A.L. Bahri, J.
1. At the motion stage, full bearing has been granted to counsel for both the parties and the revision petition is being disposed of.
2. This revision petition was filed by six petitioners namely, M/s R. S. Madho Ram & Sons through Shri Lakshmi Narain Goyal, Shri Laksami Narain Goyal Proprietor of M/s R. S. Madho Ram & Sons, M/s Sugan Textiles, through Lakshmi Narain, Shri Jagmohan Gupta, Smt Nirmal Khera and Shri Kishan Chand. Out of them, Shri Jagmohan Gupta and Smt. Nirmal Khera were partners of M/s. Sugan Textiles. The other partner Shri Vijay Gupta was impleaded as respondent In this revision petition, challenge was made to order of the appellate authority dated December 12, 1990, whereby order of the Rent Controller dated September 29, 1988, directing ejectment of the tenant and the alleged sub-tenants from the premises in dispute was confirmed The landlord M/s Dwarka Dass and Sons claimed ejectmeat of the petitioners and respondent No. 2 as described above on two grounds namely, sub-letting by the tenant M/s R. S. Madho Kam & Sons (Lakshmi Narain Goel) in favour of M/s Sugan Textiles (some portion) and other portion in favour of Kishan Chand and change of user as the premises were stated to be commercial but were used by Kishan Chand for residence. Findings of the authorities below were in favour of the landlord on these two points.
3. During the pendency of the appeal before the appellate authority, the premises were sold by the landlord by two separate sale-deeds, dated April 4, 1990. The vendees were not impleaded as parties in the appeal before the appellate authority. In the present appeal, an application was Sled for bringing on record and for considering the subsequent two sale deeds as additional evidence.
4. Civil Revision No. 605 of 1991 was filed against the order of the appellate authority aforesaid by M/s R S Madho Ram & Sons through Lakshmi Narain Goyal, Lakshmi Narain Goel, Proprietor M/s R. S Madho Ram & Sons and M/s Sugan Textiles, through Shri Lakshmi Narain Goyal. The aforesaid revision petition was dismissed as withdrawn on March 6, 1991.
5. On March 8, 1991. when the present revision petition came up for hearing, it was pointed out on behalf of the landlord respondents that the previous revision petition filed had been dismissed as withdrawn and the present revision petition filed by some of the parties could not proceed. An affidavit of Nirankar Singh, a vendee from M/s Owarka Dass & Sons was also filed to show that he was authorised by Dwaka Dass to continue to receive the rent and to act as landlord The case was adjourned to enable the counsel for the petitioners to obtain fresh instructions to proceed with this petition. Today a letter has been received from Lakshmi Narain through one Vijay Kumar Gupta, a commission agent in a sealed cover inter alia alleging that the present revision petition was not filed by him through Shri J. K. Sibal, Advocate. Someone has forged his signatures. Further reference was made to Revision Petition No. 605 of 1991, which was lateron dismissed as withdrawn under his instructions. He has sent his specimen signatures alongwith this letter and photo copies of his driving licence and Passport. Shri Baljinder Singh, Advocate, has put in appearance by filing power of attorney on behalf of Lakshmi Narain Goyal to assert that the previous petition was dismissed as withdrawn and that present revision petition is also not to be prosecured on behalf of M/s R. S. Madho Ram & Sons.
6. A preliminary objection has been raised by Shri M. L. Sarin, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the landlord that the present revision petition cannot proceed because of dismissal of the previous revision petition filed against the same impugned order. This point need not detain for long as some of the petitioners are still there who had not filed the previous revision petition to name Krishan Chand. Hence the present revision petition cannot be dismissed on the preliminary point. It is not therefore, considered proper to further probe as to whether Lakshmi Narain Goyal authorised Shri J K Sibal to file the present Revision Petition, or not
7. Shri J K Sibal, Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has argued that the order of the appellate authority passed on appeal is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. Reference has been made to Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 there lifter called the 'Act') Subsection (sic) provides for the appellate authority to send for the records of the case in appeal and after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing and after making further enquiry if any, to decide the appeal. Acceding to the counsel for the petitioners, after the landlord d had sold away the premises in dispute, be cease 1 to be a landlord and such a party before the appellate authority. The order passed by the appellate authority though after hearing the present petitioners as well as the previous landlord is void. Since the order of the appellate authority was void, the same is to be set aside with the result that order of the Rent Controller would not hold ground which was to be subject to the order of the appellate authority. In the case of sale of the premises by the landlord during pendency of the ejectment proceedings as argued, the owner of the premises would cease to lie landlord and the authorities under the Act would cease to have jurisdiction to order ejectment of the tenants. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the Pull Beach decision of Orissa High Court in Land Acquisition Officer v. Mst. Rahin, A. I. R 1971 Orissa 71. In para 13 of the judgment it was observed as under:
'............If the reference was made initially to a Court not having inherent jurisdiction and is disposed of by a Court equally having no inherent jurisdiction, then the decision on such a reference is without jurisdiction and void At any stage of the proceeding, lack of inherent jurisdiction, if discovered, can be questioned.'
