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JaIn Packwell Industries Vs. Sagar and Company and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectProperty;Tenancy
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Revision No. 19 of 1990
Judge
Reported in(1993)104PLR671
ActsEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Sections 13 and 15(5)
AppellantJaIn Packwell Industries
RespondentSagar and Company and ors.
Appellant Advocate A.C. Jain, Adv.
Respondent Advocate Surjit Bindra, Adv.
DispositionPetition allowed
Excerpt:
.....father was considered eligible for estate duty. therefore, there was no question of alienation in pritam singhs case. - before the filing of the suit in other words, a reading of the two documents clearly goes to show that the original landlords were not the owners of the demised premises on the date the petition for ejectment was filed. 5. there is another aspect of the matter as well......shall relate back to two years i.e. may 1985.' this compromise was marked as exhibit d. 2 and the suit filed by respondents 2 to 4 was decreed on the same day and compromise exhibit d. 2 was made part of the decree. on these premises, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the admission made by the original landlords in the suit filed by respondents 2 to 4 that the properties in question felt to the shares of their wives in may, 1985, m/s. sagar and company represented by saggar singh, gurpal singh and khushpal singh were not the owners and, in other words, the landlord of the demised premises qua the petitioner on the date of ejectment petition filed in september, 1985, and, therefore, the order under revision is not sustainable in law. learned counsel for the.....
Judgment:

G.C. Garg, J.

1. M/s. Sagar and Company represented by Saggar Singh, Gurpal Singh and Khushpal Singh through their General Attorney Smt Baldev Kaur (hereinafter to be referred as 'the original landlord') filed a petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (for jshort the Act) for ejectment of the petitioner from the demised premises. During the pendency of the Petition the original landlord transferred the property under the tenancy of the petitioner in favour of Nasib Kaur, Harjinder Kaur and Surmder Kaur, who are none else but the wives of the onginal landlords. On transfer of the tenanted premises, the tenant- petitioner, getting an occassion to save itself fom the clutches of the ejectment petition, moved an application for dismissal of the said petition, alleging 'that after the transfer of the property under its tenancy in favour of the aforesaid three ladies the original landlords were no more the landlord qua it. Surprfisingly, the original landlords did not file any reply to the said application but the application was stoutly opposed by their wives, namely, Nasib Kaur Harjinder Kaur and Surinder Kaur in whose names the property stood transferred. It was pleaded in the reply filed by them that during the pendency of the petition for ejectment of the petitioner, the orgial landlords and they entered into a family partition and the property in question had fallen to their shares and, therefore, they were the lanlords qua the petitioner In the reply itself, they made a prayer for being substituted as petitioners in place of the original landlords in the ejectment petition, and for the dismissal of the application moved by the present petitioner.

2. Learned Rent Controller, by order, dated October 24 1989 dismissed he petitioner's application and instead ordered the aforesaid three ladies to be substituted as petitioners in place of the original landlords, by observing that by operation of law they had become the landlords-qua the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order the tenant- petitioner has filed the present revision.

3. Learned counsel for the tenant petitioner vehemently contended that ejectment petition, out of which the present revision has arisen, was filed in September, 1985. During the pendency of the ejectment petition, Nasib Kaur, Harjinder Kaur and Surinder Kaur, respondents 2 to 4 herein filed a suit for declaration on May 26, 1987 claiming ownership of the demised premises on the basis of a family settlement and alleged therein that immediately after the family settlement, the control of the demised premises had been handed over to them. In the written statement filed by the original landlords in the said suit, they had admitted in reply to para 3 'that it is more than two years ago that the suit properties were given to the plaintiff' and 'they have no objection if decree for possession is passed in their favour.' On June 15, 1987 an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved on behalf of the original landlords (defendants therein) for recording a compromise between the parties wherein it was stated that the 'suit of the plaintiffs be decreed for possession of whole of the properties as owners and that their title shall relate back to two years i.e. May 1985.' This compromise was marked as Exhibit D. 2 and the suit filed by respondents 2 to 4 was decreed on the same day and compromise Exhibit D. 2 was made part of the decree. On these premises, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the admission made by the original landlords in the suit filed by respondents 2 to 4 that the properties in question felt to the shares of their wives in May, 1985, M/s. Sagar and Company represented by Saggar Singh, Gurpal Singh and Khushpal Singh were not the owners and, in other words, the landlord of the demised premises qua the petitioner on the date of ejectment petition filed in September, 1985, and, therefore, the order under revision is not sustainable in law. Learned counsel for the respondents was not able to controvert the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was however, sought to be argued that decree in favour of respondents 2 to 4 was passed in 1987 and they had been allowed to be substituted in place of the original landlords

4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this revision deserves to succeed True that the suit filed by responde its 2 to 4 was decreed in the year 1987 on account of admission made by the original landlords, yet a reading of the plaint and written statement of that suit makes it clear that the suit is based on previous family settlement which took place more than two years; before the filing of the suit In other words, a reading of the two documents clearly goes to show that the original landlords were not the owners of the demised premises on the date the petition for ejectment was filed. Thus, no benefit could be taken by the respondents, of the decree passed in the year 1987 and this provides do ground for getting respondents 2 to 4 substituted in the ejectment petition in place of the original landlords.

5. There is another aspect of the matter as well. Respondents 2 to 4, in whose names the property stood transferred, never made any application for being substituted in place of the original landlords who originally had filed the ejectment petition. It is only in the reply filed to the application moved by the tenant-petitioner, a prayer was made by the three ladies for being substituted in place of the original landlords. This is quite a novel way adopted by respondents 2 to 4 for being substituted in place of the original landlords. At no stage, they made an independent application for the said purpose

6. Once it is shown that M/s. Sagar and Company represented by Saggar Singh, Gurpal Singh and Khushpal Singh was not the owner of the demised premises on the date of the ejectment petition, such a petition on their behalf for ejectment of the tenant-petitioner was not competent as the original landlords ceased to be the landlords qua the tenant-petitioner on account of transfer of property in favour of the three ladies, having taken place prior to the date of filing of the ejectment petition. Once that is so, the original landlords were not competent to file ejectment petition and only the aforesaid three ladies, who got the property in family partition, could file ejectment petition against the tenant-petitioner on the grounds that may have been available to them under the Rent Act. While disposing of the application moved by the tenant-petitioner for dismissal of the ejectment petition, the three ladies could not be ordered to be substituted in place of the original landlords and the procedure adopted by the Rent Controller cannot be said to be strictly in consonance with law.

7. For the reasons aforesaid, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Consequently, the order dated October 24, 1989 passed by the Rent Controller, is set aside and resultantly, the ejectment petition fails and is hereby dismissed It is, however, left open to respondents 2 to 4 to file a fresh ejectment petition on the grounds that may be available to them under the law. No costs.


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