ORDER
A.P. Chowdhri, J.
1. The petitioner is an accused in case FIR No. 26 dated 16-11-1989 relating to Police Station Sadhaura, District Ambala, Under Section 25 of the Arms Act. The case against him is that he kept in his possession one country made pistol without any licence. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala, rejected his petition for bail by order dated 18-11-1989 on the ground that the facts constituted an offence Under Section 5 of the Terrorist & Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, which is exclusively triable by the Designated Court.
2. It is not disputed that the whole of the State of Haryana has been declared as notified area under the Terrorist & Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, which enures under the present Act of 1987.
3. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no allegation that the petitioner had contravened the provisions of Section 25 of the Arm Act, 'with intent to aid any terrorist or disruptionist' and, therefore, the offence is triable by the ordinary Court of Judicial Magistrate and not by the Designated Court. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Bimal Kaur Khalsa v. Union of India, AIR 1988 P & H 95 : 1988 Cri LJ 869. In that case, one of the Civil Writ Petitions challenging the vires of the Terrorist & Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act relating to a case under the Act of the same title of 1985 D. S. Tewatia, Chief Justice (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Full Bench collated Section 6 of the 1985 Act and the analogus section (also Section 6) of 1987 Act and concluded in para 127 as under:--
'In view of the above, the offence qua this petitioner Under Section 25 of the Arms Act would no longer attract the provision of Section 6 of the Act of 1985; because of the provisions of Section 6 and Section 25 of the Act of 1987 nor would it attract in the present case the provision of Section 6 of the Act of 1987, because the offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act herein was not committed with intent to aid the terrorist or disruptionist, as there is no such allegation against the petitioner.'
3A. On behalf of the State it was submitted that the operation of the judgment and order in Bimal Kaur Khalsa's case 1988 Cri LJ 869 (Supra) has been stayed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 77, 78 and 779 of 1988 by order dated March 7, 1988.
4. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jaloba v. State of Haryana, 1990 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 46 it was contended that in the absence of any charge Under Section 3 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, the offence was triable by the ordinary courts and not by the Designated Court. The contention was rejected as untenable. It was held as under:--
'Section 6 lays down that if in any area notified by the State Government under the Act a person contravenes any provision or rule made under the Arms Act, the Explosive Act, the Explosive Substances Act and the Inflammable Substances Act then he is liable to enhanced punishment as provided for in the section. Section 9 lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, every offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder shall be triable only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. It, therefore, follows that though the offence committed by the appellant was for contravention of Section 25 of the Arms Act, it became exclusively triable by the Designated Court because of notification made by the State Government and the operation of Section 6 of the Act.'
5. There is no dispute that if the case is, exclusively triable by the Designated Court, the application for bail lies to the Designated Court in view of the law laid down by the apex Court in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922 : 1988 Cri LJ 938. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. The petitioner, if so advised, may approach the Designated Court for the relief prayed for by him.