N.K. Kapoor, J.
1. Petitioner seeks issuance of a writ of mandamus for compliance of the Ordinance promulgated on 23.9.1992 'the interest on delayed payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Undertakings' and for issuance of such writ order or direction as the Court may deem fit and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case. According to the petitioner it is a small scale industrial Undertaking within the meaning of Section 23 Sub-clause (3) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. It is registered as a small scale industry. It is the case of the petitioner that the supplied ACSR Conductors vide two orders No. HH-1/3374QH-V1979 and HH-1/3381/QH-1/1980 for supply of 1200 Km. of conductors of the value of Rs. 82,29,600/- and 800 K.M. of the value of Rs. 36,46,400/-. As per Clause 6 of the purchase order Nos. 3374 and 3381, 100% payment was to be made with full taxes and duties within 7 days from the submission of bills. According to the petitioner supply of the conductors was made in between 16.9.1992 to 17.2.1993. As agreed between the parties, the bills were to be cleared within 7 days from the receipt of the material but the respondent failed to pay the same on due dates and so caused a considerable delay in making payments and this way the petitioner-company suffered grave financial loss by way of interest. According to the petitioner, the Company suffered a total loss of Rs. 18,50,239.49 paise which amount became due till 31.1.1994 and this interest continue to accrue to the petitioner from month to month at the deemed rate of interest till date. Vide Ordinance No. 15 of 1992 petitioner-Company being a small scale Industrial Undertaking is entitled to interest on account of delayed payment and so a request was made to the respondent-Board to pay the amount due on the basis of Ordinance. Since they failed to make payment a writ petition was filed which was disposed of by the Bench vide order dated 27.9.1994 with a direction to the Board to consider the writ petition to be a representation regarding claim for the amount of interest due on the delayed payments and decide the same. It is the case of the petitioner that the Board no doubt considered the petitioner's writ petition as representation but has erroneously declined the same vide order Annexure P-7, which is wholly illegal biased and so deserves to be set aside. Since a duty has been cast upon the respondent to comply with the mandate of the Ordinance which has now become an Act a direction by the Court is the only appropriate remedy available to the petitioner. Hence, this present writ petition.
2. Respondent No. 1-Haryana State Electricity Board has filed the written statement and has taken few preliminary objections that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that on the same cause of action petitioner filed an earlier writ petition No. 2914 of 1994 permitting the petitioner to initiate fresh proceedings in the Court of competent jurisdiction. Vide order dated 9.11.1994 petitioner had been permitted to initiate fresh proceedings in the Court of competent jurisdiction and not that the petitioner could file another petition without impugning the order passed by the Board on 2.11.1994. As per purchase order the supply of the material was to be made within a period of one month from the receipt of the purchase order whereas the supply in the present case commenced much later and so the petitioner is legally not entitled to any interest on the basis of Ordinance. Otherwise too, the purchase orders are earlier to the coming into enforcement of the Ordinance/Act. Similarly, writ petition raises disputed question of fact which can only be adjudicated by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and in any case a writ petition cannot be termed to be an alternative remedy to a civil suit. On merit, it was stated that the plea raised is wholly frivolous and devoid of merit. According to the answering respondent the petitioner did not supply the material as per the terms of the contract and as a result of the same the petitioner is liable to pay penalty for delay in delivering the goods which amount is recoverable from the petitioner as per the contract. In fact, excess amount has already been paid which the respondent can legally recover. Otherwise too, as per the original agreement between the parties the matter could be referred to an Arbitrator, if any party fell aggrieved. No such grievance had been made by the petitioner and on this ground alone the writ petition is wholly mis-conceived and the same deserves to be dismissed.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner after narrating the various factual aspects briefly noticed in the earlier part of the judgment placed complete reliance upon the Ordinance relating to payment of interest on account of delayed payment for the relief sought. According to the counsel, petitioner company is a small scale industry as per registration certificate issued by the Department of Industries, Haryana. The government with a view to remove the losses which were accruing on account of delayed payments to the small scale units thought of remedying the same and so an Ordinance was promulgated on 23.9.1992. The precise purpose of this Ordinance as is clear from its title is to award interest upon delayed payments to small scale and Ancilliary Industrial Undertakings. As per Ordinance, a period of 30 days has been prescribed from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier i.e. after the expiry of 30 days from such an acceptance interest becomes payable on such payment in terms of the Ordinance. Petitioner has given in a tabulated form challan No. and date and receipted challan No. and date (annexure P-4) and details of bills and payments bill No. and date, amount (annexure P-5). Similarly, detail of interest to be received by the petitioner as on 31.1.1994 has also been given in a tabulated form-the bill No. and the amount recoverable (annexure P-6). The calculations have been made in terms of Ordinance. Thus, there is no ambiguity with regard to the factual aspects of the matter and so a direction from the Court alone is essential for releasing amount which has fallen due in view of the mandate of the Ordinance and so the objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition or on the basis that an alternative remedy by way of civil suit is alone an appropriate remedy has been advanced merely to deprive the petitioner of its legitimate claim to recover the amounts from the respondent-Board. The objection raised on account of dismissal of the writ petition or the claim having been finally declined by the Board vide order dated 2.11.1994 (annexure P-7) is wholly inconsequential and cannot be construed in a manner depriving the petitioner of its legitimate right to recover the amount due towards the Board. Dilating upon the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Ordinance/Act, counsel argued that the term 'a suit or any other proceedings under any law for the time being in force' will also include a writ petition. According to the counsel, writ petition is an alternative remedy to a suit. Since a suit invariably takes a long time a resort by the petitioner to claim the desired relief by invoking the powers of this Court by way of a writ petition is not only just but appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand argued that the present writ petition is wholly mis-conceived. Infact earlier writ petition No. 2914 of 1994 was dismissed