G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. These petitions have been filed to quash the notification dated 18.12.1992 and 23.11.1993 issued by the State Government for acquisition of the land for the construction of District Administrative complex at Mansa Kalan, Tehsil Mansa, District Mansa, and in view of the commonness of the issues raised in all the petitions, we are deciding them by a common order.
2. Mansa was declared as a District by the Government of Punjab in March, 1992. It became functional w.e.f. 13.4.1993. Earlier to this, it was a Tehsil Headquarter with very few officials. Sub-Divisional Courts Complex at Mansa was constructed prior to it being declared as District. For the purpose of construction of sub-Divisional Courts Complex, some of the petitioners and other Land-owners contributed 117-Kanals and 14-Marlas of Land. The building constructed over this land was put to full use with the creation of the new District. After the creation of the new District, it became necessary for the Government to provide proper and secured offices and residences for the Deputy Commissioner, the District & Sessions Judge, the Senior Superintendent of Police and other officials, for this purpose, it became necessary for the Government to acquire land and with this object in view, the Government issued notification dated 18.12.1992 under Section 4 read with Section 17(2)(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') for acquisition of 120-Kanals of land. This notification was published in the Gazette dated 25.12.1992. Subsequently, it was opined by the Department of Legal and Legislative Affairs that declaration under Section 6 was required.to be made after publication of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, and, therefore, the notification issued on 18.12.1992 may be withdrawn. Accordingly, the Government rescinded the notification dated 18.12.1992 and at the same time issued notification dated 23.11.1993 for acquisition of the same piece of land by invoking the power under Section 17 of the Act.
3. Petitioners, Sadhu Singh and eight others, who have filed Civil Writ Petition No. 236 of 1993, have alleged that they purchased small plots situated in Khasra Nos. 88/24 and 25 near Court Complex, Mansa, and constructed small residential houses and while the land falling under their houses is being acquired without giving them opportunity to make representation and without compliance of provisions of Section 5A of the Act, the land belonging to influential persons has been left out. It has also been pleaded that there is no urgency for acquisition of the land because various offices and Courts are efficiently functioning after the creation of the District three years ago. Another ground of challenge to the acquisition proceedings is that residential buildings exist on the disputed land and the provisions of Section 17(1) cannot be invoked in such like matters. The petitioners have also alleged that the land is not suitable for the purpose of construction of offices/residential complex.
4. Petitioners Gurlal and Ors., who have instituted C.W.P. No. 882 of 1993, have stated that their predecessor-in-title had donated 29-Kanals and 16-Marlas of land vide gift-deed dated 27.8.1975 for the construction of Courts Complex and they have raised small houses for residential purpose after purchasing small plots of land and the Government has illegally acquired their land without following the procedure prescribed by law.
5. Petitioners, Ajit Singh and four others, who have filed C.W.P. No. 956 of 1993, have stated that they were owners of Khasra Nos. 88/24 and 25 which was bifurcated and sold to several persons named in Annexure P-3 but same portion of the land forming part of the said kashra Number still belongs to them and they have raised a small construction over the said piece of land. The petitioners have stated that khasra Nos. 24 and 25 have virtually become a residential colony where all of them are living. They have challenged the acquisition proceedings on the ground of violation of the provisions of the Act, non-application of mind and discrimination.
6. Civil Writ Petition No. 10230 of 1993 has been filed by Sadhu Singh and 12 others (9 of them are petitioners in C.W.P. No. 236 of 1993 and 4 are petitioners in C.W.P. No. 882 of 1993). The Additional facts incorporated in this writ petition are that the stay order passed in their favour in C.W.P. No. 236 of 1993 and 882 of 1993 was vacated by the High Court and their efforts to get stay order failed before the Supreme Court which dismissed the S.L.P. on 27.8.1993. Therefore, they made representation to the various functionaries of the Government who have assured of proper consideration of their grievance but now the Government has issued fresh notification and notices under Section 9 have also been issued by the Collector.
