A.S. Nehra, J.
1. This order will dispose of Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1010 to 1018 of 1989 and No. 265 of 1991, as the question involved is common in all these cases.
2. For deciding the law point, the facts of one case, i.e., Civil Revision No. 1010 of 1989 Devinder Nath Katariya v. Haryana State are briefly stated. The petitioner's land was acquired vide notification dated 30.8.1977 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act'). The Collector gave his award on 14.2.1979 at the rate of Rs. 7.23 paise per square yard, besides solatium at the rate of 15 per cent. The amount determined by the Collector was paid on that very day. The Additional District Judge, on reference under Section 18 of the Act, enhanced the compensation on 1.4.1985 and determined the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 25/- per square yard. The Additional District Judge also held that the claimants are entitled to solatium at the rate of 30 per cent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum. Regular First Appeals were filed in this Court, which were allowed and the market value of the acquired land was fixed at Rs. 39/- per square yard instead of Rs. 25/- per square yard. This Court held that the landowners were further entitled to solatium at the rate of 30 per cent, besides interest at the rate of 9 per cent annum for one year and 15 per cent per annum thereafter.
3. The amount of the award, as determined by the Collector, was paid on 14.2.1979 and the amount of the award, as determined by the Additional District Judge was paid when the regular first appeals were pending in this Court. Execution proceedings, out of which the present revision petition has arisen, were taken out by the landowners after the order of this Court fixing the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 39/- per square yard.
4. Before the Executing Court, the petitioner gave his own method of calculation, which is indicated in the order of the Executing Court, being the first mode of adjustment. The Executing Court did not accept the mode of calculation as given by the petitioner, but worked out its own mode of calculation which is also indicated in the order of the Executing Court. Feeling dissatisfied, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition.
5. Mr. S.C. Sibal, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, has reiterated the, contention as raised before the Executing Court. According to the learned counsel, the correct way to calculate the amount payable in execution would be to work out the total amount payable on the basis of the final award of the High Court or the Supreme Court and the amounts tendered in-between by the Collector in terms of its award, or award by the Court of Reference under Section 18 of the Act or the award of the High Court, first be appropriated towards costs and then towards interest and thereafter towards the market value. According to the submission of the learned counsel, it would be wholly immaterial if, in execution of any award, say, of the District Judge or of the High Court, the landlowers have claimed certain amount towards the value of the land, solatium and interest and the amount so paid should be readjusted after the determination of the amount payable in terms of the final award first towards costs, then towards interest and thereafter towards the market value of the acquired land. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention, has placed reliance on Megh Raj v. Mst. Bayabai, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 161; Manohar Lal v. State of Haryana, 1986 PLJ 581; Khushal Singh v. The State of Haryana, 1989 PLJ 262; and Smt. Tribeni Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 Patna 77.
6. Mr. Prem Singh Kadian, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana, has argued that the compensation amount as determined by the Tribunal was paid and was duly received by the petitioner and the said amount is to be adjusted towards the principal amount first and not towards interest and costs as claimed by the petitioner. In support of his argument, he has relied upon Union of India v. Shri Harbans Lal Jain, ILR (1977) II Delhi 330; Improvement Trust, Jind v. Narinder Kumar, (1990-1) 97 P.L.R. 681, National Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd., v. Prem Nath Kapur, 1987 PLJ 297; and Life Insurance of India v. Samarendra Nath Roy, AIR 1979 Calcutta 243.
7. The Deputy Advocate General, Haryana, appearing for the State, has contended that the ratio of the aforesaid cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable to the facts of the present cases, because here the amount was paid as and when determined either by Collector or the Court and that, whenever the amount was paid, it was specifically mentioned as to whether it was paid towards the compensation amount, solatium or interest. He has further submitted that, in other words, at that time, it was made clear that a particular amount was paid towards the particular due.
8. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the principles laid down in Sections 59 to 61 of the Indian Contract Act cannot be made applicable to the present case, as there was a single debt and not several distinct debts. First of all, we do not agree to this, because the debts were created from time to time, they may be in respect of a single acquisition. Secondly, in principle, we see nothing wrong as to why the rule should not be made applicable, particularly when there is a clear election or appropriation by the debtor, namely, the Land Acquisition Collector.