by the division Bench vide order dated 9.11.1994 permitting the petitioner to initiate fresh proceedings in a Court of competent jurisdiction. However, the petitioner instead of approaching a civil court or initiating such other appropriate remedy has again chosen to approach this court by filing the present writ petition and so the present petition is infact an abuse of the process of Court. Otherwise too, the petition raises numerous disputed question of fact for which the appropriate remedy is a civil suit. Respondent disputes the status of the petitioner that it is a small scale industry. Otherwise too, the provisions of the Ordinance are prospective in nature and since it came into force on 23.9.1992 whereas the purchase orders are earlier to this date the Ordinance has no applicability and on this ground alone petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. Factual aspects have been noticed i.e. purchase orders No. 3374 of 1979 and 1980 (annexures P-2 and P-3) vide which goods were supplied by the petitioner and the payment received. Admittedly, the total payment in respect of these two supply orders has been received by the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent-Board did not make the payment as stipulated in the contract i.e. payment/payments have been made somewhat late and since as per Ordinance the petitioner is legally entitled to interest on all such delayed payments such an amount is recoverable and so direction by this Court is the most efficacious remedy for the relief sought. As noticed earlier an ordinance was promulgated to provide for and regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings. It came into force on 23.9.1992. It has now become an Act No. 32 of 1993, having received the assent of the President of India on 2.4.1993 as well as published in the Gazette of India on 3.4.1993. As per Section 1 Sub-clause (3) it is deemed to have come into force on the 23rd day of September, 1992. It covers small scale industrial and ancillary undertakings as defined in Section 3 Sub-clause (aa) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. Petitioner had placed on record a certificate of registration issued by the Department of Industries, Haryana treating it to be a small scale industrial unit which fact is, however, contested by the respondent on the ground that presently the turn over in a year of the company even exceeds in Rs. 5 Crore and so is not a small scale industrial unit. Under the Act, as per Section 4 in case of a delayed payment interest becomes payable at the stipulated rate i.e. 5% above the floor rate for comparable lending and as per Section 5 the buyer becomes liable to pay compound interest at the rate mentioned in Section 4 on the amount due to the supplier. Such amount becomes recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or any other proceedings under any law for the time being in force. Thus, he parties contest the ambit and scope of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act which for facility of reference are hereunder reproduced :-
'6. Recovery of amount due.-The amount due from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of Sections 4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force.
7. Appeal.-No appeal against any decree, award or other order shall be entertained by any court or other authority unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, other order in the manner directed by such court or, as the case may be, such authority.'
6. As per Section 6 amount due from a buyer together with amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceedings under any law for the time being in force. Admittedly, no suit has been filed. Whether the term 'or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force' will include a writ petition is the vital question to be determined. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner a writ petition comes within the ambit, 'other proceeding under any law' whereas according to the learned counsel for the respondent the Act envisages a suit of any such proceeding like Arbitration proceedings or a reference made to a referee. It is well recognised principle that when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. This rule which is known as the rule of ejusden generis reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of the other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. Article 226 of the Constitution of India gives powers to every High Court to issue to any person or authority, including any Government, within its territory, directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeaus corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Thus, the Court under Article 226 can exercise its powers for two fold purposes i.e. (i) for enforcement of fundamental rights; and (ii) for enforcement of non-fundamental or say ordinary legal rights. Powers of the court under Article 226 are discretionary i.e. it cannot be claimed as of a right. One of the ground against exercise of the discretion would be that the right claimed by the petitioner is not capable of being established in a summary proceeding under Article 226 because it requires a detailed examination of the evidence as may be had in a suit. Secondly, a disputed question of fact is not investigated in a proceeding under Article 226 particularly when an alternate remedy is available. In the context of the present case there is an alternative remedy of a suit. Not only this parties dispute the factual aspects as well. On one hand there is an assertion by the petitioner that it remains a small scale industry whereas respondent challenge the same on account of its turn over. Not only this, the respondent challenges the rights of the petitioner to claim any benefit on account of Act No. 32 of 1993, as according to the respondent the supply orders were earlier in time to the coming into enforcement of the Ordinance/Act. Otherwise too parties differ as to whether the supplier adhered to the time schedule as per supply order or not. This and the related issues indeed raises disputed question of fact which can be appropriately examined by a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Normally, in case of such disputed facts the court refrains from invoking its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Apex Court in Jai Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 898 held that 'the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not grant relief when the case involves determination of disputed questions of fact or when the petitioner has an alternative remedy.' Similarly, the apex Court in Thansing Nathmal v. The Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1419, held that when there exists an alternative efficacious remedy the Court normally refrains from invoking its discretionary powers. The aforesaid judgment of the Court held as under :-
'The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief of which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily, the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a Court of appeal against the decision of a Court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.'
7. Since the points raised are contentious and need a regular enquiry, remedy of writ invoked to resolve the disputed questions of facts is not an appropriate and hence declined. Accordingly, I dismiss the writ petition with a liberty to the petitioner to approach a Civil Court for adjudication of the dispute.
8. No order as to costs.