Judgment:
Viney Mittal, J.
1. The prayer made in the present application No. 17033 of 2002 is for staying the operation of order dated October 8, 2001 passed by the Lok Adalat. Through C.M. No. 4377 of 2002 the State of Haryana-respondent has separately filed objections against the aforesaid order passed by the Lok Adalat. The averments made in the CM No. 4377 of 2002 whereby the objections have been filed against the order of the Lok Adalat may be noticed as follows;
'....2. That in the above noted writ petition reply was filed by the State and the Hon'ble High Court was pleased to refer the matter to the Lok Adalat 27.8.2001. However, it, is pertinent to mention here that under Section 20(4) of the legal Authority Act, no compromise or settlement between the parties has been effected. Therefore, the order dated 8.10.2001 passed by the Hon'ble Lok Adalat is presently without jurisdiction and liable to be recalled in the interest of justice.
3. That before the Lok Adalat the parties could not arrive at a compromise or settlement, and the matter was contested between the parties.
4. That as no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties. It was mandatory for the Lok Adalat to return the case to the Hon'ble High Court for proceeding further in the matter and deciding the same on merits. Reference in this connection may be made to the provisions of Section 20 (5) & (6) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Here in after called the 1987 Act.
5. That the Lok Adalat has passed the order dated 8.10.2001 giving direction to the respondents to accommodate the petitioner, who is otherwise qualified to be appointed as such, in the service under the instructions referred to above within two monthsfrom receipt of copy of this order, It had no jurisdiction to do so. The above noted writ petition had been field under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution and only the Hon'ble High Court in the discharge of its constitutional functions, had the power to issue any writ or direction. The Lok Adalat has no such power either under the provisions of the Constitution or of the 1987 Act.'
2. Some facts which are relevant for the present controversy may be noticed as follows:
The present Civil Writ Petition No. 5777 of 1995 was filed by petitioner Anita Chauhan under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to absorb her in Government service on compassionate ground in view of the policy of the State Government. It was stated that the husband of the petitioner died while in service, therefore, she was entitled to be appointed on ex-gratia base, as per policy.
It was averred by the petitioner in the writ petition that husband of petitioner Varinder Singh Chauhan was appointed as a Math Master in the Haryana Education Department on December 15, 1986. A copy of the appointment order of the aforesaid Varinder Singh Chauhan has been attached as Annexure P/3 with the petition which shows that he was appointed on purely temporary (as ad hoc in the pay scale of Rs. 525-1025 plus other admissible allowances). Unfortunately the husband of the petitioner died on September 3, 1990 leaving behind the present petitioner i.e. his wife and a daughter aged three months. It is averred in the petition that the petitioner at the time of death of her husband was possessing the qualification of B.A. B.Ed, and, therefore, she submitted an application for her absorption in the State service on December 17, 1990. She repeated her request and issued reminders in that regard but since the petitioner was not absorbed in the State service on compassionate ground, therefore, she filed the present writ petition.
Upon notice issued to the respondents, a written statement has been filed by respondents No. 1 to 3. In the written statements, the claim of the petitioner has been contested by the respondents stating that since Varinder Singh husband of the petitioner was working as a Math Master on ad hoc basis in the department and there is no provision to absorb the family member of a deceased employee working on adhoc basis and to grant other pensionary benefits, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to be absorbed in service on compassionate ground and also was not entitled to any other kind of pensionary and other benefits. It was specifically stated that as per the State Government policy dated December 22, 1970 which has been attached as Annexure P/5 with the petition had been amended and as per amended policy, the benefit of employment on ex gratia and other pensionary benefits were to be granted only to the family member of the deceased employee working on regular basis and not on adhoc basis.
3. Vide an order dated August 27, 2001 the writ petition was ordered to be placed before the Lok Adalat on October 8, 2001 on which date the matter was taken up by the Lok Adalat when the following order was passed:
'The present case is fully covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this High Court in Vijay Kumar Vashisht v. State of Haryana, CWP NO. 8408 of 1991 decided on August 12, 1991, which was further followed in Kailash Chandra and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., 1992(2) SLR 646, that the instructions of the State Government for appointment on compassionate grounds on account of death of Government employee would equally apply to adhoc employees.
