Swatenter Kumar, J.
1. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court dated 20th May, 1982, vide which the Court accepted the appeal preferred by the Municipal Committee, Lohharu, against the judgment and decree of the learned trial court dated 11.3.1981. The challenge to the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court is based by the learned counsel for the appellants mainly on two grounds:-
I. That appropriate notice was not served upon the appellants in accordance with the provisions of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 so as to empower the authority to take any further action or to obstruct the plaintiffs from carrying on their business:
II. The costs, in relation to shops, question was wrongly calculated by the Municipal Committee and the findings of the learned trial Court in that regard ought not to have been disturbed by the learned first appellate Court and also contends that no application was submitted by the plaintiffs for agreeing to pay the balance amount.
2. Based on these two submission, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that the judgment of the learned first appellate court, thus, is perverse and not in accordance with the settled principle of law which itself amount to substantial question of law.
3. In order to examine the merits or otherwise of these contentions, it may be appropriate to refer to necessary facts, giving rise to this Regular Second Appeal.
4. Girdhari Lal and five other plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction stating that they were licencees/tenant with the Municipal Committee for considerable time. However, their shops were demolished during emergency period, without awarding any compensation. Thereof the Municipal Committee had demanded certain amount from them in relation to plots No. 31, 33 to 35 and 43 to 45 of Rs. 2,050/- Rs. 950/-, Rs. 825/-, Rs. 1,825/- Rs. 1,350/-, Rs. 940/- and Rs. 1,025/- respectively.
5. According to the plaintiffs the said amount was demanded in full and final settlement as sale consideration of the property in question, which they had paid and thereafter they had become owners and not liable to pay any further amount. However, Municipal Committee co-opted the amount wrongly and issued notice dated 10th March, 1979 to the plaintiffs asking them to pay the balance amount, failing which the property would be resumed. Constrained with the circumstances, the plaintiffs filed suit before the court of competent jurisdiction.
6. The suit was contested by the Municipal Committee on the ground that the suit was not maintainable in face of provisions of Section 52 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 as well as agreed price of the plot was to be paid at the rate of Rs. 75/- per square yard, which the plaintiffs had not paid and, therefore, notices were issued to the plaintiffs calling upon them to pay the balance amount. All these averments were specifically stated in the written statement. It was also stated that plaintiffs had moved an application agreeing to make the payment, however, in installment.
7. On the pleadings of the parties, following seven issues were framed:-
1. Whether the suit plots were sold to the plaintiff for the prices mentioned in para No. 4 of the plaint? OPP
2. Whether the suit plots were sold to the defendants at the reserved price at Rs. 75/- per sq. yard, as approved by D.C., Bhiwani to the plaintiff? OPD
3. Whether any notice under Section 52 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 was required to be served on the defendants? OPD
4. If issue No. 3 is proved was any such notice served on the defendants? OPP
5. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction as alleged in preliminary objection No. 4 of the written statement? OPD
6. Whether the suit has been under valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD
7. Relief.
The learned trial court answered issues No. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs and decided issue No. 3 and 4 against the defendants and consequently vide its judgment and decree dated 11th March, 1981 decreed the suit of the plaintiffs with costs and restrained the defendant from recovering any further amount from the plaintiffs. Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned trial court, the Municipal Committee preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, which was accepted and the judgment and decree of the learned trial court was set aside, giving rise to the present appeal.
8. Firstly, I am of the considered opinion that no question much less substantial question of law arises in the present appeal. The learned first appellate court has, on the basis of the record, and upon appreciation of evidence led by the parties has rejected the contentions of the present appellants. The learned first appellate court, noticed the contentions raised by the parties, stating that the application, which was submitted by the plaintiffs, was duly signed by other plaintiffs except Girdhari Lal. The persons viz Jagdish Parshad and Mahabir Parshad, who have singed the exhibits AW1/1 and AW1/2 have not stepped into the witness box denying this fact. Taking cumulative effect of the evidence and relying upon these two exhibits, in addition to the approval of the price by the Deputy Commissioner, vide letter exhibit AW1/4, the learned first appellate court set aside the finding on issue decided against the plaintiffs while dismissing suit.
9. It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs in their plaint itself made no definite averments. The Plaintiffs in paragraph 4 of the plaint had stated that consolidated amounts were claimed which they had failed to pay. If that be, one cannot understanding why would the plaintiffs aver in the same paragraph that they had signed certain blank papers. If they had signed the blank papers, the heavy onus to prove what is pleaded in paragraph 4 of the plaint read in conjunction with paragraph 6 and averments of fraud made in paragraph 5 of the plaint was on them. Much less leading any evidence in that regard, the plaintiff did not even choose to file replication to the written statement filed by the Committee, denying these averments and making definite averments with regard to the agreeing of the appellant to pay the balance amount as well as fixation of rate by the Deputy Commissioner. The facts averred in the written statement, if are not specifically denied, would be deemed to be correct. It was for the plaintiffs to step into the witness box and deny these document and offer reasonable explanation for such conduct. Only one plaintiff stepped into the witness box while remaining did not even care to step into the witness box.
10. In light of the above observation, I find no reason to interfere with the judgmentof the learned first appellate court. The present appeal also does not involve any substantial question of law. Thus, in light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inthe cases of Kaluram v. Shrinathdas and Ors., J.T. 2000(5) S.C. 490, Chandra Bhan v. Pamma Bai and Anr., J.T. 2000(4) S.C. 399 and Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and Anr., J.T. 1999(2) S.C. 183, this appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.