R.L. Anand, J.
1. This is a Civil Revision and has been directed against the order dated 21.8.1997, passed by the Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Gurdaspur vide which the execution application was dismissed by deciding issue No. l framed by the executing Court in favour of the judgment debtor.
2. Some facts can be noticed in the following manner. Shri Kuldip Raj and others were landlords of the disputed property while Roshan Lal was the tenant of the same. Shri Kuldip Raj is dead. He filed Civil Suit No. 421 of 6.11.1996 against Shri Roshan Lai (Tenant) (Dead) for his ejectment as well as for the recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 20/-. The suit was compromised by the parties and on the basis of compromise, it was decreed on 5.5.1970 by the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Gurdaspur. It was agreed in the compromise that Roshan Lal would continue as a tenant in the disputed property for a period of another 25 years from the date of decree and he would also pay rent at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month to the landlord. It was also agreed that if the tenant committed default in paying the rent for a continuous period of six months, the ejectment decree shall be executable earlier to the said 25 years from the date of decree and he would also pay rent at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month to the landlord. It was also agreed that if the tenant committed default in paying the rent for a continuous period of six months, the ejectment decree shall be executable earlier to the said 25 years period. The decree holder alleged that the J.D. has not paid him the rent w.e.f. January, 1989 and, therefore, he has made himself liable for ejectment earlier to 25 years. During the pendency of the execution application, the period of 25 years has also expired and he was then got the amendment of the application and contended that he has now got a right to get the possession back from the tenant in execution of the decree. The tenant filed the objections to the effect that the decree was not executable and it was without jurisdiction. It was contended that the property in dispute is situated within the municipal limits of Gurdaspur and as such, it is governed by the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The J.Ds have also pointed out that they cannot be ejected from the disputed property except under the provisions of the aforesaid Rent Act.
3. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed by the execution Court:-
1. Whether the decree dated 5.5.1970 is not liable to be executed OP(JD)
2. Relief.
4. Both the parties were given opportunities to lead evidence in support of their case and for the reasons given in paras No. 6 to 12 of the impugned order dated 21.8.97, the objection of the J.Ds. were allowed and the execution application of the present petitioner was dismissed. Paras No. 6 to 12 of the impugned judgment are reproduced as under:-
'6. So far as this issue is concerned, the JDs have examined Lakhwinder Singh, Clerks, Judicial Record Room as OW-1 while they did not lead any other evidence. In rebuttal to this evidence, the decree holders have examined Makhan Singh son of Mohinder Singh DHW-1, Surinder Kumar son of Lachman Dass DHW-2 and Shri Inderjit son of Shri Buta Mal DHW-3. He also proved on record documents Ex.DH/1 to Ex. DH/4.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the merits of the evidence on the file. The learned counsel for the decree-holder argued that the DH is the owner of the disputed property while J.D. is in possession of the same as a tenant. He argued that as back as in the year 1970, the decree holder filed a civil suit against the JD for his ejectment from the demised premises and in that suit, a compromise was arrived at between the parties, according to which, it was agreed that the rate of rent of the said premises would be increased to Rs. 20/- and JD would vacate the premises after the expiry of 25 years from the date of decree. It was also agreed that in case the JD committed default in paying the rent for a continuous period of six months, the DH would acquire a right to eject the JD even earlier to the expiry of 25 years period. The learned counsel for DH contended that the JD did not pay any rent to the DH since January, 1989 till filing of this execution application and hence he has made himself liable to ejectment from the said disputed premises. However, during the pendency of this execution application, the period of 25 years as agreed upon also expired and for that reason also, the counsel claimed the ejectment of the JD from the disputed building..
8. I have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the DH and the only question which arises for consideration is as to wheth er the decree has been passed by the Civil Court within the framework of law and whether it could be executed or not. In this connection, it is admitted fact that the property in dispute is situated within the municipal limits of Gurdaspur and as such, it is governed by the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. It is evident that the D.H. landlord did not move any ejectment application under the said Act, but he filed a civil suit No. 491 of 6.11.1969 in the Curt of Sub Judge 1st Class, Gurdaspur and the learned Sub Judge passed the decree on 5.5.1970 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. Since the property in dispute was urban property it was covered by the Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and as such, civil suit for ejectment was not at all maintainable and if any decree has been passed by the Civil Court the same is without jurisdiction. In this connection, the provisions of Section 13 of the Rent Act are self explanatory and relevant portion of this section reads as under:-
'13(1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy except in accordance with the provisions of this section.' 9. In view of the above said provision in the Rent Act, a tenant cannot be evicted in execution of a decree passed by the Civil Court and it makes no difference whether the decree is one passed after contest or under a compromise or whether it has been passed before the Act or after the Act. This view was also taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a reported case cited as 1980 (1) All India Rent Control Journal 337 Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra in which it was held as under:-
'We feel no difficulty in holding that the text, reinforced by the context, especially section 13, convincingly includes ex-tenants against whom decrees for eviction might have been passed whether on compromise or otherwise. The effect of the compromise decree, in counsel's submission, is that the tenancy has been terminated. Nobody has a case that the appellant is not continuously in possession. The conclusion is inevitable that he remains a tenant and enjoys immunity under section 13(1). The execution proceedings must, therefore, fail because the statutory road block cannot be removed.' 10. In view of the principle of law laid down above the decree in question is not executable.