The present petition is filed by Anita Chauhan whose husband Varinder Singh Chauhan was employed as a Math Master on adhoc basis on December 15, 1986. He died in 1990 and thereafter several representations were made by the petitioner claiming appointment as teacher under the instructions of the State of Haryana. In the written statement filed by the State of Haryana, stand has been taken that such instructions Annexure R-1 are only applicable to regular employees and not to adhocemployees. These instructions were issued in 1972.
In view of the decisions referred to above, this writ petition deserves to be allowed with the direction to the respondents to accommodate the petitioner, who is otherwise qualified to be appointed as such, in the service under the instructions referred to above within two months from receipt of copy of this order.
Copies of the order be supplied to the counsel for the parties.
The file of the case be returned to the Registry of the High court for being put up before the Bench of the High Court in case of filing of objections by any of the parties for not consenting to the proposed order and for disposal of the writ petition on merits according to law.'
4. It is against this order passed by the Lok Adalat that the objections have been filed by the respondent through CM No. 4377 of 2002. Specific objections have been raised to the order of the Lok Adalat which have been reproduced above in the earlier part of this judgment.
5. A perusal of the order passed by the Lok Adalat shows that at no stage there was any settlement or a compromise ever entered at the Lok Adalat. On the other hand, the Lok Adalta chose to decide and adjudicate the controversy in question basically on the ground that the same was covered by the two Division Bench judgments of this Court. Since there was no settlement or a compromise ever so recorded in the proceedings before the Lok Adalat, therefore, the Lok Adalat itself had granted a liberty to either of the parties a right of filing the objections for not consenting to the aforesaid proposed order.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. I have also gone through the order dated October 8, 2001 passed by the Lok Adalat. A perusal of the aforesaid order does not show that in fact, at any state, any consent was ever given by the respondent-State of Haryana and Ors. for decision of the case by way of settlement. In this view of the matter the order dated October 8, 2001 passed by the Lok Adalat is nothing else but an adjudication of the controversy on merits by the Lok Adalat. In my opinion, this was totally beyond the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat and was in fact a clear infringement of the jurisdiction of the High Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. The Lok Adalat is constituted under Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Certain relevant provisions of the Act are reproduced as under:
'Section 19 Organisation of Lok Adalats-Sub-sections (1) to (4) xxxxx(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of-Section 20 Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats-Sub-sections (1) and (2) xxxxx
(3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under Sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under Sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties.
(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity fair play and other legal principles.
(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court, from which the reference has been received under Sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law.
(6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalt on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in Sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advice the parties to seek remedy in a court.
(7) Where the record of the case is returned under Section (5) to the court, such court shall proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before such reference under Sub-section (1).
Section 21 Award of Lok Adalat:- (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under Sub-section (1) of Section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1970.'
22. Powers of Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat: (1) The Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat shall for the purposes of holding any determination under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of the following matters namely:-'
9. Thus a perusal of the aforesaid relevant provisions of the Act, shows that a Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any case pending before: or any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of and is not brought before any court for which the Lok Adalat is organised.
10. In Sub Section 4 of Section 20 of the Act, the Lok Adalat while determining any reference before it has to make an earnest endeavor to get the matter compromised or settled between the parties and would be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles. However, it has been mandatorily provided under sub Section 5 of Section 20 of the Act that where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it the court, from which the reference has been received under sub Section (1) for disposal in accordance with law. A further provision has been made in sub Section 6 of Section 20 of the Act that where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in Sub-section (2) that Lok Adalat shall advice the parties to seek remedy in a court. On such receipt of the record back in the court under Sub-section 7 of Section 20 of the Act such court shall proceed to deal with such case from the state which was reached before such reference under Sub-section (1).
