R.P. Sethi, J.
1. Alleging mala-fides against Sardar Beant Singh, Chief Minister, of Punjab, the petitioner has prayed for the issuance of a direction to the respondents for releasing him in all cases known or unknown. It is submitted that the petitioner who is an Ex. I.P.S.. Officer and a former Member of Parliament has been raising number of social issues in the Court in the public interest which allegedly caused embarrassment to the Government and the head of the Government with the result that he took the matters personally and allegedly put the petitioner behind the bars on flimsy cases. It is contended that the petitioner filed a public interest litigation in this Court praying for an independent probe into the case of alleged molestation of Ms. Katia. It is submitted that in the said case the grand son of the respondent Chief Minister, was involved. It is further claimed that Gurkirat Singh who is the grand-son of the Chief Minister had to remain behind the bars for nearly two month' on account of initiation of the proceedings against him by the petitioner. It is contended that the Chief Minister made a statement to the Press in New Delhi in December, 1994 declaring that the petitioner would be arrested soon. The petitioner was arrested on 5-1 - 1995 from Bassi Pathana and produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib on 6-1-1995. At that time it was disclosed that the petitioner had been arrested in FIR No. 108 dated 26-12-1994 registered at PS Sirhind under Sections 124A, and 153A of the Indian Penal Code and FIR No. 70 dated 13-8-1994 registered at P. S. Sirhind under Section 153A, of I.P.C. He is also shown to have been arrested in another FIR dated 5-1-1995 registered at P. S. Sirhind for an offence under Section 506, I.P.C. and other offences. The petitioner filed a bail application for his release in FIR dated 26-12-1994 and was granted bail by the Sessions Judge, Patiala. He moved another application for bail in FIR registered against him on 5-1 -1994 and 13-8-1994 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Fatehgarh-Sahib who also granted him bail in FIR dated 5-1 -1995 but no bail could be granted to him in FIR dated 24-8-1994 because the prosecution had allegedly changed the offences to Section 124A, I.P.C. The Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehagarh Sahib, however, granted him bail in that case also. Despite the fact that the petitioner had been granted bail in all the aforesaid three cases, he could not be released from Jail as another case was registered against him at Police Station Khanna vide FIR No. 89 dated 15-8-1994 under Section 124A, and 153A, I.P.C. and under Section 4 of the TADA. It is submitted that all the FIRs. registered against the petitioner contains similar allegations and contents of speeches made by the petitioner. It is further submitted that the petitioner has filed Criminal Misc. No. 1087-M of 1995 in this Hon'ble Court seeking quashing of the FIR. The Police party from Beas is also stated to have come before the Judicial Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib and sought petitioner's police remand in FIR No. 59 dated 27-8-1994 for offences under Sections 3 and 4, of TADA. The remand was, however, refused by the Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner was again produced in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Talwandi Saboo on 27-1-1995 in FIR No. 32 dated 29-4-1994 for offences under Sections 124A and 153A, I.P.C. He was again produced at Ludhiana on 30-1-1995 in another FIR allegedly registered way back in the year 1992. It is alleged that the petitioner was produced in the Court in handcuffs allegedly on the ground that the petitioner made statements in the Press declaring his intention to file case against the extension granted to Mr. K. P. S. Gill, Director General of Police. It is contended that new unknown cases are being brought against the petitioner only with the purpose of keeping him behind bars at any cost allegedly due to personal vendatta of the Chief Minister.
