Judgment:
M.S. Liberhan and K.K. Srivastava, JJ.
1. The acquisition was questioned in a number of writ petitions, a reference to which was made by the learned Single Judge, in the judgment dated April 26, 1993, rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 1358 of 1984. The appellant has accepted the quashing of the acquisition in Civil Writ Petition No. 1358 of 1984. There was neither any challenge before the Supreme Court nor this Court by way of appeal. However, the appellant has come up in appeal with respect to a part of the acquisition by way of this Letters Patent Appeal after the expiry of 365 days. The only averment made for condonation of delay is hereby reproduced in verbatim:-
'That the delay of 365 days has occurred because of the official channel that has to be followed in these matters and not due to any wilful or intentional delay on the part of the appellant.'
2. Except the sentence reproduced above, there is not an iota of reason or fact explaining the delay of almost one year. There is no gainsaying that the State cannot be placed, in any manner, above an ordinary litigant so far as the provisions of the Limitation Act are concerned. Reference in this behalf my be made to the decision in Revenue Divisional Officer, Vijaywada v. T. Laxminarayana, A.I.R. 1975 Andhra Pradesh 109.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent, while opposing the condonation of delay, referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Union of India and Ors. v. Tata Vodogawa Limited and Anr., J.T. 1988(4) S.C. 472, wherein the Supreme Court after taking into consideration the averment made in the application for condonation of delay to the effect that the delay of 51 days was on account of 'interdepartmental correspondence and processing of the matter to enable the department to file the instant petition' and referring to various dates observed:
'There is no whisper to explain what 'legal problems in filing the special leave petition arose'. It appears to be that no attempt has been made to explain this delay.'
Further opportunity was given to the petitioners therein to file additional affidavit explaining the cause, if any, for the delay. The Supreme Court, after noticing the contention raised in the rejoinder affidavit, observed:
'We are aware of the fact that the Government being impersonal takes longer time than the private bodies or the individuals. Even giving this latitude, there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay. As stated from the facts narrated hereinbefore there is no sufficient cause to explain the delay.'
4. The facts and circumstances of this case are squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Yadogawa's case (supra). Except a bare averment made, that too vaguely, that the delay had occurred because of the official channel that had to be followed in these matters, nothing has been stated how and in what manner or where the bottle neck occurred. Whether those bottleneck were reasonable or unreasonable, nothing has been pointed out in the application or in the affidavit. The delay cannot be condoned solely because the State is the appellant when the Legislature, in its wisdom, has not provided special limitation to the State or exempted the State from application of the provisions of the Limitation Act.
5. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no ground to condone the delay of 365 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal, Dismissed.