Hemant Gupta, J.
1. Present revision petition is by the tenant challenging the orders of ejectment passed by the Appellate Authority on the ground that the demised premises are required for bona fide use and occupation of the respondent landlady.
2. Respondent landlady filed an ejectment petition on 15.11.1985 of the ejectment of the tenant of the first floor of the house situated at Ludhiana. The ejectment was inter-alia sought on the ground that the demised premises are required for bona fide use of the landlady and her family members. It was submitted that her husband Dr. G.K. Athwal was an employee of National Fertilizer Ltd., Naya Nangal who died on 26.10.1984 as a result of an accident. The landlady and her family members including her two un-married daughters were permitted to stay in the company's house till 25.2.1985 and that she had to shift to Ludhiana in her own house by that date. She was in occupation of 6 Kanal residential bungalow, consisting of 4 bed-rooms, one worship room, 1 store apart from bath room and varandan etc. It may be stated that the ground floor was on rent with another tenant which became available to the landlady and she occupied the same. It was the case of the landlady that both of her daughters are highly educated and her family is accustomed from the very beginning to a special mode of life. It was stated that the husband of the petitioner having died, one of the daughters being yet unmarried the landlady has to depend upon her parents to live with her at Ludhiana, especially when there is no other male member. They cannot permanently shift to her house unless separate adequate accommodation to them is provided for. It was also submitted that she requires separate room for her married daughter and/or for her husband. It was also stated that the other daughter is waiting for licence to practice as an Advocate at Ludhiana. She also alleged that they always had independent room to keep Guru Granth Sahib for daily prayers and worship and that the petitioner and other members of her family needs separate room for study and for guests.
3. The landlady has also alleged in the petition that the tenant has agreed to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the building vide writing executed on 1.3.1985. It is also alleged that the tenant is guilty of various acts and conduct which are nuisance to the occupiers of the building. The tenant systematically and regularly used filthy language and habitually conducted himself in indulging in most obnoxious and vulgar abuse within the hearing and view of the landlady and her family members when he is drunk. She also stated that the strangers also visit the tenant day and night causing constant annoyance to the landlady and other occupiers of the building in the neighbourhood. She also alleged that with the strangers including the family of the tenant occupying the first floor, the privacy of the family of the landlord is seriously affected. She had a grievance of the tenant bolting the door from inside the common entrance door and causing constant annoyance to the landlady and her family members. She feels unsafe and insecure, quite apart from the inadequacy of the accommodation and infringement of the privacy of her family. Moreover, the tenant is creating insanitary and unhygienic condition just near her bedroom, which also affected the neighbourers.
4. The respondent while controverting the allegations also raised a preliminary objection that the ejectment petition is not maintainable as he is tenant of the entire first floor, its terrace and the garage located on the ground floor of the building. The landlady denied such averments in the replication.
5. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment petition holding that the eviction petition is not maintainable being for partial eviction. However, the Rent Controller has found that the premises are bona fide required by the landlady. However, in appeal, the finding regarding the petition being bad for partial eviction were set aside. The Appellate Authority maintained the findings that the premises in occupation of the landlady are insufficient and that the tenant is liable to be evicted. Aggrieved against such order of eviction the tenant has filed the present revision petition.
6. During the pendency of the present petition landlady has filed Civil Misc. No. 5604-C of 2001 on 28.3.2001 along with her affidavit to bring on record subsequent events. It was mentioned therein that the landlady has two daughters namely Gurpreet Kaur and Harpreet Kaur. Gurpreet Kaur has two children namely Hardeep Singh aged 16 years who is studying in 9th standard and Jasleen Kaur aged 10 years who is studying in 6th standard. It was further stated that the husband of Gurpreet Kaur most of the times, was getting his posting at non-family stations, therefore, Gurpreet Kaur alongwim her. children had been staying wkh the landlady and on account of insufficiency of accommodation Gurpreet Kaur along with her children is residing in House No. 171-J Sarabha Nagar. Ludhiana on rent. Her second daughter Harpreet Kaur is a Judicial Officer and is posted at Rajpura. She further stated in the affidavit that she has no son and is now 67 years of age and not keeping good health and therefore, she is required to be looked after by her daughters. She has also produced some photographs to show that the accommodation with her daughter is insufficient as the belongings of Gurpreet Kaur are stored in packing in a tempoary shed in the house of the landlady.