2. On 2-2-1995 while issuing notice of motion we asked Shri S. S. Shergill, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, to accept notice and to file reply disclosing the number of cases registered against the petitioner alongwith the copies of the FIRs, for our perusal. In reply, Annexure R has been filed which gives information regarding the cases registered against the petitioner till that date. The particulars of the cases are as follows:
______________________________________________________________________________________________
S. Particulars of the case Present position Date of arrest Custody
No.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
1. FIR No. 108 dt. 26-12-94 Under Section 124A, IPC, Under 5-1-95 Judicial
153A IPC, Section 3 Police (incitement to disaf- investigation custody
fection Act, 1922 P.S. Sirhind (FGS)
2. FIR 2 dt. 4-1-95 Under Section 353, 186, 506 IPC PS -do- 6-1-95 -do-
Sirhind (FGS)
3. FIR 70 dt. 13-8-94 Under Section 153A, IPC, P.S. -do- 6-1-95 -do-
Sirhind (FGS)
4. FIR 89 dt. 15-8-94 Under Section 124A, IPC and Sec- -do- 20-1-1995 -do-
tion 4 TADA, PS Khanna
5. FIR 59 dt. 27-8-94 Under Section 124A, IPC, 153A, -do- Yet to be -do-
IPC and 3/4 of TADA PS Beas (Majitha) arrested
6. FIR 32 dt. 29-4-94 Under Section 124A, 153A, IPC P. -do- 27-1-95 -do-
S. Talwandi Sabho (Bathinda)
7. FIR 71 dt. 11-9-92 Under Section 123/124A, IPC, 153A -do- 30-1-95 -do-
307, IPC and 3/4 TADA Act PS Dehlon(Jagraon)
8. FIR 75 dt. 18-9-92 Under Section 124A IPC, 153A IPC -do- Yet to be -do-
and U/s3,4,5,6ofTADAPSJaito(Faridkot) arrested
9. FIR 124 dt. 18-12-93 Under Section 124A IPC, 153A Under trial 23-12-93 -do-
IPC P.S. Sadar, Ropar.
10.FIR 19 dt. 10-2-92 Under Section 171C, 153A, 124A, Under Yet to be -do-
295-A, 506 and 120-B, IPC P.S. Civil Lines,Patiala. Investigation arrested
______________________________________________________________________________________________
3. In the detailed reply by way of affidavit of Karnail Chand Banga, Deputy Secretary to Government, Punjab, Department of Home Affairs and Justice, it is submitted that the present petition had been filed in the Court with the oblique motive of discrediting the State administration with mala-fide intention. It is submitted that the public interest litigation in Ms. Katia's case was filed by the petitioner knowing fully well that the Police had already not only identified the accused but had actually arrested them and kept in the jail. The fact that the petitioner had been a Member of Indian Police Service and thereafter a Member of Parliament has not been disputed. It is, however, submitted that despite his election as Member Parliament, the petitioner stood disqualified as he refused to take Oath under the Constitution in the Parliament. The petitioner is alleged to have failed a number of frivolous and vexatious petitions in the public interest. He is stated to have acted as meddlesome interloper and wayfarer. It is submitted that in the garb of public interest he has deprived the general public of their right of being heard, the filing of public interest litigation by the petitioner has been termed to Personal Interest Litigation. The suggestion of the petitioner that on account of his filing a public Interest Litigation in Katia's case, the State Administration was enraged has vehementally been denied. It is submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 5-1 - 1995 at Bassi Pathanan and produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib on 6-1-1995. He was arrested in connection with the aforesaid FIRs. registered for the commission of the alleged substantive offences. It is brought to the notice of the Court that despite the grant of the bail, the petitioner has not furnished bail bond in case FIR No. 70 dated 13-8-1994 registered at P. S. Sirhind and case FIR No. 2dated 4-1-1995 of P. S. Sirhind. It is stated that the petitioner in fact does not want to come out of the Jail for reasons best known to him as is evident from the non furnishing of bail bonds despite Court orders. The arrest of the petitioner is allegedly on account of his declared intention to file a case against the extension of Mr. K. P. S. Gill, Director General of Police has vehementally been denied being incorrect. All cases registered against the petitioner are attributed to be in his knowledge. The petitioner, is alleged to have addressed a number of meetings wherein he made inflammatory speeches declaring the creation of a separate State of Khalistan out of India. It is submitted that as the petitioner is involved in cases under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short the 'TADA') he is not entitled to the grant of any relief from this Court. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to approach the Designated Court for the grant of appropriate relief in accordance with the provisions of law as contained in TADA and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, governing the grant of bail in such cases.
