Judgment:
K. Kannan, J.
1. Revision is against the order directing eviction of the tenant in favour of the landlord who had applied under Section 13B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The tenant had obtained leave to defend originally contending that the landlord was living away at Canada and having immovable property at Canada. Later, he filed a written statement specifically denying that the landlord was an NRI within the definition of Section 2(dd) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and that he required the premises bona fide for his occupation since it was admitted by the landlord that he had yet another portion of property where he was running the business. The Rent Controller rejected the contention of the tenant and upheld the claim for eviction.
2. The primary contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner was that the landlord did not fulfill the requirements of the definition of Non-resident Indian since the landlord has no intention to settle down permanently outside India. According to him, a person who merely goes in and out of India and visits his son outside India but who has no intention to settle outside India could admit him of the Non-resident Indian status. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would lay emphasis on Section 2(dd)(c) under which the landlord claims the status that a person settled outside India 'for any other purpose' shall be a person who has a definite intention to stay outside for an uncertain period would require a clear intention to stay outside India and would not apply to a person, who is only residing in India and who has also been contesting for election in India. The expression 'uncertain period', occurring in the Section, according to him, shall have to be understood in the context of how the amendment permitting a Non-resident Indian to apply for eviction by a special procedure brought through the Punjab Act 9 of 2001 introducing Section 13B to the statute book. Reading the statement of objects and reasons for introduction of the amendment, learned Counsel points out that the State Legislature was enacting the provision, responding to the representations of NRIs, who had spent long years of their life abroad but did not find the conditions congenial in their own countries, on their return, either to settle down or take up any business. Learned Counsel would read these objects as guiding the legislative intent that a person who is otherwise residing permanently in India and who goes in and out of the country cannot claim such a status to obtain the benefit of the law.
3. It will be an elementary rule of interpretation of statute that where the language of the provision is clear, there shall be no need to allow the objects and reasons to govern the interpretation. The fact that the representation came from persons, who had been living away from India for several years cannot mean that every person, who is an NRI shall be a person, who shall be a resident in a foreign country for several number of years. It would cause a violence to the clear meaning that the words employed in the definition of NRI admits of. All that the law requires would be that either a person is employed outside India or must be a person carrying on a business or a vocation outside India or for any other purpose as would indicate his intention to stay outside India. 'Any other purpose' is residuary in character, which would include persons without employment or without business or occupation. Evidently, there shall be ever so many instances, where a person in his old age, who does not take up employment or who does not carry on a business looks to one's own child in a foreign country for support in the twilight years of his life. It is indeed a social aspect of Indian life that elderly parents looks to their own children for support. In this case, the fact that the landlord's son was living away in Canada is an admitted fact. The fact that the landlord has obtained a permanent resident status issued by the Government of Canada is also one, which is brought through documentary evidence that cannot be impeached. Without such a permanent status perhaps it should have been difficult for the landlord himself to claim such a status if he was merely visiting his son on a tourist visa. These are the instances, which the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself illustrated in its decision in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini : J.T. 2005(12) S.C. 442 when it points out to situation of persons who undertake certain courses or degrees in a University or a person, who would stay outside India for a short period as a tourist as not qualifying in the definition of NRI. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, was not really examining the Section in all its facets to bring out instances of when a person cannot claim a NRI status. The definition as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 21 of the judgment in the above decision was repelling the contention that the landlord who returned to India shall be a person who shall come back to India for good with no intention to go back. The Hon'ble Supreme Court extended the definition to even include persons who had settled permanently outside India. Section 2(dd)(c) says that the person, who remains outside India shall have his intention to stay as such. The residence itself could be either permanent or temporary as the initial words in the Section gives out. In my view, the landlord, who had secured a permanent resident status at Canada could not have been admitted to such status without his intention to stay outside India.
4. Learned Counsel wants to point out to the circumstances that the landlord had admitted in his evidence that he had returned to India six months prior to the filing of the petition and on reading that the petition itself had been filed only on 23.05.2002, it was pointed out that if his initial contentions were accepted, it would almost seem like that he had gone out of India and returned even within a period of six months to present the petition and therefore, even his length of stay abroad could not have been for a period of six months. He would so read the provision that a person such as the landlord, who has all his interests only in India and who has been only residing here in India, doing his business would never have any intention to stay outside India permanently. The problem arises by reading the definition clause itself disjointedly. The Section does not state anywhere that the intention to stay outside India shall be for a long period. In fact, the Section talks about an intention to stay outside India for an uncertain period. The expression is flexible enough to even accommodate instances of persons, who happen to stay outside India for a short period, if only it is uncertain. The length of stay is not the criterion but it is the intention that has to be looked into. Here, the fact that the landlord has obtained a permanent resident status at Canada that assumes significance. Without an intent to stay outside India, it will be well-nigh impossible to obtain such a permanent resident status. Although the permanent resident cards that had been filed into Court was stated to be valid fill 2008, the learned Counsel for the respondent quickly points out in response to an argument from the counsel for the petitioner that status was also extended upto 2013. However, what is important for our consideration is that on the date when the petition was filed and when the proceedings were pending, the landlord was granted a permanent resident status, which was valid at the time when the proceedings were taken up by the Court and the order was passed. Under the circumstances, I reject the contention of the revision petitioner that the landlord does not fulfill the status of a Non-resident Indian.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also points out that the need of the landlord was itself not clearly proved by the fact that admittedly the property purchased by him in the year 1991 contained two items, one of which was rented out and stated to be in the occupation of his brother for running a tent house. In his own evidence in Court, he had admitted that he was running the tent house. Here the evidence was not as clear to say that it was only in the property purchased by him that he was running the tent house. The above statement that he was running the tent house shall be read from out of the whole evidence, where he has made another statement that it was his brother, who was running the tent house at the property, which was purchased by him. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that the landlord does not fulfill the requirement of law for establishing his personal need. Admittedly, he does not own any other property apart from what was purchased under the document in the year 1991 in the same town and if it should be granted that his brother was running the business in the other property, there is no reason to suspect the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord. Learned Counsel for the petitioner points out that the brother himself was not examined in this case but I find no serious flaw in the non-examination of his brother when there was a categorical statement that it was only the brother, who was the owner of the tent shop and not himself.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also states that the property which the landlord had purported to have purchased in the year 1991 cannot still claim the benefit since he was not shown to be an NRI for a period of 5 years prior to the filing of the petition. While the period of 5 years has a bearing to the ownership of the property prior to the filing of the petition, the said period has no bearing to the ascertainment of status of the person as such NRI. We cannot import into the Section more than what Section 2 (dd) itself provides for and it will be wrong, in my view, to juxtapose the definition of Nonresident Indian to the qualification which the specific landlord makes in requiring the Non-Resident Indian to own a property for a period of 5 years prior to the filing of the petition. As I have observed, the five years period has relevance only to the possession of the property and not to his status as such. 7. Considering all the relevant facts and circumstances, I have no hesitation to confirm the order passed by the Rent Controller and dismiss the civil revision.
8. Civil revision petition is dismissed. Time for eviction shall be four months.