V.K. Bali, J.
1. Petitioner/landlord lost his case on merits before the Rent Controllers his petition for eviction filed under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent/Restriction Act was dismissed on 25.1.1981. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order, petitioner preferred an appeal which has been dismissed being barred by time. It is against this order of the appellate authority dated 24.3.1982, that the present petition has been filed.
2. It is the conceded position that learned Rent Controller dismissed the petition on 21.5.1981 and that the petitioner made an application to obtain certified copy of the order on 28.5.1981 and the same was supplied to him on 26.6.1981. It is again conceded position that Civil Courts remained closed from 16.6.1981 to 15.7.1981 and once again it is the conceded position that the appeal came to be preferred before the appellate authority on the next day i.e., 16.7.1981. Learned appellate authority held that appeal was barred by time on the basis of the judgment of Kerala High Court rendered in Jokkim Ferauez v. Amiua Kunhi Umma, A.I.R. 1974 Kerala 162 which in turn had followed the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 209 and Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1335.
3. Mr. Sarin, learned counsel representing the petitioner vehemently contends that limitation was to be counted as per the provisions contained in Section 29 and Section 4 of the Limitation Act, which read as under:-
'29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.'
'4. Expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed- Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court reopens.'
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further cites judgments of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Civil Revision No. 495 of 1957 decided on 10.1.1961 to contend that Sections 29(2) and 4 of the Limitation Act would apply to rent proceedings under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act.
5. As mentioned above, after the period for which civil Courts remained closed is excluded, the appeal would be within limitation. Learned counsel representing the respondents has not been able to controvert the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner by raising any meaningful argument but to support the order of the appellate authority on the basis of the judgments referred to above.
6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that provisions of Sections 29(2) and 4 of the Limitation Act were applicable to the facts of the case. That apart, Section 15 of the Rent Restriction Act which provides for filing of appeal also vests the said authority with the power to enlarge the time beyond 15 days. It may be mentioned here that time prescribed for filing appeal is 15 days under the Rent Restriction Act. Section 15(b) of the Act which is relevant for determining the issue involved in this case reads as under:-
'15(b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may within fifteen days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the period of fifteen days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.'
7. It the appellate authority had power to enlarge the time, in my view there could not be a better case then the one in hand where time should have been enlarged. Petitioner could not have filed the appeal in vacuum. It was necessarily to be filed in Court. If the Court was not functioning and no appeals were being entertained the petitioner had absolutely no choice but to present the appeal when the Court reopened.
8. As mentioned above, appeal was filed on very first day when the Courts reopened.
9. In view of what has been stated above, I set aside the order of the appellate authority dated 24.3.1982 and remand the case for decision on merits.
10. Parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the appellate authority on 10.3.1999. Since the matter herein is pending for a period of about 20 years, appellate authority would endeavour its best to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible and preferably within three months from the date of parties put in appearance.