7. In reply to such affidavit, the tenant has filed affidavit dated 24.2.2003 wherein it has been stated that the landlady has three bed-rooms in her possession. It was stated that Col. Gursharan Singh, the husband of elder daughter Gurpreet Kaur has retired from service. In fact, said Col. Gursharan Singh had already retired from service even at the time when the landlady filed her additional affidavit dated 28.3.2001. It was also stated that the younger daughter is a Judicial Officer presently posted at Chandigarh and she cannot in any case look, after the landlady till she is posted in Ludhiana. The landlady has more than sufficient accommodation in her possession. It was further submitted that insufficiency of accommodation with the daughter of the landlady is not a ground of eviction and therefore, storage of goods in her mother's house is immaterial for the possession of demised premises. It is stated that the photographs Annexures Rs. 10 to Rs. 12 have been taken only for the purpose of trying to create an impression that there is shortage of space in the demised premises.
8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and with their assistance gone through the record of the case. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made two forceful submissions, firstly being that the ejectment petition is bad for partial eviction and secondly that the present accommodation with the landlady is sufficient for her needs. It is only a case desire and she has failed to prove the element of need. The landlady by way of additional affidavit has tried to allege that the demised premises are insufficient for her requirement. The landlady cannot take such plea without amending the ejectment petition.
9. Pleadings:
The landlady has sought eviction of the tenant describing the tenanted premises being first floor. The enant has asserted in the written statement that he is tenant on the garage portion of the ground floor as well. The landlady has filed replication controverting the stand of the tenant. In support of the first contention, the tenant has relied upon letter Ex.PW5/B dated 23.3.1984 written by Dr. Athwal, husband of the landlady to the petitioner- In the said letter, Dr. Athwal has sought for enhancement of rent, and claimed more rent than the one being paid by bank because the garage is extra in your case. Apart from such letter the petitioner strongly relied upon the averments made by the landlady in the replication to draw an inference that the garage was earlier part of tenancy. It is useful to reproduce para No. 1 of the replication: 1. That the contents of para 1 (of preliminary Objections) are denied to the extent mat the garage located on the ground floor of the building was now part of the tenancy. The plan attached to the written statement has not been supplied to the petitioner and without seeing the same, nothing more can be stated. The petition has been rightly and justly filed for the full demised premises in possession of the respondent, and it is maintainable.'
10. The learned Appellate Authority had returned finding that the letter Ex.PW5/8 is not binding on the rights of the landlady and that word 'now' in above para is in fact typographical mistake for word 'not'. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the said findings of the Appellate Authority are absolutely incorrect and in fact, that was not the case set up by the landlady herself.
11. Mr. Arun Jain, learned counsel for the landlady has brought to my notice that before filing of the ejectment petition, a notice for eviction, Ex.A.1 dated 25.1.1985 was served wherein it was mentioned that the petitioner is a tenant on the first floor. The tenant has given reply Ex.A.1 on 13.1.1985 wherein he has not disputed the extent of tenancy. Still further Ex.AX/1 to Ex.Ax/6 are the rent receipt for the months of May, 1985 to August, 1985. All these receipts show that the rent was for the first floor of the house. He has further submitted that the garage is in possession of the landlady and she is not asking for ejectment of the tenant from the garage. He has further relied upon Subhash Chander v. Ranjit Singh, (1995-3) 111 P.L.R. 651 and Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, J.T. 2003(1) Supreme Court 438.
12. After considering the respective contentions of the parties, I am of the opinion thai the garage was not part of tenancy and there is no defect in filing the ejectment petition. Letter Ex.PW 5/B is signed by Dr. Athwal, Dr. Athvval was not a constituted attorney of the landlady. Still further the garage, is extra in your case mentioned in one of the paragraphs cannot determine the extent of tenanted premises. The landlady has admitted in her cross-examination that the garage was used by the tenant for some time as licence. Though the landlady has denied such letter having written by her husband but assuming such is the letter written by her husband still such letter is not conclusive to return a finding that the garage was part of the tenanted premises. As a matter of fact, the reply to the notice Ex.A.2 and the various rent receipts produced would show that the tenanted premises is only the first floor. As a matter of fact, in additional affidavit filed by the petitioner he has stated that the alleged shed where goods are stored is the garage in the demised premises which has been used by the respondent to dump junk so as to create evidence for the purpose of eviction.
