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Smt. Jaswinder Kaur Kooner Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectDirect Taxation
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in[2007]291ITR80(P& H)
AppellantSmt. Jaswinder Kaur Kooner
RespondentCommissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredIn Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India
Excerpt:
- haryana urban(control of rent and eviction)act,1973[har.act no.11/1973] -- section 4(2)(b): [m.m. kumar, hemant gupta, ajay & kumar mittal, jj] determination of fair rent held, the fair rent of building under the section is to be determined on the basis of rent agreed between landlord and tenant preceding the date of application. in the absence of rent agreed between parties the basic rent is required to be determined on the basis of rent prevailing in locality for a similar building or rented land on the date of application. if on the date of filing of the application under section 4 of the act for determination of fair rent, the agreed rent was still in vogue thus, it has to be regarded as the basic rent and the same would be constituted as the basis for determining fair rent. ..........jurisdiction under section 127 of the income-tax act, 1961, (for short, 'the act') being void, reassessment proceedings were void on that ground. the tribunal followed its earlier order dated june 30, 2004 in the case of the asses-see (i.t.a. nos. 80 and 81 of 2000). in the said order, the tribunal observed that the assessee had the knowledge of the order and did not challenge the same at the relevant forum and that the same could not be set aside in assessment proceedings by the assessing officer or the commissioner of income-tax (appeals).4. the only question which arises for consideration is whether the assessee could be allowed to challenge an order of transfer under section 127 of the act in the assessment proceedings.5. the scope of assessment proceedings under the act is.....
Judgment:

1. This appeal has been preferred by the assessee against the order dated August 26, 2004, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, Amritsar (for short, 'the Tribunal') in I.T.A. No. 287/(ASR) of 2001, for the assessment year 1993-94, proposing the following substantial questions of law:

(i) Whether the compliance of Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has been made in the present case ?

(ii) Who would have the jurisdiction to decide the case of the appellant and whether the provisions of Section 127 in all its facets have been complied with ?

2. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 2,44,243 rejecting the plea of the assessee that investment in construction of the house was out of agricultural income and not unexplained income. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal but upheld the addition of Rs. 1 lakh. On further appeal, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer.

3. The assessee had also raised a plea that the order of transfer of jurisdiction under Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (for short, 'the Act') being void, reassessment proceedings were void on that ground. The Tribunal followed its earlier order dated June 30, 2004 in the case of the asses-see (I.T.A. Nos. 80 and 81 of 2000). In the said order, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had the knowledge of the order and did not challenge the same at the relevant forum and that the same could not be set aside in assessment proceedings by the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

4. The only question which arises for consideration is whether the assessee could be allowed to challenge an order of transfer under Section 127 of the Act in the assessment proceedings.

5. The scope of assessment proceedings under the Act is confined to determining the income of the assessee and liability to tax. The officer to whom jurisdiction is transferred and who derives jurisdiction from such an order, cannot question the validity of such an order. If the assessee is aggrieved by an order of transfer, the remedy of the assessee is to challenge such an order in independent proceedings either before the higher administrative authorities as per the Act or in any independent proceedings by way of writ petition or otherwise. If no such challenge is made at the initial stage, the issue cannot be raised in appeal against the assessment order.

6. In Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India : [1957]31ITR565(SC) , the hon'ble Supreme Court observed while upholding the power of transfer that inconvenience to the assessee or likelihood of misuse of provision could not be a ground to declare the said provision to be void but if there was abuse of the power, appropriate remedy could be taken. The relevant observations are (page 589):

It follows, therefore, that Section 5(7A) of the Act is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and also does not impose any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade or business enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. If there is any abuse of power it can be remedied by appropriate action either under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution and what can be struck down is not the provision contained in Section 5(7A) of the Act but the order passed thereunder which may be mala fide or violative of these fundamental rights. This challenge of the vires of Section 5(7A) of the Act, therefore, fails.

7. In Ajantha Industries v. CBDT : [1976]102ITR281(SC) , it was observed by the hon'ble Supreme Court (page 286):

Mr. Sharma also drew our attention to a decision of this court in S. Narayanappa v. CIT : [1967]63ITR219(SC) where this court was dealing with Section 34 of the old Act. It is clear that there is no requirement in any of the provisions of the Act or any section laying down as a condition for the initiation of the proceedings that the reasons which induced the Commissioner to accord sanction to proceed under Section 34 must also be communicated to the assessee. The Income-tax Officer need not communicate to the assessee the reasons which led him to initiate the proceedings under Section 34. The case under Section 34 is clearly distinguishable from that of a transfer order under Section 127(1) of the Act. When an order under Section 34 is made the aggrieved assessee can agitate the matter in appeal against the assessment order, but an assessee against whom an order of transfer is made has no such remedy under the Act to question the order of transfer. Besides, the aggrieved assessee on receipt of the notice under Section 34 may even satisfy the Income-tax Officer that there were no reasons for reopening the assessment. Such an opportunity is not available to an assessee under Section 127(1) of the Act. The above decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable.

8. The assessee having not raised the objection as to jurisdiction at the appropriate time before the Assessing Officer cannot be permitted to take up the issue in appeal.

9. In view of the above, no substantial question of law arises.

10. The appeal is dismissed.


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