7. Case of the respondents is that there is no residential colony on the land sought to be acquired and some of the petitioners have made unauthorised construction after the proceedings for acquisition were started. It has been asserted by the respondents that due to non-availability of suitable accommodation, temporary arrangements have been made by the Government for running the district administration and the district judiciary which could not be made fully functional due to non-availability of proper accommodation. The respondents have pleaded that officers belonging to the Judiciary, executive and police wings are facing difficulties in carrying out their functions due to non-availability of proper and secured accommodation. In reply to C.W.P. No. 16230 of 1993, it has also been stated that the land has been acquired after approval by the site selection Committee which was constituted by the Government and that emergency provisions have been invoked because the administration was facing acute shortage of accommodation for proper functioning. It has been stated that the district office is functioning in tehsil office and the tehsil office is functioning in the Central Patwarkhana. It has been reiterated by the respondents that some of the petitioners have constructed kothas after the issuance of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Further assertion of the respondents is that notices under Section 9 have been served on the landlords and all formalities have been completed for taking possession after payment of compensation. In an additional affidavit dated 24.2.1994, filed in C.W.P. No. 16230 of 1993, Shri Amar Singh, Land Acquisition Collector-cum-S.D.O. (Civil) has stated that a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- has been allocated for construction of District Administrative Complex and another amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- has been allocated for acquisition of land. Another affidavit has been filed by Shri Krishan Chand, S.D.O. - cum-Land Acquisition officer, Mansa, on 24.2.1994 (C.W.P. No. 236 of 1993). In this Affidavit, Shri Krishan Chand has stated that after vacation of the stay order on 31.5.1993 execution proceedings were again started and notices under section 9 were issued but before possession could be taken, an order of status quo was passed on 3.1.1994 in C.W.P. No. 16230 of 1993 regarding two acres of land. Therefore, possession of the remaining land (13 acres) was taken and it was handed over to the public Works Department (B&R;) on 5.2.1994. That Department has already spent Rs. 2.30 crores for construction of Judicial/Administrative Blocks. It has also been stated that the land-owners of 13 acres land have accepted the award under protest and reference made under Section 18 of the Act is pending in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Mansa. During the course of arguments, we directed the learned counsel for the State to produce documentary evidence to show as to who took decision to acquire the land by invoking urgency proceedings. Shri Chhina produced photostat copies of the letters dated 5.6.1992 and 13.7.1992 written by the Deputy Commissioner, Mansa to the Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Punjab and photostat copies of the note-sheets showing that the proceedings were approved by the Minister concerned as well as the Chief Minister before notification dated 18.12.1992 was issued. Perusal of the letter dated 5.6.1992 shows that a meeting of the district level site Selection Committee was held in order to decide the site for construction of different offices and residential colony for the officials of the new district. No-objection Certificates were obtained from some of the Departments but the senior Town planner has not sent 'No-objection Certificate' by that time. The Deputy Commissioner gave out the detail as of the procedure for execution of the land. Along with the second letter, the Deputy Commissioner again submitted the papers to the Financial Commissioner (Revenue). Photostat copies of the note-sheets show that the Government had already allocated funds for the purpose of acquisition of land and for construction. The funds were to the utilized in that financial year. Notes also suggest that requirement of the offices was quite urgent. The proposal for issue of the notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Act was approved by the Minister concerned and Hon'ble the Chief Minister on 2.12.1992 and 11.12.1992, respectively.
8. Two-fold contentions have been raised by Sh. Dhaliwal, learned counsel for the petitioners. His first contention is that there was not material available with the Government to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act and in fact there is no justification to invoke urgency clause because construction of offices and residential blocks are bound to take long time and even if some time was spent for holding inquiry under Section 5-A, no prejudice would have been suffered by the Government. Sh. Dhaliwal argued that the petitioners are being deprived of their properties without being heard and, therefore, the impugned acquisition is contrary to the principles of natural justice. He argued that the impugned acquisition is malicious and arbitrary because the respondents have deliberately left out the land of influential persons although that land is adjacent to the complex and more suitable for expansion of the existing complex. Sh. Dhaliwal also argued that there exist residential houses and, therefore, the land in dispute cannot be treated as waste or liable so as to allow invoking of powers under Section 17 of the Act. he relied on, the following decisions :-
1. Shiv Dayal v. State of Punjab, 1992 P.L.J. 11;
2. Mangat Singh v. State of Punjab, 1992 P.L.J. 129;
3. Harpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (1992-2) 102 P.L.R. 67.
4. V.K. Madan v. State of Haryana, 1985 P.L.J. 518.
5. K.U.M. Samiti v. Ratan Prakash, AIR 1988 SC 1459;
6. Union of India v. K.K. Chopra, AIR 1988 SC 2036 and
7. State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319.
9. Section 17(2) of the Act which has been invoked by the respondents for acquisition of land has been amended by the Land Acquisition (Punjab Amendment) Act. 1954 and Land Acquisition (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1956. These amendments are very significant because they have widened the purpose of urgency clause contained in Section 17. For the purpose of this order, it will be Useful to quoteSections 17(1) and 17(2) as these are applicable to the State of Punjab in the amendment form. These provisions are:-
'17. Special Power in cases of urgency :
(i) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1) take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall there-upon vest absolutely in the Government, for all circumstances.
Explanation :- This sub-section shall apply to any waste or arable land, notwithstanding the existence therein of scattered trees or temporary structures, such as huts, pandals or sheds,
(2) In the following cases, that is to say :-
a) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a riverside or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station;
b) whenever in the opinion of the Collector it become necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of any library or educational institution or for the construction, extension or improvement of any building or other structure in any village for the common use of inhabitants of such village, or any godown for any society registered under Co-operative societies Act, 1912, or any dwelling house for the poor, or the construction of labour colonies or houses for any other class of people under a Government sponsored housing scheme, or any irrigation tank, irrigation or drainage channel, or any well, or any public road;
c) Whenever land is required for a public purpose which in the opinion of the appropriate Government is of urgent importance, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned inSub-section (i) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances;
Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof atleast forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience.'