13. The stress of the counsel for the petitioner on the averments made in the replication is untenable. The pleadings have to be read as a whole. The word 'now' in para No. 1 of the replication is not coherent with other averments in the paragraph. The landlady has stated that the petition has been rightly and justly filed for full demised premises for possession and it is maintainable. The demised premises have been explained in the ejectment petition where the garage is not included. The only reasonable way of reading the paragraph is to read not instead of word now in the first line of the paragraph. It is only a case of typographical mistake. It has been so found by the Appellate Authority as well.
14. It is admitted by the tenant in his affidavit dated 24.02.2003 that the landlady has stored goods of her daughter in garage. Therefore, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Authority that the petition is not bad for partial eviction.
15. Regarding the second question whether the premises are required for bona fide use and occupation of the landlady, the petitioner has submitted that the primary requirement as pleaded in the ejectment petition was that of the parents. Since parents have died and therefore, the personal necessity as pleaded does not survive. It was argued that subsequent events which can be taken into consideration are the one which are related to the personal necessity pleaded and thus the requirement of the daughters cannot be sought to be introduced by way of additional affidavit without amending the ejectment petition, ft was further argued that the requirement of the married daughters cannot be considered the requirement of the landlady. He has placed reliance on Ramesh v. A. Balreddy, 1990(1) R.L.R. 704.
16. Elaborating further, it was submitted that it is only mere desire of the landlady and no element of need is present so as to warrant eviction of the tenant. The landlady is in possession of the entire ground floor consisting of 3 bed rooms. One of her married daughter is residing separately with her husband at Ludhiana, whereas the second daughter is posted at Chandigarh. Therefore, at best the landlady required the premises for visiting daughters. The visiting daughters can comfortably live in the accommodation already available with the landlady. Therefore, it was submitted that it is mere wish of the landlady to seek ejectment of the tenant, the said proposition reliance was placed on Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and Ors. A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1059; Shri Rattan Chand Jain v. Shri Charan Singh, 1978(1) Rent Control Reporter 265 and Hasmal Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, 1982(1) All India Rent Control Journal 499.
17. Dr. Arun Jain, learned counsel for the respondent controverted the allegations with great vehemence. It was argued that the landlady is used to comfortable living. While her husband was working they had 6 kanals house consisting of 4 bed rooms with lot of open space. The ground floor in possession of the landlady consists of 2 bedrooms apart from dinning hall and kitchen. One room has been kept reserved for worship. It is common in the families in Punjab to maintain a separate room for worship of Shri Guru Granth Sahib if it is in the means of the family. It is her stand that she had been maintaining worship room since long. In this view of the matter she is left with only one bed-room for her visiting daughters and other family members. Since the landlady has no son, therefore, the judgments that the requirement of married daughters cannot be taken into consideration can not apply in the case of the landlady as in the absence of any son the landlady has to depend upon her married daughters. It was submitted 'that due to changing circumstances, the subsequent events are required to be taken into consideration. It is apparent from the additional affidavit filed that elder daughter of the landlady is residing in Sarabha Nagar itself but in a rented house. She required the premises for her daughters and other relations. Reliance was placed by the respondent on Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies, 1996(2) R.C.R. 233: Ra-gavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machiners and Co., 2000(1) Rent Control Reporter 135 and Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.. (1999-1)121 P.L.R. 805 (S.C.) to submit that the landlady is the best judge of her requirement.
18. In the, alternative it was submitted that even if the accommodation of the landlady is not considered to be insufficient still the tenant is liable to be evicted as she being widow living alone in the house is entitled to maintain her privacy specially in view of the fact that the tenant is in the habit of using obnoxious and vulgar language and had created problems with bolting of main door from inside of the house. She feels disturbed with the entry of strangers on the first floor of the house. It was stated that there was a compromise in the proceedings under Section 107/151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein the tenant has undertaken to vacate the premises. It was also submitted that the landlady moved Civil Misc. No.71 of 2001 for early hearing of the case on the ground that the roof of the ground floor has been severely damaged. There has been seepage of water all over in the roof of ground floor. The tenant who is occupying the first floor is further adding to the suffering of the respondent by accumulating water on the first floor. The landlady has produced four photographs with this application. The photographs show that the water is dripping even in the bed-room of the landlady.
