M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This order shall dispose of two writ petitions. First writ petition bearing C.W.P. No. 7658 of 2005 has been filed by the Central Academy Educational Progressive Society of India for issuance of directions to respondent Nos.l to 3, namely, National Fertilisers Limited, Noida and its two officers to hand over the school premises owned by the National Fertilisers Limited at Panipat. The aforementioned prayer stems from a lease agreement dated 11.2.2005 (Annexure P-6). The second petition bearing CWP No. 9500 of 2005 has been filed by some students in which the Central Academy Educational Progressive Society of India has been impleaded as respondent No. 4 alongwith the National Fertilisers Limited and its officers. In the latter writ petition, directions have been sought to the respondents to ensure that the petitioners do not miss their studies on the re-opening of the school on 21.6.2005 after the summer vacations. It has further been prayed that the respondent-National Fertilisers Limited through its officers should take appropriate steps to ensure that the Kendriya Vidalaya Sangthan starts operation of the school owned by NFL at Panipat.
2. A detailed reference to the facts stated in both the petitions is not required to be made in view of a preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. It has been pointed out that necessarily, the relied claimed by the Central Academy Educational Progressive Society of India is based on a lease deed dated 11.2.2005 (Annexure P-6). According to the respondents, the lease deed dated 11.2.2005 (Annexure P-6) contains a specific Clause envisaging that in the event of any dispute (s) of difference(s) arising between the parties then the same was to be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chief Executive of the lessor Company. On the basis of the aforementioned Clause, it has been claimed that ordinarily, this Court should not entertain the dispute in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of the submission, reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. 1996(2) S.C.C. 22. Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, learned Senior Advocate has argued that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable in view of the preliminary objection raised in the written statement filed by respondent No. 4. Learned counsel has further submitted that Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked for enforcing the contractual obligations arising out of lease deed. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. : AIR2002SC206 .
3. Mr. Vikram Aggarwai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made an attempt to persuade me to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by submitting that in cases where there is a wanton disregard of the principles of natural justice or the action is wholly without jurisdiction, then this Court is not refrained from interfering to undo the injustice. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the of trie Supreme Court in the case of Harbans Lal Sahnia and Anr. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors. : AIR2003SC2120 . He has then submitted that the principles of legitimate expectations requiring the respondent-National Fertilisers Limited to act reasonably and grant of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner would also be applicable. In support of the aforementioned argument, he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries : AIR1993SC1601 .
4. In the second petition, Mr. Navkiran Singh, learned counsel has argued that a direction deserves to be given to the respondents to ensure that the school is run by the agency, which was managing the affair till March, 2005, namely Kendriya Vidyalya Sangthan. He has maintained that the education career of the students is at stake and they are going to suffer an irreparable loss.
5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, perusing the various averments made in both the petitions alongwith the Annexures and considering the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that no interference of this Court would be warranted in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution because it is well settled that once in a contract or a lease agreement, there is a Clause for arbitration mutually agreed between the parties then the High Court is not to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard reliance placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. (supra) is meritorious. The observations of their Lordships in paras No. 16, 17 and 18 would be relevant and the same read as under:-
16. Firstly, the contract between the parties is a contract in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. It is governed by the provisions of the Contract Act or, may be, also by certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. Any dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated and could not have been agitated, in a writ petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the contract or for Civil Court, as the case may be. Whether any amount is due to the respondent from the appellant-Government under the contract and, if so, how much and the further question whether retention or refusal to pay any amount by the Government is justified, or not, are all matters, which cannot be agitated in or adjudicated upon in a writ petition. The prayer in the writ petition viz., to restrain the Government from deducting particular amount from the writ petitioner's bill(s) was not a prayer, which could be granted by the High Court under Article 226. Indeed, the High Court has not granted the said prayer.
17. Secondly, whether there has been a reduction in the statutory liability on account of a change in law within the meaning of Sub-clause (4) of Clause 70 of the Contract is again not a matter relating to interpretation of a term of the contract and should be agitated before the arbitrator or the Civil Court, as the case may be. If any amount is wrongly withheld by the Government, the remedy of the respondent is to raise a dispute as provided by the contract or to approach the Civil Court as the case may be according to law. Similarly, if the government says that an over payment has been made to the respondent, its remedy also is the same.
18. Accordingly, it must be held that the writ petition filed by the respondent for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus restraining the Government from deducting or withholding a particular sum, which according to the respondent is payable to it under the contract, was wholly misconceived and was not maintainable in law. [See the decision of this Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Isaac Peter : [1994]2SCR67 , where the law on the subject has been discussed fully.] The writ petition ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone.
6. If the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgment, it becomes evident that the lease-deed dated 11.2.2005 (Annexure P-6) is not statutory in nature nor it has been pleaded or argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that some statutory contract has come into being by execution of the lease deed. It necessarily leads to the inference that contract between the petitioner and respondent Nos.l to 3 is in the realm of private law. It is further evident from a perusal of Clause 33 that there is an arbitration clause provided for settling any dispute between the parties. Clause 33 of the lease agreement reads as under:-
33. That in the event of any dispute (s) or difference (s) arising between the parties hereto as to the construction, interpretation or operation of this agreement or the respective rights and liabilities of the parties, such dispute (s) or difference (s) shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chief Executive of the lessor Company or his nominee, whose decision in the matter shall be final and binding upon both the parties. There shall have no objection, if the Arbitrator so appointed is an employee of the lessor and that he had to deal with the matter to which the agreement relates and that in the course of his duties, he had expressed views on all or any of the matters in dispute or defence. The Arbitrator shall give a reasoned award, if the subject matter of the arbitration shall be decided by the Arbitrator.
Subject, as aforesaid, the provision of India Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the rules made thereunder, or statutory modification or re-enhancement thereof from time to time shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under the clause.
It is thus evident that any dispute with regard to the agreement is required to be referred to the sole arbitration of Chief Executive of the respondent-Company or his nominee and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity 'the Act') have been made expressly applicable. Therefore, the dispute raised in the instant petition is liable to be adjudicated by virtue of arbitration clause in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, in the presence of arbitration clause, I would not feel inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226. The Act itself is a complete code and provides for comprehensive mechanism of settling dispute. It is well settled that in the face of such an arbitration clause, this Court is not to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
7. The argument of the learned counsel with regard to the violation of principles of natural justice or legitimate expectations, which is another facet of the principles of natural justice would not require any detailed consideration because firstly, the lease deed between the parties is not the result of any statutory obligation nor it has a statutory character. Secondly, the grievance with regard to the violation of the principles of natural justice or legitimate expectations can always be raised before the arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of Clause 33 of the lease agreement dated 11.2.2005 (Annexure P-6). Therefore, I do not feel persuaded to accept the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
8. The argument with regard to the students raised in the connected petition would also not require any detailed consideration because there is no legal or vested right with the students to study in a particular school, which is to be maintained by a particular management. Moreover, with the dismissal of the connected writ petition bearing C.W.P. No. 7658 of 2005, respondent Nos.l to 3 would feel free to proceed with the restart of their school at Panipat. In any case, no mandamus could be issued in the absence of any statutory legal right creating a corresponding legal duty on the respondents. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument raised on behalf of the students.
9. For the reasons aforementioned, these petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. As the alternative remedy of arbitration is provided by Clause 33 of the lease agreement dated 11.2.2005 (Annexure P-6), there is no infringement of the right of the students, who are petitioners in the connected writ petition. No costs.