Judgment:
S.S. Sudhalkar, J.
1. This writ petition is filed by the employer challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 27.10.1998, copy annexure P/6 vide which respondent No. 1 was ordered to be re-instated in service with continuity thereof and 25% back wages.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
3. The Labour Court has held that the termination of the service of respondent is against the provisions of section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The Labour Court has held that the principle of 'last come first go' has been violated when persons junior to the respondent were retained and the respondent was terminated. The Labour Court has also observed that the respondent had categorically stated that certain persons junior to him were retained in service at the time of termination and he has not been cross-examined on this point.
4. The Labour Court has further held that MW-1 who had appeared for the Management has also no where stated in his testimony that the juniors were not retained in service. There appears to be no infirmity in the findings of th Labour Court relying on these two reasons. Moreover, the management could have shown from the documentary evidence available with it that the allegation made by the petitioner is not correct. This is not done. Therefore, adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioner. We are supported in our view by the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Gopal Krishnaji Ketker v. Mohamed Hajl Latif and others, reported as AIR 1968 SC1413.
. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the case of Brij Bhushan v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Panipat and another, reported as 1998(2) RSJ 449 : 1998(3) SCT 17 (P&H;)(DB). It is a judgment of Division Bench of this Court. In that case, it has been held that the prayer of reinstatement can be refused even though the termination of service may not have been brought about without compliance of Sections 25F or 25G of the Act. The last extension to the workman, in that case, was given during the pendency of a writ petition filed by one Ved Parkash in which the workman was also a party-respondent. The facts of the case can be seen by reproducing para No. 8 of the judgment. It is as under
'8. What has happened in the present case amply justifies the refusal of the Labour Court to order reinstatement of the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner was given initial appointment for fixed term of less than one month. However, the tenure of his service was extended from time to time with the sole subject of bye-passing direction given by the Court in Kulbhushan's case (supra) against employment of temporary and ad hoc employees without advertisement of the post and without complying with the provisions of the Act of 1959. The officer concerned devised a clever conduct to disobey the Court's order. He appointed the petitioner ignoring the rights of large number of other persons who may be more qualified than the petitioner and who may have been waiting for years together for an opportunity to compete for entry in the public service. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner's initial appointment was an act of favouritism and clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.'
6. In this case, there is no allegation that the respondent was appointed in order to bye-pass the order of any court in any other case or by virtue of favouritism. Therefore, the principle in the above mentioned case will not be applicable to the facts of the present case.
7. This writ petition is, therefore, without merits and is hereby dismissed.
8. Writ petition dismissed.