4. Sardar Beant Singh, Chief Minister, respondent has filed his personal affidavit stating theirein -
'That in reply to press statement mentioned in Para No. 5 of the writ petition, it is submitted that no date of alleged statement made by the deponent has been mentioned. It is further submitted that the copy of the press statement alleged to have been made by the deponent, has not been attached, with the writ petition. Moreover, Press statement is not a reliable piece of evidence. It is, therefore, not possible to give any further reply to para 5 of the petition.'
5. We have heard elaborate arguments in the case and perused the record.
6. It is not acknowledged that the petitioner is involved in various criminal cases as detailed in Annexure R/11. Some of the cases registered against him are under the provisions of TADA. It is also admitted that the petitioner has already been directed to be released on bail in FIR No. 108 dated 26- 12-1994 of P. S. Sirhind, FIR No. 70 dated 13-8- 1994 of P. S. Sirhind and FIR. No. 32 dated 29-4- 1994 of P. S. Talwandi Sabho (Bhatinda) However, in FIR No. 89 dated 15-8-1994 of P. S.Khanna, FIR No. 59 dated 27-8-1994 of P. S. Beas, FIR No. 71 dated 11-9-1992 of P. S. Deholon (Jagraon) and FIR No. 75 dated 18-9-1992 of P. S. Jaitu (Faridkot) the petitioner is alleged to have committed amongst other offences punishable under the TADA.
7. The writ jurisdiction is normally exercised in cases in which ordinary legal remedies are not adequate. Even though there is no specific bar for this Court to issue appropriate writs, orders or directions even in cases where alternative remedy is available yet as a matter of caution and prudence it would not be resorted to unless it is shown that such alternative remedy was not efficacious. The powers of the High Court are guided by self imposed restrictions. The writ petition cannot be termed to be a substitute of ordinary criminal remedy. In Master Hari Singh v. State of Haryana, 1994 (2) Ren CR 4 it was by this Court:
'the power of the Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution for the purposes of quashing the criminal prosecution are circumscribed and can be exercised only in proper eases for the enforcement of fundamental or legal rights or where it manifestly appears that there was a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged offence where the allegation in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value are accepted in their entirety. The High Court is not required to embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question was reliable or not which is the function of the trial Court or the Magistrate(.) Similarly, the powers in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked or permitted to be invoked or utilised by a litigaht which may ultimately result in holding of parallel investigation by the Court and preventing the investigating agency to discharge its duties and functions as entrusted under the Criminal Procedure Code. It would not be a healthy practice if a person accused of an offence is permitted in all cases to come to the High Court at the stage of investigation with the prayer of quashing the proceedings on the ground that no offence was made out despite the fact that the investigation had not yet commenced or was pending. The High' Court should be reluctant to interfere at the stage of pendency of investigation....'
8. In 'Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat' : 1988CriLJ938 ; the Supreme Court observed that TADA was an extreme measure to be resorted to when the police is not in a position to tackle the position under the ordinary Penal law. A special machinery is provided under the Act to combat a great menace of terrorism in different parts of the country. It was held by the Supreme Court in that cases:-
'The legislature by enacting the law has treated terrorism as a special criminal problem and created a special Court called a designated Court to deal with the special problem and provided for a special procedure for the trial of such offence. A grievance was made before us that the State Government by notification issued under Section 9(1) of the Act has appointed District & Sessions Judge as well as Additional District and Sessions Judges to be Judges of such Designated Courts in the State. The use of ordinary Courts does not necessarily imply the use of standard procedures. Just as the legislature can create a special Court to deal with a special problem, it can also create new procedure within the existing system. Parliament in its wisdom has adopted the frame-work of the Code but the Code is not applicable. The Act is a special Act and creates a new class of offences called terrorist acts and disruptive ' activities as defined in Sections 3(1) and 4(2) and provides for a special procedure for the trial of such offences Under Section 9(1), the Central Government or a State Government may by notifications published in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Designated Courts for the trial of offences under the Act for such area or areas, or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. The jurisdiction and power of a Designated Court is derived from Act and it is the Act that one must primarily look to in deciding the question before us. Under Section 14(1), a Designated Court has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of offences under Act and by virtue of Section 12(1) it may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. Where an enactment provides for a special procedure for the trial of certain offences, it is that procedure that must be followed and not the one prescribed by the Code.'