11. It is thus apparent from the perusal of the various provisions of the Act that whereas the Lok Adalat has been constituted under the Act, the entire purpose of the constitution of such Lok Adalat was to induce settlement between the parties and to make such efforts which may reach to a compromise. However, if such reconciliation, settlement or compromise is not arrived at between the parties in spite of the best efforts made by the Lok Adalat, then the Lok Adalat has no other role to play and at that stage shall send back the record of the case to the court from where the case was received for adjudication in accordance with law. However, in the present case the Lok Adalat without making any effort for getting the matter settled or compromised chose to adjudicate upon the controversy on the ground that the said matter was fully covered matter by two Division Bench judgments of this court. It may also be noticed that the stand taken by the respondents in the written statement was not even noticed by the Lok Adalat while adjudicating upon the controversy. In any case since the sine-qua-non for taking cognizance of a dispute by the Lok Adalat is the settlement between the parties or a compromise on the basis of which an award can be rendered by the Lok Adalat, therefore, the order dated October 8, 2001 passed by the Lok Adalat is totally without jurisdiction.
12. The matter with regard to the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat is not res-integra, rather has been authoritatively decided by the two Division Bench judgments of thiscourt namely F.A.O. No. 798 of 1999 Kamal Mehta v. General Manager, Rajasthan Roadways Transport Corporation and Anr.1 decided on November 7, 2001 and Sham Lal Sharma v. State of Haryana and Ors.2, (2002-2)131 P.L.R. 188.
13. Certain observations made in Kamal Mehta's case (supra) may be noticed with advantage:
It will be seen from a conjointed reading of Section 19 to 21 that the sine qua non for the conferment of jurisdiction on a Lok Adalat is its acceptance by both parties. This is clear from Sub-section (i) of Section 20 wherein the matter can be referred to a Lok Adalat on the agreement of the parties or on an application made to the Court by one party for referring the case to the Lok Adalat and it is only if the Court is prima facie satisfied that there are chances of a settlement that the matter can be referred to the Lok Adalat. Sub-section 3 thereof makes the intention even more explicit and stipulates that it is only after the parties have agreed to refer the matter to a Lok Adalat that the Adalat shall have jurisdiction to proceed in the mater and to arrive at a compromise or settlement. Sub-section 4 and 5 clearly spell out the guide-lines to be followed by the Lok Adalat and in case it has not been able to effect a compromise or settlement, the record of the case has to be returned to the Court from which the reference had been made for disposal in accordance with law and an obligation rests on the Lok Adalat under Sub-section 6 to advise the parties that as the matter has not been settled before the Lok Adalat, they should seek their remedy in Court. Sub-section 7 visualises the procedure to be followed by the Court after the matter has been sent back by the Lok Adalat and clearly provides that the Court will proceed to deal with the matter from the stage which was reached before the matter had been referred to the Lok Adalat under Sub-section (i).
We now examine the two orders passed by the Lok Adalat on November 24, 2000 and April 27, 2001 which have been reproduced above in extenso. It will be observed that the respondent-Corporation had repeatedly expressed its unwillingness to have the matter settled through the Lok Adalt and its counsel had also withdrawn from the case at one stage and it was a bit of arm twisting that had brought him back to Court. The request of the Corporation to have the matter decided by the Court was declined by the Lok Adalat vide its order dated November 24, 2002. It is further clear that even when the final order was made on April 27, 2001, the respondent-Corporation had not given its consent to the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat. For the Lok Adalat therefore, to pass an award on the merits of the controversy and to determine the quantum of compensation with liberty to the Corporation to file objections against the award by dubbing its award as a settlement to our mind, was wholly without jurisdiction. Black's Law dictionary (7th Edition) describes a 'compromise' as 'an agreement between two or more persons to settle matters in dispute between them' and a 'settlement' as 'an agreement ending a dispute or law suit.' The common feature of both these terms is an 'agreement' between the parties and are, therefore, more or less interchangeable. The dictionary further defines agreement as 'a mutual understanding between two or more persons about their relative rights and duties regarding past or future performance; a manifestation or mutual assent by two or more persons.' We are, therefore, of the opinion that as the respondent had not acquiesced