, the quid pro quo cannot be in exactproportion to the fee levied. Mathematical proportions are notpossible in such matters. We have accepted that some servicesand amenities were already provided for in the notified marketarea which fully justified the levy of market fee. We are thusunable to agree with the finding of the High Court that the marketcommittee had failed to provide any services or amenities in thenotified market area. The findings of the High Court areaccordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. As a result of this,the suit filed by the plaintiff, respondent herein, shall standdismissed. There will be no order as to costs.


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