H.S. Bedi, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed by the claimants in a land acquisition matter. It arises out of the following facts:
2. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition ACt, 1894 (hereinafter called the 'Act') for acquisition of 153 kanals 18 marlas land corresponding to 19.24 acres of land was issued by the State of Haryana on 18.02.1980. The acquisition pertained to the land of village Darra Kalan situated within the municipal area of Kurukshetra. The Land Acquisition Collector in his award dated 25.08.1982 awarded Rs. 30,000/- per acre for Chahi and Gair Mumkin qualities of land and Rs. 15,000/- per acre for Banjar Jadid land. Twelve references under Section 18 of the Act were thereafter made by the claimants before the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, who vide his award dated 30.09.1985 enhanced the compensation uniformally to Rs. 1,13,250/- per acre corresponding to Rs. 23.40 per square yard. For arriving at this conclusion, the Addl. District Judge relied upon the award of the District Judge, Kurukshetra, Exh.P-15, dated 30.07.1982 as a base price and as that acquisition aforesaid was made about seven years prior to the present acquisition, awarded an increase of 50% on the said price.
3. The claimants still dis-satisfied with the compensation filed twenty two first appeals in this Court, which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 3.11.1988 by observing that the award of the Addl. District Judge was absolutely fair and correct and that the reliance on Exh.P-15 was fully justified. Some of the claimants other than the present appellants still aggrieved by the Judgment of the learned Single Judge, preferred L.P.A. Nos.1513 and 2232 of 1989 and 1516 of 1990, which were dismissed by a Division Bench on 7.1.1999 with the observation that the compensation granted by taking Ex.P-15 as a base was in order and no increase above 50% of the base price fixed vide Exh.P-15 was called for. It appears that, for certain reasons, the present appeal could not be heard and disposed of by the L.P.A. Bench on 7.1.1999. While this appeal was pending, the claimants-appellants filed Civil Misc. No. 1013 of 1990 for additional evidence pointing out that a learned Single Judge in his Judgment dated 14.03.1990 passed in R.F.A. No. 7 of 1982 had enhanced the compensation with respect to the acquisition covered by Exh.P-15 from Rs. 15.59 to Rs. 37/- per square yard and that the benefits must, therefore, flow to the present appellants as well. Notice of this application was issued on 11.09.1990 and it was ordered to be heard alongwith the main case.
4. On these facts, Mr. M.L. Sarin, the learned Senior counsel for the appellants has argued that as the Addl. District Judge, the learned Single Judge and the L.P.A. Bench had relied upon Exh.P-15 for determining the compensation in the present acquisition, it was appropriate and just that the compensation granted by Exh.P-15 having been increased in R.F.A. No. 7 of 1982 by the learned Single Judge from Rs. 15.59 to Rs. 37/-per square yard, the latter amount should be made the base for determining the compensation payable to the claimants. He has pointed out that notwithstanding the fact that connected L.P. As had been dismissed, the present appeal was to be decided on the basis of the evidence that was before the Court and the dismissal of the earlier L.P. As would not effect the merits of the present appeal because admittedly the Judgment in R.F.A. No. 7 of 1982 had not been brought to the notice of the Division Bench at the time of the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeals on 7.1.1999. For this argument, he has placed reliance on M/s Raj Dhani Land and Finance (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana 1994(2) R.R.R. 87 : 1994(2) All India Land Laws Reporter 431 and Birinder Singh and Ors. v. The State of Haryana 1990 P.L.J. 90. He has also urged that notwithstanding the above facts, it was only appropriate that in a land acquisition matter where the land was taken away by the State with no option to the land owners to ask for anything beyond fair compensation, a procedure which was equitable to the landowners should be adopted. In this connection, he has placed reliance on Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by LRs and Ors. : [2002]SUPP5SCR350 .
5. Mr. Rajiv Kwatra, the learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana, representing the State has however, argued that the argument raised by Mr. Sarin was based on a misconception as it was the positive case of the claimants throughout that Exh.P-5 was in fact not the correct base for determining the compensation and in the face of other more and reliable evidence, which was on the record and as such a complete volte-face at the stage of the present appeal, was not justified.
6. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
7. The facts stated above are not disputed and clearly emanate from the record. Admittedly, Exh.P-15 was taken as the basis for determining the price on which an increase of 50% was granted by the Addl. District Judge in his award dated 30.9.1985. This award was maintained in first appeal as well in the L.P.A. with the learned Benches observing that Exh.P-15 was the proper basis for determining the compensation. Admittedly, the compensation given by Exh.P-15 was enhanced by this Court in R.F.A. No. 7 of 1982 from Rs. 15.59 to Rs. 37/- per square yard. We are thus, of the opinion that the 50% increase is to be taken on Rs. 37/- per square yard. It is also relevant that the Judgment in R.F.A. No. 7 of 1982 was produced on record vide Civil Misc. No. 1013 of 1990 way back in the year 1990, but had not been produced before the L.P.A. Bench which disposed of L.P.A. No. 1513 of 1989 With two other connected appeals. In this situation, we are of the opinion that the Judgments cited by Mr. Sarin become extremely relevant. In paragraph 15 of the Judgment in M/s Raj Dhani Land & Finance (P) Ltd.'s case (supra), it has been observed as under:
15. It has been held by this Court in Birinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. 1989(2) Revenue Law Reporter 391, that the awards of the Land Acquisition Courts are only admissible in evidence and cannot be binding on the parties and that such awards cannot shut out the consideration of other evidence of comparable nature. It was further held that the paretic (party?) can always insist that particular awards be ignored and determination of market value be done on the basis of the evidence brought by them. This Court while making the aforementioned observations, relied upon certain other judicial (sic) joint and severable. This aspect seems to have been adjudged in different cases depending upon the nature/source of rights, the cause of action, (sic) the contradictory nature of decrees impossible of execution, likely to result when considered differently. It is for this reason any standardised formula was avoided and the matter left for the consideration of courts, on the peculiar nature of the cases coming for determination. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances noticed by us that the appellant claimants have each their own distinct, separate and independent rights, the principles enumerated in Harihar Prasad case and Indian Oxygen Ltd. case squarely apply with all force. The appeals even de hors the claims of the deceased and others who have not chosen to approach the High Court or this Court, were neither rendered incapable of consideration nor impossible of according any relief nor could be held difficult to enforce the decree that may be passed, in favour of the remaining appellants without suffering the vice of inconsistency. Even if it likely to result in two different sets of Judgments of varying content, purport or reason, as long as enforcement of the decrees passed therein is not tendered impossible due to mutual contradiction in terms of self-destructive nature, there is no justification whatsoever to assume them to be inconsistent or contradictory decrees, at all. The mere fact that in a set of similar or identical nature of cases two different nature or type of decrees were necessitated is no reason to treat them to be inconsistent or contradictory decrees, so long as both can be executed and enforced without either of them being destructive of the other. Contradictory of inconsistent decrees, consequently, be held to have held resulted only in a given case when the relief granted in one cannot be enforced/realised without denying the relief in the other or totally nullifying or setting at naught the relief granted in the other, and in no other class of cases.
33. Even assuming that the decree appealed against or challenged before the higher forums is joint and several but deals with the rights of more than one recognised in law to belong to each one of them on their own and unrelated to the others, and the proceedings abate in respect of one or more of either of the parties, the courts are not disabled in any manner to proceed with the proceedings so far as the remaining parties and part of the appeal is concerned. As and when it is found necessary to interfere with the Judgment and decree challenged before it, the court can always declare the legal position in general and restrict the ultimate relief to be granted by confining it to those before the court only rather than denying the relief to one and all on account of a procedural lapse or action or inaction of one or the other of the parties before it. The only exception to this course of action should be where the relief granted and the decree ultimately passed would become totally unenforceable and mutually self-destructive and unworkable vis-a-vis the other part, which had become final. As far as possible, courts must always aim to preserve and protect the rights of parties and extend help to enforce them rather deny relief and thereby render the rights themselves otiose, 'ubi jus ibi remedium' (where there is a right, there is a remedy) being a basic principle of jurisprudence. Such a course would be more conductive and better conform to a fair, reasonable and proper administration of justice.
We, therefore, allow the present appeal as well. We accordingly direct that the compensation granted to the appellants shall be determined as a base of Rs. 37/- per square yard with an increase of 50% above this figure, which have been told, comes to Rs. 55.00. The appellants will also have all statutory benefits on the enhanced amount.