11. The learned counsel for the D.H. argued that the property in dispute was previously the evacuee property and under section 29 of the Displaced persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, the property is exempt from the provision of Section 13 of the Rent Act and as such, only civil suit was the proper remedy and hence the decree is executable. The counsel also relied upon a reported case cited as (1961)63 PLR 716 Sadha Ram v. Paras Ram, in which it was held that the rights and liabilities of the transferee and of the person in possession were not intended to be governed by section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act. I have considered the contention of the learned counsel for the D.H. in view of the principle of law laid down above and it would be evident from the provisions of Section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 that the tenant or transferee of the property is entitled to avail its benefit only for a period of two years from the date of transfer of the property by Rehabilitation Department to a displaced person. The relevant portion of Section 29 of the said Act is reproduced as under:-
'29(1) Where any person to whom, the provision of this section apply, is in lawful possession of any immovable property of the class notified under sub-section (2) which is transferred to another person under the provisions of the Act, then notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, such person, shall, without prejudice to any other right which he may have in the property, be deemed to be a tenant under the transfer on the same terms and conditions as to payment of rent or otherwise on which he held the property immediately before the transfer:
Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any such terms and conditions, no such person shall be liable to be ejected from the property during such period not exceeding two years as may be prescribed : except on any of the following grounds namely.......'Rule 121 of the rules framed under Section 140 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, also says that :-
'121. The period during which persons to whom the provisions of section 29 of the Act apply, shall not be liable to be ejected from any immovable property other than the agricultural land in their lawful possession shall be two years.'From the above said provisions of law, it is quite clear that a tenant in the evacuee property is not liable to be governed under Rent Act for a period of two years from the date of transfer of evacuee property to a displaced person. In the present case, from para No. 1 of the plaint of the main suit, copy of which is Ex.DHW/1 it is evident that the DH had purchased the disputed property from the Rehabilitation Department and its possession was also delivered to him on 1.3.1958. The DH claimed ownership in the said property from that date. This para has been admitted by the JD in his written statement, which Ex.DH/4. The benefit Under Section 29 of the Act was available to the DH only upto 1.3.60, while he filed the present suit for ejectment in the year 1969 and at that time, the provisions of section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Compen sation) Act, 1954 were not applicable to him. Hence the contention of the counsel for the DH cannot be accepted.
12. In view of the position stated above, the decree of the Civil Court to eject a tenant who is being governed by the Rent Restriction Act, 1940, is not at all tenable being without jurisdiction and therefore, it is not executable. The issue is decided accordingly against the decree-holders.'
5. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present revision has been preferred.
6. I have heard Shri Sushil Saini, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner.
7. Though, it is a case of extreme hardship but a decree-holder who got a consent order of ejectment and allowed the tenant to remain in the disputed property for a period of 25 years still such a decree holder is not entitled to take the possession of the property in question. But the law has to prevail and this Court cannot go by the sentiments of a litigant. It is a common case of the parties that the property in dispute though at one point of time was an evacuee property is situated within the municipal limits of Gurdaspur. The provisions of Rent Restriction Act are applicable. Any decree passed in civil suit, even on consent, is not executable because the ejectment order has not been passed by the Rent Controller under East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and in view of the specific bar of Section 13(1) such a decree is not enforceable. It remains a paper decree only so long the provision of special Act are in force in this part of the country.
8. Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon (1961)63 PLR 769 Sardha Ram v. Paras Ram but this judgment is not helpful to the petitioner. I agree with the reason advanced by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division) who dismissed the execution application of the petitioner.
9. Resultantly, the present revision is dismissed with the clear observations that it will not prevent the petitioner to file an ejectment application against the respondents under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and to obtain a valid order against the legal heir of the tenant.