or agreed to the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat, the proceeding taken by it were well beyond its jurisdiction and clearly impinged upon and used the appellate power of the High Court. It was incumbent on an objection first raised to have returned the record to the High Court under Sub-section (5) to be dealt with as per Sub-section (6) and (7) of Section 20 of the Act. Not only this, even on the day when the award was being made on April 27, 2001, the learned counsel had again expressed his reservations but the Lok Adalat had nevertheless chosen to give its award on the merits of the controversy. It will be clear from the above discussion that the Lok Adalats have been conceptualised as agencies wherein matters can be amicably compromised and settledby mutual agreement. These words have been repeatedly used in the statute and if such an agreement cannot be reached, the Lok Adalat must divest itself of the controversy and must itself refer or advise the parties to approach a Court. It is true that the respondent-Corporation has been left with the liberty to file objections but this procedure is unknown to proceedings under the Act and clearly violates the principle of the finality of an award of a Lok Adalat envisaged under Section 21. This is a clear transgression on the power of the appellate Court,'
14. Even in Sham Lal's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held that the jurisdiction and power to decide cases by adjudicating upon the issues of fact and law exclusively vest in the regular Courts and whereas the Lok Adalats play an important complementary role by assisting the Courts in expeditious disposal of cases by way of compromise or settlement, they cannot assume the role of regular courts and decide the cases de-hors compromise and settlement.
15. It may also be pertinent to notice here that the Lok Adalats are the creation of the statute namely Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. They derive their existence, constitution and power from the aforesaid statute. Thus the entire jurisdiction and power of the Lok Adalats would follow from the aforesaid statute and from nowhere else. Unlike a civil court which enjoys pleanary powers in the Civil disputes under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also enjoys inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code, there are no such general powers with the Lok Adalats.
16. In this view of this matter also the exercise of jurisdiction without any consent by the Lok Adalat in passing the order dated October 8, 2001 was without jurisdiction and, therefore, the aforesaid order is liable to be set aside.
17. Before parting with this judgment I must notice the submissions made by Shri J.S. Bagga, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner with regard to his reliance upon Sections 22-C and 22-E of the Act. On the basis of the provision of Sections 22-C and 22-E of the Act, Shri Bagga has submitted that after the induction of the aforesaid provisions by Act No. 37 of 2002, the Lok Adalat could give an award even if there was no amicable settlement between the parties to the dispute. Shri Bagga submits that in view of the aforesaid provisions, order dated October 8, 2001 passed by the Lok Adalat was absolutely within the powers of the Lok Adalat. However, I do not agree with the submissions made by Shri Bagga. Firstly Chapter 6-A of the Act has been inserted by Act No. 37 of 2002 and has become operative with effect from June 22, 2002. Thus, the order of the Lok Adalat which was passed on October 8, 2001 could not be supported on the basis of the provisions which came into existence much later. Even otherwise the aforesaid Chapter 6-A deals with pre-litigation conciliation and settlement. Even Section 22-C lays down that 'any party to a dispute may, before the dispute is brought before any court, make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for the settlement of the dispute....'
18. In view of the above, it is abundantly clear that the entire Chapter 6-A including the provisions of Sections 22-C and 22-E would only be attracted to pre-litigation conciliation and would have no application to a dispute which was already pending in a court of law and which had been referred to the Lok Adalat by the order of the Court. Thus, this submission made by Shri J.S. Bagga, learned counsel for the petitioner has absolutely no force and cannot be accepted.
19. In view of the above, I allow CM No. 4377 of 2002 and set aside the order dated October 8, 2001 passed by the Lok Adalat. In view of the fact that objection petition filed by the respondent-State of Haryana has been allowed by me, CM No. 17033 of 2002 for setting aside the order has been rendered infructuous.
20. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, I order that the main writ petition to be heard on merits on November 28, 2002.
21. A copy of this order be also placed in the file of CWP No. 6735 of 1987 (RoopLal v. State of Haryana) wherein vide a separate order of the even date I had allowedthe similar objections against the order of the Lok Adalat.