10. Section 17(2)(b) permits invoking of urgency clause whenever the Collector is of the opinion that it is necessary to acquire to immediate possession of any land for the purpose of any library or educational institution or for the construction, extension of improvement of any building or other structure in any village for the common use of inhabitants of such village etc.Clause (c) of Section 17(2) contains an omnibus provisions empowering the Government to invoke urgency clause whenever the land is required for a public purpose which in the opinion of the appropriate Government is of urgent importance. It is therefore, evident that once the Government forms a bonafide opinion that the purpose of acquisition of urgent importance, Section 17 can be invoked which necessarily means that the provisions regarding inquiry can be given a go-bye. The process by which the Government forms opinion about the existence of, public purpose for acquisition and urgent importance does not involve adjudication of a list between the parties and, therefore, there is not scope for reading principles of natural justice as a part of the process of opinion of formation. What can be seen by the Court is whether some material existed on the basis of which the Government could form an opinion about the urgent acquirement of the land. In this case, there existed more than sufficient material to show that the Government urgently acquired the land for the purpose of construction of residential and official accommodation to accommodate administrative officers as well as judicial officers. Once the Government took a decision of create a now District, it became imperative for it to immediately provide for adequate and secure'4 office complex as well as the residential premises for the officers. Running of the administration as well as the Courts cannot possibly be done without proper buildings. Therefore, the requirement of constructing administrative and judicial blocks at Mansa was urgently required. Similarly, provision for housing the officers of the rank of District and Session Judge, Deputy Commissioners and Superintendent of Police and other Class-I officers was urgently required. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Government had acted arbitrarily be invoking the urgency clause, more so, when by the Punjab Amendment, the Legislature has conferred much more wider power on the Government to invoke urgency clause for acquisition of land. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the contention of Shri Dhaliwal that exercise of the power under Section 17 is vitiated due to arbitrariness or non-application of mind. In this connection, we consider it appropriate to refer to a recent decision of this Court in St. Swaran Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1995-2)110 P.L.R. 412. In that case acquisition was for establishment of Industrial Training Institute at Jalalbad (est), Tehsil Fazilka, District Ferozepur. While upholding the exercised ofpower under Section 17(2), a Division Bench of this Court held :-
'Section 17(2) as substituted by the Punjab Act, inter alia provides that the urgency provisions can be invoked 'whenever in the opinion of the Collector, it becomes necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of any library or educational institution or for ....' and 'whenever land is required for a public purpose which in the opinion of the appropriate Government is of urgent importance.' In this case, land is being admittedly acquired for the public purpose of establishing an educational Institution. The State Government has clearly notified its opinion that the land 'is urgently needed.....so as to meet the time-bound construction schedule....' Has it the power is doing so? Was the urgency such as could not brook a delay of 30 days?
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Learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that the matter regarding the establishment of an Industrial Training Institute, has been pending consideration with the Government since the year 1991. Since the Government had taken almost four years, it cannot be said that a delay of 30 days involved in allowing the landowners to file objections would have seriously affected the public interest. This allegation as made by the petitioners, has been specifically controverted in the Written Statement filed on behalf of the respondents. It has been pointed out that the decision to establish the Institution was taken by the Government on September 21, 1993. After the minutes were drawn up, the Deputy Commissioner was asked to call the meeting of the site selection 'Committee on October 27, 1993. Soon thereafter the committee has surveyed the land and selected the site on February 11, 1994. The other formalities regarding issue of No Objection Certificate etc. were complied with and thereafter the notification under Section 4 was issued on March 12, 1994. Taking all these factors into consideration, it cannot be said that the State Government had acted in such a lackadaisical manner that the proceedings for acquisition or the action of the State Government in invoking the urgency clause should be vitiated. Time was spent in consideration of the matter at different levels. Even, the execution of urgent projects is invariably delayed a account of inter-departmental communications. In the present case, at least three Departments viz, Education, Industrial Training/Technical Education and the Finance Department were involved, sometimes, even the inter-departmental delays make the problem more acute and increase the 'urgency of the necessity for acquisition'. This is precisely what appears to have happened in the present case. In the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the time spent in the present case is 'sufficient to nullify the urgency which 'existed at the time of the issue of the issue of the notification......'
11. The same yiew has been expressed by a learned single Judge in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996-1) R.L.R. 401.
12. We may also refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan and Ors. s, JT 1993(1) SC 298, Chameli Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., JT (1995) (9) SC 380, and B. Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab and Ors. s, JT 1996(3) SC 60.