The ratio of the aforesaid decision cannot be applied to the casein hand as it is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the appellate authority to decide the appeal. All decisions erroneous, illegal or against the provisions of the statute, are not without jurisdiction, null or void. The question of jurisdiction depends upon the statute conferring it. It cm be either of competency of the Presiding Officer or territorial or pecuniary The present case does not fall under any such categories. Thus it cannot be held that the 'appellate authority had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal or pass the impugned order. An attempt has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to argue that the impugned order would be void and thus a nullity as the appellate authority gave hearing in the appeal to an unauthorised person whose interest and title in the premises in dispute had ceased by sale during pendency of the appeal lam afraid, this contention cannot be accepted. It the order adverse to any person has been passed without giving him opportunity of hearing, it may be void order not effecting his rights. Present is a case where decision of the appellate authority is against the present petitioner which was given after hearing them. Thus in that sense, it cannot be held to be against the principles of natural justice. If the decision had been given by the appellate authority after hearing tae counsel for the appellants and without hearing the respondent or his counsel, and the decision had been against the appellant, it could not be held to be void or against the principles of natural justice or id violation of the provision of Section 15(4) of the Act. The mere fact that the appellate authority also gave hearing to the original landlord who was impleaded as a party in the appeal yet the decision was against the appellant, will not make the order void or null. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in such an eventuality, the mind of Presiding Officer was prejudioed by giving a hearing a third party who had no interest in the lis, cannot be accepted.
8. Shri J. K Sibal. Advocate, for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision of Karnataka High Court in The Asiatic Oxygen & Acetylene Co Ltd v. Mrs. Azra Abdullah, 1983 (2) R. C. R. 686. During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, the landlord transferred the suit premises to his daughter by way of gift it was hold that the cause of action did not survive in favour of the donee who got an independent right which could be enforced separately. Further reliance has been placed on the decision of Delhi High Court in Madan Lal v. Harkrishan Lal, (1965) 68 P. L. R. D. 14. An application for ejectment of the tenant was filed on the ground of non-payment of rent and subletting an J during pendency of the application the premises were sold by the landlord. It was held that decree for eviction could not be passed. The provisos of Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable. In the two cases referred to above, the matter had arisen during the pendency of the proceeding before the trial Court (Rent Controller) There was no further question for consideration as to whether the old landlord was left with any right, title or interest in the premises in dispute or not The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that appeal would be continuation of the ejectment proceedings which were initiated before the Rent Controller and while making reference to Section 15 (4) of the Act it has been argued that it is the decision of the appellate Court which is to be treated as final and subject to that decision, the order of the Rent Controller is to be treated as final Otherwise on filing an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller the proceedings could be stayed as .mentioned in sub section (2) of Section IS. I have given due consideration to these arguments but I do not find any force therein. Under Section 15 (2) of the Act a power is given to the appellate authority for staying further proceedings in the matter pending decision of the appeal in the case of an order of ejectment, .farther proceedings as contemplated therein the execution proceedings should be staved otherwise, the order of the the Rent Controller in the absence of any order of stay would be enforced even of the appeal against the aforesaid order was filed and was pending Till such an order of the Rent Controller is set aside on appeal that will remain final. It is only when such an order is set aside, that order of the appellate authority would become final No doubt, the appeal would be continuation of the original proceedings but when the question for consideration is regarding the competency of the person to act as landlord sad a question has to be decided if raised on evidence as to whether such a person would be covered under the defnition of landlord' as provided under Section 2 (c) of the Act which reads as under:-
'2(c) 'landlord' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit of say other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised and every person from time to time deriving title under the landlord.'
