Judgment:
Vinod K. Sharma, J.
1. This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed to challenge the order dated 11.2.2005 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Rohtak confirming that of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak dated 8.3.2004.
2. The respondent Brahmo, step mother of the petitioner filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure claiming a sum of Rs. 1,500/- per month as maintenance from the petitioner.
3. The case set up by the respondent-step mother was that she was married to Mange Ram father of the petitioner, who died on 17.6.1996 and out of the said wedlock, one daughter namely Meena Devi was bom. Meena Devi is married and is living at her matrimonial home. The agricultural land belonging to Mange Ram has been inherited by the petitioner on the basis of a Will, which was alleged to be forged and a civil suit qua the same is pending.
4. It was further the case of the respondent that petitioner is drawing salary of Rs. 7,000/- per month whereas the step mother has no source of income.
5. On an application moved for grant of ad-interim maintenance by the step mother, the learned Judicial Magistrate was pleased to grant a sum of Rs. 1,000/- per month as maintenance and the revision filed by the petitioner against the said order also failed.
6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that under the provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no maintenance could be fixed for payment to the respondent being step mother and in support of this contention the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat 1996(3) R.C.R. (Crl.) 147 (S.C.), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down as under:
14. In view of the above discussion it follows that the expression mother, in Clause (d) of Section 125(1) of the Code, means and is referable only to the real or natural mother, who has actually given birth to the child and if that be so, the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Havaben Beline's case (supra) that the word 'mother' occurring in Clause (d) of Section 125(1) includes a woman who has the status of a 'step-mother' by reason of her lawful marriage with the father of the person sought to be made liable for maintenance under Section 125 cannot be accepted. This assumption of the meaning of the expression 'mother' by legal fiction would mean some thing which is not so intended by the legislature. For the same reasons the view taken by the Orissa High Court in Patel Bewa's case (supra), cannot also be accepted as it adopts the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court in preference to Bombay High Court which took the view that the word 'mother' used in Section 125(1)(d) of the Code, will have to be given its natural meaning and so construed it will mean only the natural mother and will not include the stepmother, who is common parlance is a distinct and separate entity and cannot be equated with one's own mother. The High Court of Allahabad in case of Ganga Sharan Varshney (supra) was mainly concerned with the question of jurisdiction with reference to the place where maintenance petition could be filed and there is not elaborate discussion on the question whether a step-mother would include in the expression 'mother' in Section 125(1)(d) of the Code or not. In our considered opinion the view expressed by the High Courts of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, with regard to the meaning of the expression 'mother' in Section 125(1)(d) of the Code is the correct view and the contrary view of the Gujarat High Court, Orissa High Court and the Allahabad High Court (supra) is not the correct view.
15. The point in controversy before us however is whether a 'step-mother' can claim maintenance from the step-son or not, having regard to the aims and objects of Section 125 of the Code. While dealing with the ambit and scope of the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Code, it has to be borne in mind that the dominat and primary object is to give social justice to the women, children and infirm parents etc. and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. The provisions of Section 125 provide a speedy remedy to those women, child and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions in Section 125 are intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions contained in Section 125 are intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions contained in Section 125 clearly is that the wife, child and parents should not be left in a helpless state of distress, destitution and starvation. Having regard to this social object the provisions of Section 125 of the code have to be given a liberal construction to fulfill and achieve this intention of the Legislature. Consequently, to achieve this objective, in our opinion, a childless step-mother may claim maintenance from the step-son provided she is a widow of her husband, if living is also incapable of supporting and maintaining her. The obligation of the son to maintain his father, who is unable to maintain himself, is unquestionable. When she claims maintenance from her natural born children, she does so in her status as their 'mother'. Such an interpretation would be in accord with the explanation attached to Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 because to exclude altogether the Personal Law applicable to the parties from consideration in matters of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code may not be wholly justified. However, no intention of Legislature can be read in Section 125 of the Code that even though a mother has her real and natural born son or sons and a husband capable of maintaining her, she could still proceed against her step-son to claim maintenance. Since, in this case we are not concerned with, we express no opinion, on the question of liability, if any, of the step-son to maintain the step-mother, out of the inherited family estate by the step-son and leave that question to be decided in an appropriate case. Our discussion is confined to the obligation under Section 125 Cr.P.C. only.
16. In the present case, as discussed above, the 'step-mother' respondent No. 2 has got 5 natural born sons who are all major and at least 3 of them are well to do and capable of maintaining their mother. This apart, as already noticed, the husband of respondent No. 2 is also possessed of sufficient means and property besides the monthly income that he derives from the business of Snuff enabling him to maintain and support his second wife, yet the stepmother respondent No. 2 preferred to claim the maintenance only from the step-son, the appellant herein leaving out all her natural born sons (from whom she could claim maintenance as their mother) and husband who are well to do. Prima facie it appears that respondent No. 2 proceeded against her stepson with a view to punish and cause harassment to the appellant, which is wholly unjustified. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that respondent No. 2 is not entitled to claim any maintenance from the step-son, appellant herein. In the result the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court and the Courts below are set aside and the petition of respondent No.2 for maintenance is dismissed, but without any orders as to costs. We, however, wish to clarify that in the interest of justice and to balance the equities, the amount already received by respondent No.2 from the appellant shall not be refundable to her to the appellant.
7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is that in view of the specific finding by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a step-mother is not entitled to maintenance from her step-son, the impugned order passed by the learned Court below cannot be sustained.
8. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent disputed this step and contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has nowhere laid down that there is a complete bar to maintain an application under Section 125 by a step-mother.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that under the given circumstances when the step-mother is childless or if her natural born son is unable to maintain her then she always can claim maintenance from her step-son. In the present case the agricultural land belonging to her deceased husband stands inherited by the petitioner and, therefore, there is a legal obligation on the petitioner to maintain her as the only daughter is married and, therefore, incapable to maintain widowed step-mother. In support of this contention he has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Ulleppa and Ors. v. Gangabai 2003(3) R.C.R. (Crl.) 405, wherein by relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kirtikand D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat (supra) the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court has been pleased to lay down as under:
10. In the light of the above referred judgments, as I mentioned earlier, a step-mother in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court can maintain a petition in the light of the larger object of Section 125 but she has to prove her helplessness in the matter. The Supreme Court in (1996)4 S.C.C. 479 has noticed that liberal construction has to be given to achieve the intention of the legislature and ruled that a childless step-mother can claim maintenance from her step-sons provided she is widow of her husband, and if living, is also incapable of supporting and maintaining her.
9. On consideration of the matter, I find force in the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent. It is admitted case of the parties that the only daughter of the respondent is married and is living in her matrimonial home. The liability of the petitioner under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 cannot be disputed in view of the inheritance of estate of his father.
10. Thus, keeping in view the object of Section 125 of the Act it has to be held by the learned Courts below were justified in granting maintenance to respondent step mother. No ground for interference is made.
Dismissed