It was further held,
'There is thus a total departure from different classes of Criminal Courts enumerated in Section 6 of the Code a new hierarchy of Court is sought to be established by providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment or order of a Designated Court, not being an interlocutory order and substituting the Supreme Court for the High Court by Section 20(6) in the matter of confirmation of a death sentence passed by a Designated Court.'
9. The Supreme Court in 'State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid JT 1.994 (7) SC 660 held that if there was debatable area regarding the commission of the offence under the TADA, the same was not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and the gamut of procedure under the TADA is required to be followed including challenging the order of the Designated Court under Section 19. The High Court should not venture to perform a laboured exercise of scrutinising the materials. The disputed facts could not be determined on their face value and their correctness is required to be gone into only at the time of trial. The Supreme Court in that case held :-
'Before we go into the merits it is desirable to determine the limitations of power of the High Court under Article 226 in this Court. In the State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed : 1994CriLJ415 after holding that the High Court in writ petition under Article 226 can interfere only in extreme cases where charges ex facie do not constitute offence under TADA it was held in paragraph 7 at pages 669-70 as under :-
'the first question: is: Whether the High Court was empowered in the present case to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to examine the correctness of the view taken by the Designated Court and to quash the prosecution of the respondent under the TADA Act Shri Jethmalani contended, placing reliance on the decisions in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab : 1960CriLJ1239 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 Cri LJ 527 that in the facts of this case, the High Court had such a jurisdiction since there is no accusation against the respondent in the charge- sheet filed in the Designated Court which, if believed, must result in his conviction for an offence punishable under TADA Act. We are not impressed by his argument of Shri Jethmalani. It is no doubt true that in an extreme case if the only accusation against the respondent prosecuted in the Designated Court in accordance with the provision of TADA Act is such that ex facie it cannot constitute an offence punishable under TADA Act, then the High Court may be justified in invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the detention of the accused is not under the provisions of TADA Act. We may hasten to add that this can happen only in extreme cases which would be rare and that power of the High Court is not exercisable in cases like the present where it may be debatable whether the direction accusation made in conjunction with the attendant circumstances, if proved to be true, is likely to result in conviction for an offence under TADA Act. The moment there is a debatable area in the case, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution and the gamut of the procedure prescribed under TADA Act must be followed, namely, raising the objection before the Designated Court and, if necessary challenging the order of the Designated Court by appeal in the Supreme Court as provided in Section 19, of TADA Act. In view of the express provision of appeal to the Supreme Court against any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Designated Court, there is no occasion for the High Court to examine merits of the order made by the Designated Court that the Act applies. We have no doubt that in the present case wherein the High Court had to perform the laboured exercise of scrutinising the material containing the accusation made against the respondent and the merits of the findings recorded by the Designated Court holding that the provisions of TADA Act were attracted, there was sufficient indication that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not available. The ratio of the decisions of this Court in R. P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal on which reliance is placed by Shri Jethmalani, has no application to the facts of the present case. There was thus no justification for the High Court in the present case to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for examining the merits of the controversy much less for quashing the prosecution of respondents Abdul Hamid in the Designated Court for offences punishable under TADA Act.' From the above quotation it is clear if there is a debatable area it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the gamut of the procedure prescribed under TADA must be followed including challenging the Order of the Designated Court under Section 19. It is also clear that the High Court cannot perform a laboured exercise of scrutinising the materials.'
