Judgment:
Hemant Gupta, J.
1. Challenge in the present revision petition is to the order passed by the Courts below on an application under Order 39 Rule 2 A of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. The plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction alongwith an application for grant' of ad interim injunction. On such application, defendant No. 1 suffered the following statement on 13.11.2001:
The defendant refused to accept service of summons. However, Sh. G.S. Dhaliwal, Advocate, filed power of attorney on behalf of the defendant. Adjournment requested for filing written statement and reply to stay application. The plaintiff counsel submits that defendant is bent upon to demolish the wall forcibly. Defendant is present and stated at bar that he will not demolish the said wall. In view of which, case is adjourned to 22.11.2001 for filing written statement and reply to the stay application.
3. The defendant filed written statement on 22.11.2001, but on the aforesaid date no interim order was granted, but on 24.11.2001 at about 6.00 PM as per the plaintiff, defendant demolished the wall. Since, the defendant demolished the wall allegedly in violation of the statement given in the Court on 13.11.2001, the petitioner filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2 A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been dismissed by the Courts below, primarily for the reason that the statement of the defendant that the wall shall not be demolished was valid till 22.11.2001, whereas the wall is allegedly demolished on 24.11.2001, when there was no injunction, therefore, no order is required in terms of Order 39 Rule 2 A of the CPC.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has admitted during the course of hearing that the suit in which such statement was made stands dismissed. In view of this fact, two questions arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the statement of the defendant on 13.11.2001 was operative and valid on 24.11.2001?
(ii) Whether the application under Order 39 Rule 2 A of the Code of Civil Procedure would be maintainable after the suit has been decided and when the interim order granted during the pendency of the proceedings stands merged with the final order?
5. Both the Courts have taken a view that the statement of the defendant not to demolish the wall was operative till 22.11.2001. The statement, as reproduced above, does not specifically say so. However, the Court has granted time for filing of the written statement and reply to the stay application. It was, thus, for the interregnum period that defendant made a statement that he shall not demolish the wall. Therefore, the view taken by the Courts below that the statement of the defendant that he shall not demolish the wall was valid till 22.11.2001, is a possible view. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the view taken by the Courts below.
6. However, in respect of the second question, the matter was directly to an issue in a judgment reported as Darshan Singh v. Sadha Singh and Ors. (2002)131 P.L.R. 680, wherein it has been held that after the suit has been decided, the proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2 A of the Code of Civil Procedure are not maintainable.
7. The Division Bench of this Court in Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh : AIR 1985 Punjab and Haryana 299 has held that proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2 A of the Code of Civil Procedure are to seek compliance of the ad interim order as it is evident from the reading of the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2 A of the CPC as the detention is for the period till such time the injunction order is complied with. Once the injunction order is complied with the defaulter cannot be detained in civil prison. It was held to the following effect:
From the combined reading of the provisions of these two subrules, it appears that their purpose if the enforcement of the injunction and not the punishment for its disobedience. From the phraseology used in the said rule, it is further evident that detention in the civil prison and attachment of the property are to continue for a specified period and that too only during the continuance of the disobedience of the breach. In the case of detention in the civil prison, the court is empowered to release the person guilty of disobedience or breach even prior to the expiry of the maximum period of three months and obviously it can be ordered only if the disobedience or breach discontinues. Similarly, attachment of the property cannot remain in force for more than one year and has to be withdrawn if any time prior thereto the disobedience discontinues. It would not be possible for the court to order the sale of property if the disobedience or breach comes to an end prior to the period of one year. Similar are the provisions contained in Rule 32 of Order 21 which relates to the enforcement of a decree for permanent injunction. It cannot be disputed that the measures contained in Rule 32 are intended only to enforce the decree and not for awarding any punishment to the judgment-debtor for its disobedience. The conclusion, therefore, appears to be irresistible that the provisions of Rule 2-A are meant for enforcing an ad interim injunction and not for punishing the person guilty of such disobedience.
8. In view of the aforesaid judgment, the purpose of introduction of provisions of Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure is to provide a mechanism to seek compliance of the orders passed by the Civil Court. It is not the proceedings for Contempt of Court governed by the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of this Court in Smt. Rajinder Kaur v. Sukhbir Singh 2002(1) Civil Court Cases 125, to contend that the proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A do not come to an end with the decision of the suit. Though the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Rachhpal Singh's case (supra) was noticed in Smt. Rajinder Kaur's case (supra) and it was noticed that the application under order 39 Rule 2A is not maintainable after the interim order stands vacated. But it was found that the proceedings for Contempt of Court can still be initiated. Present is not a case for Contempt of Court proceedings.
10. The jurisdiction under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 vests with this Court and not with the Civil Judge. Therefore, the application under Order 39 Rule 2 A could not have been entertained by the learned trial Court after the suit was dismissed. Though in appropriate cases, the jurisdiction of this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 could be invoked.
11. In view of the above, I do not find any patent illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the Courts below, which may warrant interference by this Court in the present revision petition.
Dismissed.