9. Megh Raj's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the present cases. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Union of India v. Shri Harbans Lal Jain, (supra) held:-
'On a plain reading of Section 28 (of the Land Acquisition Act), interest is payable only on the excess amount awarded by the Court. This means that, if the High Court and the Supreme Court further increased the compensation, interest will be payable respectively on the excess amounts awarded by the High Court and the Supreme Court. It will be a wholly incorrect way of calculating the interest by first fixing the market value on the basis of the rate ultimately fixed by the Supreme Court and then working out 6 per cent interest on the compensation for the entire period from the date of possession. This would be not only unjust but an incorrect way of calculating interest. If no amount has been paid by the Land Acquisition Collector till the final decision by the High Court or the Supreme Court, then, of course, the calculation as sought to be made by Harbans Lal Jain would be justified. If, however, payments have been made, as in this case, from time to time, as and when each successive court enhanced the compensation, then to pay interest even on amounts already in the hand of the party concerned, in the present case Harbans Lal Jain, would be inequitbale and incorrect.'
It has been further held in Shri Harbans Lal Jain's case (supra) :-
'The principles of law enunciated in Sections 59 to 61 of the Contract Act would be attracted.... Sections 59 to 61 embody the general rules as to appropriation of payments in cases where a debtor owes several distinct debts to one person and voluntarily makes payment to him. They do not deal with cases in which principal and interest are due- on a single debt, or where a decree has been paid on such a debot, carrying interest on the sum adjudged to be due on the decree.... when moneys are received without a definite appropriation on the one side or the other, the rule which is well established in ordinary cases is that in those circumstances, the money is first applied in payment of interest and then, when that is satisfied, in payment of the capital.'
It was further held in Shri Harbans Lal Jain's case (supra) :-
'When 'Court' enhanced the compensation, there was clearly (a) the excess amount awarded as compensation, and (b) interest calculated thereon. The deposit was made for the excess amount of compensation and the interest. When the High Court increased the compensation further, once again the enhanced compensation and interest were worked out and deposited distincitly as such. The same happended when the Supreme Court further enhanced the compensation. The doctrine of election or appropriation is clearly attracted.'
10. This court has held in National Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited's case (supra) that the claimants were not justified in appropriating payments made by the debtor, first against the costs, then against the interest and finally against the principal. In Improvement Trust Jind's case (supra), it was again held by this Court that the claimants cannot be allowed to adjust the amount already received by them, towards the enhanced interest and costs etc. and then to claim the principal amount as was contended on behalf of the claimants in this Court. It was further held in that case that Section 60 of the Indian Contract Act, which provides that where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limiation of suits, has no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the case and that the enhanced rate of interest and solatium have been allowed to the claimants by the High Court in view of the amendments later on made in the Act and, therefore, the claimants cannot be allowed to adjust that amount already received by them, towards interest and costs etc., at this stage of the execution, as enhanced by the High Court. The Patna High Court in Smt. Tribeni Devi's case (supra) has held that Section 28 of the Act could be applied when the amount of compensation, originally awarded, has already been paid or deposited and when the Court awards excess amount, then interest on that excess only is payable, but, if the compensation which is awarded either by the Collector or by the Court is not paid, then the interest would run on the entire amount and not only on the excess and it would run from the date of dispossession in view of Section 34 of the Act. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in Smt. Tribeni Devi's case (supra), but the method of calculation of interest, which was shown by a chart in that case, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Samarendra Nath Roy (supra) has held as under :-
' The decision of the Supreme Court in Megh Raj v. Bayabai (AIR 1970 SC 161) (supra) and the Bench decision of this Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Gadadhar De, AIR 1978 Calcutta 419, on which much reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner, do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In our opinion, in view of the facts stated above, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner did not understand the implication of the said Bengali expression or the words 'decretal amount' as the principal amount of the decree.'
11. It has been further held by the Division Bench in Samarendra Nath Roya's case (supra) that where a suit was decreed with interest but the challans by which the opposite party deposited the amounts, showed the specification of debt towards which the payments were intended as 'decretal amount', and the amounts were withdrawn by the decree-holder taking it to be payment of the 'principal amount', the decree-holder was held not entitled to appropriate the same towards interest.
12. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we hold that once the principal amount, as determined by the Tribunal or on reference, was deposited, further interest thereon will cease. The claimants cannot be allowed to adjust the amount already received by them, towards enhanced interest and costs etc, and then to claim the principal amount, as was contended on behalf of the petitioners in this Court. This view of ours is supported by a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Union of India v. Shri Harbans Lal Jain (supra) and two Single Bench judgments of this Court in National Fertilizer Corporation of India, v. Prem Nath Kapur and Ors. (supra) and Improvement Trust Jind v. Mohinder Kumar (supra). The contrary view taken by the Single Judges in Manohar Lal and Ors. v. State of Haryana (supra) and Khushal Singh and Ors. v. The State of Haryana and Anr. (supra), is overruled.
13. In view of the above-mentioned discussion, the revision petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.