After referring to various judgments and the facts of the case, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court on the ground that the High Court had wrongly appreciated the evidence at the pre-trial stage.
10. In view of the judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court and of various High Courts, it is held that the High Court would not be justified in entertaining a petition where upon the allegations made in the FIR or the accompanying documents an offence under the TADA is alleged to have been committed. This limitation may not be applicable where it is proved on admitted facts that no offence under the TADA is made out but where the determination regarding the commission of the offence is dependent upon the appreciation of evidence of rival contentions the High Court would refrain from exercising its jurisdiction and leave the parties to approach the Designated Court or the Supreme Court for the grant of appropriate relief. The High Court would also be empowered to protect the civil liberties of a citizen in appropriate cases where the action of the respondent is found to be actuated by mala-fides or held to be contrary to the established principles of law.
11. It has been argued in the instant case, that upon the accusation made no offence under the TADA is made out against the petitioner. The Act has been enacted to make a special provision for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Under Section 4, of the TADA a person is liable to be punished for disruptive activities. Section 4, of the Act provides:-
'4. Punishment for disruptive activities -
(1) Whoever commits or conspires or attempts to commit or abets, advocates, advises, or knowingly facilitates the commission of, and disruptive activity or any act preparatory to a disruptive activity shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), 'disruptive activity' means any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever,-
i) which questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; or
ii) which is intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly or indirectly for the cession of any Part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union.
Explanation., For the purposes of this sub-section
(a) 'cession' includes the admission of any claim of any foreign country to any part of India, and
(b) 'Secession' includes the assertion of any claims to determine whether a part of India will remain within the Union.
(3) Without pre-judice to the generalityof the provisions of Sub-section (2), it is hereby declared that any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever, which-
a) advocates, advises, suggests or incites; or
b) predicts, prophesies or pronounces or otherwise expresses, in such manner so to incite, advise, suggest or prompt, the killing or the destruction of any person bound by oath under the constitution to uphold the soverignty and integrity of India or any public servant shall be deemed to be a disruptive activity within the meaning of this Section.
(4) Whoever harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any disruptionist shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.'
12. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, : 1995CriLJ517 the Court dealt with the problem of terrorism. Even though 'terrorism' is not defined under the Act, yet the Court summarised it as under:-
''Terrorism' is one of the manifestations of increased lawlessness and cult of violence. Violence and crime constitute a threat of an established order and are a revolt against a civilized society. 'Terrorism' has not been defined under TADA nor is it possible to give a precise definition of 'terrorism' or lay down what constitutes 'terrorism'. It may be possible to describe it as use of violence when its most important result is not merely the physical and mental damage of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or has the potential of producing on the society as a whole. There may be death, injury, or destruction of property of even deprivasion of individual liberty in the process but the extent and reach of the intended terrorist activity travels beyond the effect of an ordinary crime capable of being punished under the ordinary penal law of the land and its main objective is to overawe the Government or disturb harmony of the society or 'terrorise' people and the society and not only those directly assaulted, with a view to disturb even tempo, peace and tranquility of the society and create a sense of fear and insecurity. A 'terrorist' activity does not merely arise by causing disturbance of law and order or of public order. The fall out of the intended activity must be such that it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to tackle it under the ordinary penal law. Experience has shown us that 'terrorism' is generally an attempt to acquire or maintain power or control by intimidation and causing fear and helplessness if the minds of the people at large or any section thereof and is a totally abnormal phenomenon. What distinguishes 'terrorism' from other of violence, therefore, appears to be the deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation. More often than not, a hardened criminal today takes advantage of the situation and by wearing the cloak of 'terrorism', aims to achieve for himself acceptability and respectability in the society because unfortunately in the States effected by militancy, a 'terrorist' is projected as a hero by his group and often even by the misguided youth, it is therefore essential to treat such a criminal and deal with him differently than an ordinary criminal, capable of being tried by the ordinary courts under the penal law of the land. Even though the crime committed by a 'terrorist' and an ordinary criminal would be overlapping to an extent but then it is not the intention of the Legislature that every criminal should be tried under TADA, where the fall out of his activity does not extend beyond the normal frontiers of the ordinary criminal activity. Every 'terrorist' may be a criminal but every criminal cannot be given the label of a 'terrorist' only to set in motion the more stringent provisions of TADA. The criminal activity in order to invoke TADA must be committed with the requisite intention as contemplated by Section 3(1) of the Act by use of such weapons as have been enumerated in Section 3(1) and which cause or are likely to result in the offences as mentioned in the said-section.'