A perusal of the aforesaid definition of landlord would show that a person for the time being entitled to receive rent is a landlord This further shows that a person need not be an owner to become a landlord but be can be other person who is entitled to receive rent. For example if a sub-tenant with tie permission of the landlord sublets the premises the tenant would be the landlord qua sub-tenant. In that situation, the tenant would not be owner but would be a person entitled to receive rent. The question was not raised before the appellate authority, there was no decision in the impugned order. Merely because such a question was not raised and decided will not make the impugned order to be null and void as it has been passed after giving hearing to the original landlord who in tic meantime, had sold away the premises.
9. With regard to Civil Revision No. 605 of 1991 having been filed which was dismissed as withdrawn on March 6, 1991, it has been argued by Shri J. K. Sibal, Advocate that Laksbmi Narain Goyal being one of the partners of the firm M/s Sugan Textiles, the alleged tenant. could not withdraw the revision petition in view of Section 19 of the Partnership Act. Section 19(2) of the Indian Partnership Act reads as under:-
'In the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to-
(a) Submit a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration.
(b) open a banking account on behalf of the firm in his own name.
(c) compromise or relinguish any claim by the firm,
(d) withdraw a suit or proceeding filed on behalf of the firm,
(e) admit any liability in a suit or proceeding against the firm
(f) acquire immovable property on behalf of the firm,
(g) transfer immovable property belonging to the firm; or
(h) enter into partnership on behalf of the firm '
The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that in view of sub-clause (d) of Section 19(2) of the Partnership Act, Laksbmi Narain having filed the previous revision petition on behalf of M/s Sugan Textiles was not competent to withdraw it since there were other partners of this firm. The contention of Shri M. L. Sarin, Sr. Advocate for the respondents is that it is a matter of evidence as to Whether there was any usage or custom or trade to the contrary to Enforce the aforesaid provisions. I do not find any merit in the contention of Shri Sarin. In the matter of like nature proceedings for ejetment having been filed culminating in an order of ejectment on appeal being filed by a firm through one of the partners, there is no question of usage or custom of trade involved Thus a partner who had filed the appeal could not unilaterally without opinion or consent the other partners withdraw the same As holding above, it cannot hi laid that the previous revision petition was wholly dismissed as withdrawn. As already stated above, the previous revision petition was filed by the tenant M/s R. S. Madho Ram & Sons through its sole proprietor Mr. Lakshmi Narain Goyal and M/s Sugan Textiles, the alleged sub tenant. As far as the tenant M/s R. S Madho Ram & Sons and Lakshmi Narain Goyal are concerned, the revision petition aforesaid was property filed and properly dismissed be withdrawn. Thus the present revision petition on behalf of the tenant aforesaid cannot proceed and against the tenant, the order of ejectment passed by the appellate authority has become final.
10. As to what is the effect of the decision in the previous revision petition which was dismissed as withdrawn, on the fate of the present revision petition is for further consideration. The ejectment was ordered on two grounds ; (i) sub letting in favour of M/s Sugan Textiles and Krishan Chand of different portions of premises in dispute and for change of user of the premises from commercial to residence as Kishan Chand was using the same for residential purposes as representative of the tenant M/s R. S. Madho Ram & Sons. It is not considered necessary to decide the question of sub-tenancy as on the ground of change of user of a portion of the premises for residence stands proved by both the authorities below and such a finding is binding on the tenant M/s R. S Madho Ram & Sons and Lakshmi Narain Goyal. As far as Kishan Chand is concerned, in the joint written statement filed by all the parsons, tenant and alleged sub-tenants he was stated to be an employee of the tenant M/s R. S Madho Ram & Sons. The fact that Kishan Chand was using a portion of the premises for residential purposes, was not specifically denied in the written statement. Qua this aspect of the matter, findings and order of ejectment passed against the tenant are final and if on one of the grounds ejectment of tenant can be ordered, it is not necessary to decide the other grounds. Reference was made to the decision of Justice Mehar Singh, the then Chief Justice in Ganga Ram v. Mewa, Civil Appeal No. 1984 of 1967. (Civil Revision No. 1984 of 1967), decided on April 19 1968 There were two revision petitions filed against orders of ejectment' In one revision petition, the order of ejectment was affirmed In the second revision position, it was held that the same had' become tnfrucfuous. The order of ejectment passed against the tenant is binding on the sub-tenaut. It was so held by the Supreme Court in Messers. Importers and . v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewata, A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 73.
11. For the reasons recorded above finding no merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
12. Civil Misc. filed therein also stands disposed of as the effect of subsequent sale has been taken into consideration. The petitioners are allowed two months' time to vacate the same.