13. In the case of Rajasthan Housing Board (supra) acquisition of the land was made by the Government for Rajasthan Housing Board which has undertaken a scheme for construction of houses. By a majority decision, Full Bench of the High Court quashed the acquisition on the ground that the land was not waste because construction existed over it. While reversing the decisions of the High Court, the Supreme Court held :-
'We are satisfied that there was material before the Government in this case upon which it could have and did form the requisite opinion that it was a case calling for exercise of power under Section 17(4).........' The material placed before the Court discloses that the Government found, on due verification, that there was an acute scarcity of 'land and there was heavy pressure for construction of houses for weaker sections and middle income group people, that the Housing Board had obtained a loan of Rs. 16 crores under time-bound programme to construct and utilize the said land by 31.3.1983; that in the circumstances, the Government was satisfied that unless possession was taken immediately and the Housing Board permitted to proceed with the construction, the Board will not be able to adhere to the time-bound programme......that in view of the time bound programme stipulated by the lender, HUDCO, the Board had already appointed a large number of Engineers and other subordinate staff for carrying out the said work and that holding an inquiry under Section 5-A would have resulted in uncalled for delay endangering the entire scheme and time schedule of the Housing Board.
' Their Lordships further held :-
'It must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is substantive one and that so long as there is material upon which the Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate Authority. This is the principle affirmed by the decision of the Court not only under Section 17(4) but also generally with respect to substantive satisfaction.'
14. In Chameli Singh's case (supra) and in B. Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar's case (supra) purpose of acquisition was to provide houses to the poor. In both the cases, the Supreme Court held that the said purpose warrantedexercise of power under Section 17(4) to dispense with inquiry under Section 5-A.
15. The various decisions on which Shri Dhaliwal has placed reliance do not have any direct bearing on the point raised in these cases. In Shiv Dayal's case (supra), a learned single Judge quashed the notification issued under section 17 for construction of staff quarters. The learned single Judge held that the public purpose for which the land had been acquired per se is not something which could be accomplished in a day was of not such a nature that it cannot brook the delay during which objections underSection 5-A could not be heard and decided. Learned Single Judge relied on the then prevailing view of the Supreme Court on the urgency provisions and held that the impugned notification was bad.
16. In Mangat's case (supra) a Division Bench struck down invoking of urgency provision for setting up of a Sugar Mill on the ground that the State took one year to take final decision to set up the Sugar Mill at a particular place. The Court held that the State could have waited for 30 days to enable the land owners to file objections under Section 5-A.
17. In Harpal Singh's case (supra), the acquisition of land for construction of a truck stand. A Division Bench held that purpose cannot be said to be so pressing or urgent that the authority could not even afford the time spent in hearing the objections.
18. In V.K. Madan's case (supra), learned single Judge quashed the notification issued underSection 17 for acquisition of land for construction of a Police Station. The decision of the Supreme Court in K.U.M. Samiti v. Tatan Prakash (supra), goes against the petitioners rather then supporting their case. In that case their lordships upheld the invoking of urgency clause even though earlier proceedings had been quashed by the High Court. In K.K. Chopra's case there is hot discussion with reference to urgency clause.
19. All these decisions turned on their own facts and, therefore, they cannot be treated as precedent for holding that the urgency clause cannot be invoked in any case where construction of a building is to be raised on the acquired land. Rather the recent decisions of the Supreme Court shows that invoking of urgency clause.for a housing scheme or for providing houses to weaker sections can be upheld. Above all in view of the special provisions contained in Section 17(2) of the Act, as it stands after amendment, which have not been considered in any of the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners the impugned acquisition cannot be nullified either on the ground of arbitrariness or on the ground of non-application of mind or mala fide.
20. Coming to the second contention of Shri Dhaliwal regarding discrimination, we may straightaway observe that except making a bald statement that land of others has been left court, the petitioners have not produced any cogent evidence to prima facie establish the charge of discrimination. The burden to prove violation of Article 14 of the Constitution primarily lay upon the petitioners and as they have failed to produce cogent evidence to support the plea of discrimination, we do not find it just and proper to make a fishing and roving inquiry to find out some or the other ground to sustain the plea of discrimination. If at all the petitioners felt that land of others have been left out due to extraneous consideration, it was their duty to implead such persons as respondents so as to enable the Court to direct the acquisition of the land belonging to such other persons in order to bring about positive equality. That having not been done, we are unable to uphold the plea of discrimination.
21. Before concluding, we deem it proper to mention that after this Court had vacated the interim stay order in C.W.P. Nos. 236 and 882 of 1993 a huge sum of Rs. 2.30 crores has been spent by the respondents for construction of building and, therefore, it would cause great public mischief if the acquisition proceedings are quashed by this Court at this belated stage.
22. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition are dismissed.