13. In the instant case, it is alleged that the petitioner has been advocating, propagating, abetting and advising disruptive activities by his speeches when he questioned the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. He is alleged to be preaching cessation of a part of Indian Territory for carving out of an independent State of Khalistan. In F.I.R. No. 89 dated l5-8-1994 of P.S. Khanna (Annexure R/4), the petitioner is alleged to have made a speech to the following effect:-
'I have got confidence on Jathedar Tohra, this country cannot now remain one. Between Hindustan and Pakistan this shall be an independent state, which shall be called Khalistan, today on this martyr's land we should take an oath that we have to take independence, whose slogan shall he Khalistan. I shall teach you, say after me, Khalistan. The people repeated three times like him. After this they raised slogans Zindabad, Zindabad. People said Khalistan after this said that by peacefully methods while asking for Khalistan, Beant Singh Government arrests us then when we came out then Khalistan shall be made.'
14. Similarly, in F.I.R. No. 59 dated 21.-8-1994 of P.S. Majitha, the petitioner is alleged to have made the following speech :-
'... In America passed a resolution to a fact that a separate sikh home land should be formulated, when sikhs can live independently and its name should be as Khalistan and I say there should be no Khalistan athlete there shall be Khalistan because the sacrifices which have been done for cause of Khalistan shall not be allowed to go spare/waster in 1992 one person gave me an affidavit that his son has been killed by the Police and I say that if your son has been killed they should give me there affidavits which I shall sent the same to U.N.O. and due to my efforts only the transfer of 136 Policemen has been made and only in Sangrur Distt. C.B.I., has started enquiries and registered cases against Policeman. In Ruada minority of community 20 Lakh people have been killed by the Major and they continued there agitation and struggle, in Punjab, 1 Lakh 10 thousand Sikh Youth have lost their lives and 70,000 are behind the Bars and when other Govt. comes into power, the list of 20000 people will be made and action will be taken against them, Sant Bhindrawala has made a lot of sacrifices for us and Punjab Govt. is again ready to send me in Jail But I have no grudge against this because Sikh Community is behind me and I will make independent and then rest and I have not come to say that you make me the Head of S.G.P.C. or Chief Minister of Akali Dal but I have come to say that you should keep your hands open for independence and people have given me a new life and will keep on giving my services to you and you all should raise slogans for independence....'
15. In F.I.R. No. 71 dated 11-9-1992 of P. S. Dehlon (Ludhiana) (Annexure R/7), the petitioner is alleged to have made the speech to the following effect :-
'... The police should know it that we have not left alive Indira Gandhi, General Vaidya and other Generals persons who had harmed the Sikhs, though he may be Ruberio or not. Beant Singh has challenged us and we accept his challenge and we will return him the same kind, as Indira Gandhi and General Vaidya has been returned the kind (Bhaji).
They have 36000 Armymen, 60000 Punjab Police, 25000 Home Guards and 25000 SPOS and many thousand C.R.P.F. men are with them and K.P.S. Gill has stated that he will finish the Sikhs by September. If Pakistan and China give their Army to me then I will hoist the flag of Khalistan at Lai Qilla within 15 days. We want Khalistan and whosoever demands Khalistan, this cruel government ends his life.