19. The petitioner has sought time to seek instructions for the purpose of carrying out repairs in the building in possession of the petitioner on 23.3.2001. Subsequently, on 5.2.2003 an order was passed permitting the landlady to get necessary repairs effected of a tap to stop the leakage of water. However, during the course of hearing it was submitted that the petitioner has not permitted the repairs of the tap to stop leakage of the water.
20. After considering the respective contentions and the precedents cited by the parties, I am of the opinion that no case for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is disclosed.
21. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, 2001(1) Rent Control Reporter 221 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principle for taking into consideration subsequent events. It has been held that crucial date for deciding the bona fide requirement is the date of his application for eviction. Subsequent events which could be taken into consideration are completely eclipsed need of the landlord. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
'10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fide of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration.
If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fide of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the buildings. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an appellant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.
13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events.
15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notion causes the lis to creep through the line for long years from the start to the ultimate mini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many events bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused.
17. Considering the aforesaid decisions, we are of the definite view that the subsequent events pleaded and highlighted by the appellant are too insufficient to overshadow the bona fide need concurrently found by the fact finding courts'.
22. Keeping in view the principle of law enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad's case, I am of the opinion that the subsequent events as found above do not eclipse the requirement of the landlady. As per the site plan Ex.P.4, the landlady has in her possession only 2 bed rooms. - one 10 x 12 and another 12/3 4 x20 apart from a worship room. The landlady is accustomed to comfortable living. One of her daughters is Judicial Officer and another married to Ex.-serviceman who retired as Colonel. She requires comfortable accommodation for the stay of her visiting daughters who require to visit her more often than in normal circumstance in view of the fact that she is taken to be care of only by her daughters in her old age. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy; 2001(2) Rent Control Reporter 539 that if the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself and dwell into lesser premises as to protect the tenant's continued occupation in tenancy premises. It has been held that the question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord, is, whether in the given facts proved by maternal on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere honest? If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide.
23. Since both the courts of fact have found the need to be bona fide, I do not find any reason to take a different view. The landlady has a right to live comfortably free from daily bickering which are evident from the records of the case. The landlady has not only pleaded the behaviour of the tenant but also deposed that the tenant used filthy language within her hearing and even the neighbourers are fed up with it. The tenant drinks and the strangers visit him day and night which also annoy the landlady and the neighbourers and she feel unsafe and insecure in the circumstances. The tenant on several occasions bolted the door from inside the common entrance door, to cause constant annoyance to the petitioner and her family members and he has created insanitary and unhygienic condition near her bedroom.
24. Still further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies, 1996(2) Rent Control Reporter 233 has held that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis which is either insecure or inconvenient. It is not for the courts to dictate him to continue to occupy such premises.
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghunaih G. Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co., 1999(2) Rent Control Reporter 485 has explained the meaning of the word bona fide requirement. It has been held that the word reasonable connotes that requirement is not fanciful or unreasonable whereas the requirement coupled with the reasonable means that it must be something more than mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute dire necessity. A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and the compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end.
26. Whether the premises are bona fide required by a landlord is a question of fact in each case. The law on the subject is not static and has kept tune with the changing times. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not lay down any absolute rule. In the facts of each case, the Court has returned a finding whether the premises are bona fide required or not.
27. Keeping in view the said principles of law as discussed above, I am of the opinion that the landlady has proved that she has reasonable and bone fide requirement of the tenanted premises for her own use and occupation. She may not require the first floor as dire or absolute necessity but she has proved that the accommodation in her possession is not only insufficient but also circumstances warrant that the accommodation on the first floor should be made available to her for her comfortable and convenient use of her property.
28. In view of above discussion, the present revision petition is dismissed. The petitioner is granted two months time to hand over the vacant possession of the premises tothe landlady.