Judgment:
T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.
1. The petitioners are invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Jind, dated 22.12.1972 as confirmed by the Collector on appeal and by the Additional Commissioner and Financial Commissioner, Haryana, vide Annexures P-1 to P-4. Challenging the said orders, the petitioners filed this writ petition.
2. The 2nd respondent, who is the land holder, filed an application before the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Jind for the eviction of the petitioners from the land in question Under Section 5 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. According to the land holder, the petitioners were inducted as tenants after 1956. They are liable to be evicted from the land. The authorities below held that the petitioners became the tenants of the land in dispute in 1959. As they had completed minimum term of 3 years, they are liabie to be evicted from the land and accordingly, the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade by his order dated 22.12.1972 ordered the eviction of the petitioners. The said order was confirmed by the Collector on 21.3.1975. The revision petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner, Hissar Division by his order dated 20.1.1982. The Financial Commissioner also dismissed the further revision.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners were old tenants and they were inducted as tenants even prior to 1956. Section 8 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to the as the 'Act') is not applicable. Therefore, the orders of the authorities below are liable to be set aside. The Assistant Collector, on the basis of the jamabandis on record, found that the petitioners became the tenants from the year 1959. This finding was also confirmed by the Collector on the basis of the material placed on record. The authorities below relied upon Exhibits P-l to P-6 to show that the petitioners, who are not the that the petitioners, who are not the tenants prior to 1955-56, got the land from Shankar in Kharif 1959. They also considered the documents marked as Exhibits D-1 to D-4 filed by the petitioners. According to the Collector, Khasra Girdawaris which are marked as Exhibits D-1 to D-4 proved that Shankar got the possession of the disputed land from Kharif 1959 and continued thereafter. This is purely a finding of fact arrived at by the authorities below on the basis of the evidence adduced by both the parties. The Court while exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will not ordinarily interfere with the finding of fact unless it is shown that the said finding has been arrived at on the basis of no evidence or on the basis of evidence which is not legally admissible. Such is not the case here. Therefore, there are no grounds to interfere with the said finding of fact.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that Section 8 of the Act does not furnish a ground for eviction. It only protects the right of the tenant said to be in possession of the land for a period of three years if he was inducted as a tenant after 1956. He further contended that Section 8 of the Act shall apply subject to provisions of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, a tenant can be evicted even during the period of three years if the grounds enumerated in Section 7 are present. He also argued that Section 7-A which was introduced alongwith Section 8 in the main Act furnishes additional grounds for evicting the tenants, but Section 8 was not made subject to the provisions of Section 7-A. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the grounds mentioned in Section 7 of the Act are available to the landlord to evict the tenant during the period of three years while the tenant cannot be evicted during that period of three years on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 7-A of the Act. Thus according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, Section 8 of the Act does not furnish a fresh ground for eviction on the basis that the tenant completed three years of tenancy on being inducted as a tenant after 1956. Though this argument appears to be appealing, on a reading of the provisions contained in Sections 7, 7 A and 8 of the Act, but in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court and also of the Supreme Court, I am not able to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners.
5. In Piara Singh v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab and Ors., (1977 PLJ 151) a full Bench of this Court by a majority, held as follows:-
'The question whether Section 8, as re-enacted, provide an additional ground of ejectment of a tenant came for consideration before this Court in Randhir Singh and Ors. v. Financial Commissioner and Ors., 1970 PLJ 519 and it was held by learned brother P.C. Jain, J. that Section 8 provides an independent ground of eviction and a tenant inducted after the enforcement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, can be ejected after the expiry of three years without proving any of the conditions specified in Section 7 of the Act. The view of the learned Single Judge was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in Devi Chand v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana and Ors., 1971 PLJ 200. The correctness of the view taken by that Division Bench was assailed before a Division Bench in the present case and, therefore, their Lordships referred the questions of law referred to above, to a Full Bench. It may not be out of place to mention here that earlier the learned Financial Commissioner of Punjab in Dina v. Dalip Singh and Ors., 1967(46) LLT 232 = (1967 PLJ 278), and Avtar Singh and Anr v. Smt. Kaki and Ors., 1968(47) LLT 193 = (1968 PLJ 70) also took the same view.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered opinion that no fault can be found with the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Devi Chand's case (supra).......It would be seen that the interpretation given to the provisions of Section 8 of the Act by the Division Bench in Devi Chand's case (supra) brings out a clear intention of the Legislature in providing that all the tenants inducted on the land after the enforcement of the Second Amendment Act of 1956, should in general terms have three years protection from being ejected by the big landowners from their reserved area and by the small landowners from the area within their permissible limits.'
6. Dealing with the same question, the Apex Court in Bhartu v. Randhir Singh and Ors., (AIR 1985 S.C. 413) held as follows:-
'The only alternate construction of Section 8 is to hold that quite distinctly from the provisions Section 7, a tenancy may not be terminated within a period of three years after commencement if the tenancy commenced after the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, that is to say, while the provisions of Section 7 would always be available in the case of tenancies commencing after the second Amendment Act, a tenant may also be evicted on the termination of the period of tenancy which shall not be less than three years. So construed it may appear as if the words 'subject to the provisions of Section 7; are being read by us as 'notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7: but that may not be a correct way of looking at what we have said. The proper way of looking at the scheme of Sections 7, 7-A and 8 is to hold that while Section 7 enumerates the ground on which any tenancy may be terminated, Section 7-A provides for additional grounds on which tenancy subsisting at the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 may be terminated as Section 8 provides for the termination of a tenancy commencing after the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 apart from the grounds mentioned in Section 7. That is why Section 7 itself uses the words 'no tenancy shall be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or except on any of the following grounds that is to say, a tenancy may be terminated either on the grounds mentioned in Section 7 or in accordance with the provisions of the Act. We think that this is the only reasonable and permissible way of construing Section 8 in the setting of Sections 7, 7-A and 8. The view taken by us appears to have been taken consistently by the Punjab High Court in the last 15 years and construing as we are doing the State Act, we do not think that there are any compelling reasons justifying any departure from the view taken by the Punjab High Court for so long.'
7. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Section 8 provides for the termination of tenancy commencing after the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 on the expiry of the period of tenancy which should not be less that three years apart from the grounds mentioned in Section 7 of the Act. Thus, it is clear that the petitioners, who have been inducted into possession as tenants of the disputed land after 1956 can be evicted on the expiry of three years by terminating their tenancy. I, therefore, do not find any grounds warranting interference with the orders of the authorities below.
8. The result is the writ petition fails and is, accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.