16. He further stated that he will surely get Khalistan, though all the Sikhs are sacrificed. Though we may have to kill Hindus, we do not accept the Constitution. After forming Khalistan we will form our own constitution. Ready and oil your arms. We will route out the Brahmanwad. Near the stage, Gurchetan Singh son of Jagir Singh Jat resident of Bahadur was also speaking in favour of Khalistan and distributing the Pamphlets which have been got published by Simranjit Singh Mann and therein wrong propaganda has been made to instigate the public. After his arrest from him 2300 pamphlets have been recovered which have been taken into possession by the police separately. Simranjit Singh Mann by addressing the people gathered in such hot words and stating about the murders of Indira Gandhi and General Vaidya and by threatening to murder Beant Singh Chief Minister Punjab, in his address, and for hoisting Khalistan flag on Lal Qilla....'
17. According to the allegations made in F.I.R. No. 75 dated 18-9-1992 of P. S. Jaito, Faridkot (Annexure R/8), the petitioner is alleged to have made the following speech :
'... The Sikh community while living in India does not want to call them inferiors and of minority community. The army of the present India cannot live in Khalistan and also raised slogans Indian Army must go back Khalistan Zindabad, Kharku Jathebandi zindabad, and they will not live underthe Brahaman's regime and also stated that in case the Indian Army does not go back and then the Khalistan Army made by him, at the point of gun would make to run away the Indian Army. We will not let live any Hindu in Khalistan. We by forming our Khalistan Raj, will become separate from India. In case any individual of India or Army or any other force took any action against us then we will fight them with our full force....'
18. According to the allegations made in F.I.R. No. 19 of P.S. Civil Lines, Patiala (Annexure R/10), the petitioner is alleged to have declared to topple the Indian Government with an armed struggle. He is alleged to have stated,' Hindus should be compelled to leave Punjab. Hindus temples are to be demolished and instead Gurdwaras will be built. This may be a separate armed Khalistan will be carved and Khalsa Raj will be established.'
19. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents have submitted that as the petitioner is guilty of offences punishable under the TADA, this Court should not exercise its constitutional powers to issue any directions for his release. The learned counsel for the petitioner has impliedly admitted the delivery of speeches by the petitioner but, however, submitted that his client had not advocated violence. Be it as it may, we are not inclined to adjudicate at this stage as to whether the petitioner is guilty of offences punishable under the TADA lest it may pre-judice the case of any one of the parties. We are, however, of the opinion that the pleas raised in the case require this Court to perform a laboured exercise of scrutinising the material which is not warranted.
20. We are also of the view that the allegations of mala-fide made by the petitioner in the instant case are vague and ambiguous. The petitioner has alleged that the Chief Minister of Punjab had declared to arrest him allegedly for his moving this Court in Katia's case. The allegations made by the petitioner do not indicate the time and the place of making the allegation. The allegations have been denied by the Chief Minister. The vague allegations cannot be made a basis for holding the existence of mala-fides. The mere fact that the petitioner and the Chief Minister are political rivals is not sufficient to return a finding regarding the alleged existence of mala-fides.
21. We are also not inclined to return a finding as to whether the litigation initiated by the petitioner was for the public or for his person as the matter is stated to be sub-judice before this Court.
22. We are, therefore, not inclined to issue any direction with respect to the cases in which the accused is charged of having committed offences under the TADA. He is, however, at liberty to move the Designated Court for the grant of bail in accordance with the provisions of law.
23. The petitioner is stated to have already been released on bail in F.I.R. Nos. 108 dated 26-12-1994 of P.S. Sirhind, 2dated4-1-1995 P.S. Sirhind and 70 dated 13-8-1994 of P.S. Sirhind. In case F.I.R. No. 124 dated 18-12-1993 registered at P.S. Sadar, Ropar, the petitioner is directed to be released on bail on his furnishing bail bond in the amount of Rs. 1000/- with personal bond of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Court having jurisdiction to try the said case.
24. With the above order and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of.