M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This is defendants' appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, 'the Code') challenging the view taken by the learned District Judge, Patiala in his judgment and decree dated 3.9.1988 holding that the plaintiff-respondents along with defendant-respondent 6 were entitled to a declaration to the effect that they have become absolute owner of the suit land because the defendant-appellants being the mortgagor had failed to redeem the property mortgaged to them by mortgage deed Ex.P1 in the year 1928. The view taken is that the mortgage deed although is not registered, was. not required to be registered in the year 1928 as the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (for brevity, 'the Registration Act') was applicable to British India alone and it was not applicable to Pepsu. In that regard reliance has been placed on a judgment of Lahore High Court in the case of Maru Singh v. Mohru and Ors., A.I.R. 1929 Lahore 495. The trial Court has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents by excluding from consideration the mortgage deed Ex.Pl on the ground that it was required to be compulsorily registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act. However, the learned lower Appellate Court accepted the appeal of the plaintiff-respondents on the basis of the arguments that in the year 1928, the Registration Act was not made applicable to the Erstwhile State of Pepsu nor Section 59 of the Transfer or Property Act, 1882 (for brevity, Transfer of Property Act') was applicable to Punjab. The view of the learned lower Appellate Court in this regard reads as under:
6. The only contention raised by the counsel for the appellants is that in the year 1928 the provisions of Indian Registration Act were not applicable in the Erstwhile State of Patiala and as such the document being not computsorily registerable at that time has to be admitted in evidence. The contention of the counsel for the appellants is not without force. Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage can be effected either by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses. The Transfer of Property Act initially extended to the whole of British India but when India became independent after 1947 the expression' whole of India' was replaced by the words 'All the Provinces of India' and now it extends to the whole of India. The native States of India admittedly were not part of British India and the State of Patiala being a native State of India, the Transfer of Property Act did not extend to the same nor its Section 59 regarding compulsorily registration of the mortgages of immovable property securing a sum more than Rs. 100/-. It has been held in Maru Singh v. Mohru and Ors., A.I.R. 1929 Lahore 495 as under:
As the provisions of Transfer of Property Act do not extend to Punjab, a mortgage-deed which Section 59 ordinarily requires to be attested is admissible in Punjab even without attestation and the absence of attesting witness does not contravene the provisions of Section 68 Evidence Act.
It further confirmed that the provisions of Transfer of Property Act in respect of mortgages were not even applicable in Punjab much less the State of Patiala at the time of the execution of the mortgage-deed (Ex.P1) in the year, 1928. It is common knowledge that oral mortgages used to be in vogue earlier to the extension of provisions of Transfer of Property Act in Punjab. Accordingly the findings of the trial Court on issue No. l that mortgage deed (Ex.Pl) was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration has to be set aside. Mortgage-deed (Ex.P1) which is otherwise not disputed by the respondents is admissible in evidence and the respondents having not got redeemed the mortgage at any stage as observed by the trial Court, have lost their right of redemption by efflux of time thereby the plaintiff appellants have become absolute owners of the suit land.
2. Mr. G.S. Bhatia, learned Counsel for the defendant-appellants in support of the appeal has submitted that although the Registration Act or Transfer of Property Act were not applicable but its general principles all the same continued to apply as these principles are based on sound public policy. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a DivK sion Benrh judgment of this Court in the case of Messrs. Ram Gopal Dula Singh v. Sar-dar Gurbux Singh Jiwan Singh and Ors. and has argued that in para 15 of the judgment, it has been categorically held with regard to the Transfer of Property Act, that the principles of the Transfer of Property Act would still be applicable to Punjab because they are based on justice, equity and good conscience, although the rules of procedure may not be applicable. According to the learned Counsel, if this is the situation with regard to Transfer of Property Act, it would equally be the position with regard to Registration Act. Learned counsel has placed reliance on two other judgments of Pepsu High Court in the cases of Hari Chand v. Kartar Singh A.I.R. 1952 Pepsu 56 and Mt. Parsini w/o Joginder Singh v. Wasan Singh Labh Singh and Anr. A.I.R. 1951 Pepsu 109 and argued that in both these cases the unregistered deeds were not accepted in evidence by the Pepsu High Court itself. According to the learned Counsel, the Registration Act has been made applicable to Pepsu according to the view taken in the aforementioned two judgments.
3. Mr. Dinesh Nagar, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has pointed out that if the provisions of the original Registration Act are examined, then Section 1(2) thereof would show that the Registration Act was extended to whole of British India except such districts or tracts of country as the Provincial Government may exclude from its operation. Learned counsel has submitted that it was never extended to the State of Pepsu and, therefore, the view taken by the learned lower Appellate Court deserves to be upheld. Learned counsel has maintained that once the mortgage deed Ex. P1, which is although unregistered is accepted in evidence, then there is no hurdle in the way of the plaintiff-respondents to succeed as has been held by the learned lower Appellate Court. There is no other impediment except the want of registration which in fact is not applicable.
4. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the opinion expressed by the learned lower Appellate Court does not call for interference which is to the effect that an unregistered document would be admissible because the provisions of the Registration Act and Transfer of Property Act were not extended to the State of Pepsu. Learned lower Appellate Court has categorically observed that oral mortgage used to be prevalent prior to extending the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the Registration Act to Punjab. Section 1(2) of the Registration Act as well as Section 1 and 59 of the Transfer of Property Act as originally stood are reproduced hereunder for a facility of reference:
Registration Act
1. (1) xx xx xx xx
(2) It extends to the whole of British India, except such districts or tracts of country as the Provincial Government may exclude from its operation.
Transfer of Property Act
1. Short title.- This Act may be called the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Commencement.- It shall come into force on the first day of July, 1882.
Extent- It extends, in the first instance to the whole of India except the territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were comprised in Part-B States, or in the States of Bombay, Punjab and Delhi.
But this Act or any part thereof may by notification in the Official Gazette be extended to the whole or any part of the said States by the State Government concerned.
And any State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette exempt, either retrospectively or prospectively, any part of the territories administered by such State Government from all or any of the following provisions, namely:
Section 54, Paragraph 2 and 3, 59 107 and 123.
Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing part of this section, Section 54, Paragraphs 2 and 3, 59, 107 and 123 shall not extend or be extended to any district or tract of country for the time being excluded from the operation of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), under the power conferred by the first section of that Act or otherwise.'
'59. Mortgage when to be by assurance.- When the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards,a mortgage, other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses.
Where the principal money secured is less than one hundred rupees, a mortgage may be effected either by a registered instrument signed and attested as aforesaid, or (except in the case of a simple mortgage) by delivery of the property.
5. A perusal of Section 1(2) of the Registration Act envisages that the Act was to apply to the whole of the then British India. However, its application by provincial government could be excluded in respect of any districts or tracts of country obviously belonging to British India. Similar is the position with regard to the Transfer of Property Act. It is also evident that Pepsu was never a part of British India. A casual glance at the Reorganisation Act, 1956 (for brevity, 'the Reorganisation Act') would show that Pepsu became part of Punjab in w.e.f. 1.11.1956.
6. The matter is not res-integra. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Chand and Ors. v. Nathi (1983)85 P.L.R. 288, has taken the view that prior to the extension of Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act to Punjab, the oral or unregistered mortgages were valid. In the instant case, admittedly, unregistered mortgage had been made in the year 1928. At that time the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act had not been made applicable to the then State of Patiala which merged - into Pepsu and then into Punjab much later. In similar circumstances, the Full Bench in Shri Chand's case (supra) had held that such type of transaction at that time was, therefore, valid and legally enforceable one. It has further been held that it was wholly irrelevant with regard to the issue of validity of such a mortgage whether it was registered or not. The limitation therefore, is to run from the year 1928 which expired long back in 1958.
7. The view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Shri Chand's case (supra) came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Sampuran Singh v. Naranjan Kaurf : [1999]1SCR841 . Approving the judgment of the Full Bench in Shri Chand's case (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under:
The Full Bench decision rightly overruled the decision of Inder Singh (1966)68 P.L.R. 408 as that decision wrongly based its conclusion on an earlier decision in the case of Pursottam Dass v. S.M. Desoujza, : AIR1950Ori213 . The facts in that case were that the mortgage was for an amount for more than Rs. - 100 and was unregistered which was executed after the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to the State of Orissa hence the mortgage was invalid. It is for this reason it held that the period of limitation would only start after the expiry of 12 years of such invalid mortgage as such possession would perfect into a valid mortgage after the expiry of this period. Hence the Full Bench rightly held that the principle of Purshottam Dass was wrongly applied in Inder Singh. The Full Bench finally concluded:
In the present case, admittedly the oral mortgage had been made on June 14, 1948. At that time the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act had not been made applicable to the area. The said transaction at that time was therefore, valid and legally enforceable one and the fact whether the mortgage was registered or not was wholly irrelevant with regard to the issue of its validity. Consequently, the terminus for the limitation for redemption has to run from the aforesaid date of June 14, 1948....
We find no error committed in coming to the said decision by the Full Bench. No sustainable submission has been advanced to hold a contrary view.
8. When facts of the present case are considered in light of the principles laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Shri Chand's case (supra) and judgment of the Supreme Court in Sampuran Singh's case (supra), it becomes evident that the mortgage deed Ex.P.1 was executed in the year 1928. At that time neither the Registration Act nor Transfer of Property Act were applicable to the State of Patiala, which later on merged into the State of Pepsu and then Punjab. Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been extended to the territories which immediately before 1.11.1956 were comprised in Part B of State or in the State of Bombay, Punjab and Delhi. It was further provided by Section 1 of the Transfer of Property Act that any principle of the said statute may by notification in the official gazette be extended to whole or any part of the said territory by the State Government concerned. Admittedly, in this case the area is in the State of Punjab and the Transfer of Property Act had not been extended to the State of Patiala being not part the British India in 1928. Therefore, registration of the mortgage deed Ex.P. 1 is not required. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court, therefore, deserves to be approved.
For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.