ORDER
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The basic principle that the plaintiff is dominus litis of his suit and a party objectedto by him cannot be impleaded in the proceedings, is not an absolute principle or rule. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the Code, are exception to this Rule. The parties to a suit are governed and regulated by the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code, which would finally be the guiding factor for the Court to determine, whether an applicant is a necessary or proper party to a suit or not. This is the precise question which arises for consideration in the present revision petition.
2. Before entering into the realm of legal precepts of this proposition it will be appropriate to refer to the facts giving rise to the present revision petitions i.e. Civil Revision No. 1204 of 1997 and Civil Revision No. 1706 of 1996. Admittedly, Kashmiri Lal and Krishan Lal were the joint owners of the property i.e. plot/House No. 456, New Jawahar Nagar, Jalandhar. Both the brothers had inducted their third brother Banarsi Dass somewhere in the year 1972 as a licensee in the part of the premises. Similarly, late Mr. Raj Kumar was also inducted as a licensee in other part of the same premises on the part of the first floor.
3. It is the case of Krishan La! and his wife Santosh Rani (petitioners herein) that Kashmiri Lal had sold his share in the property by a registered sale-deed dated 7-6-1995 (1985) to Santosh Rani. Consequently, they have become owners of the entire property. They did nol wish to continue the licence in favour of Banarsi Dass. They had called upon Banarsi Dass to vacate the portion in his possession of the property in question, which Banarsi Dass failed to do. Consequently, they had instituted a suit for mandatory injunction directing the licensee to hand over the possession of the portion in his occupation, as a licensee which stands terminated. This suit has been registered as a Civil Suit No. 74 of 1995. Still another suit was filed by the same set of plaintiffs against the wife and children of late Raj Kumar on same facts praying that a decree for mandatory injunction be passed against defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in that suit for delivering back the possession of the portion in their occupation shown in red colour in the site plan annexed to the plaint. This suit was registered as Civil Suirt No. 326 of 1995.
4. The case of Banarsi Dass defendant in one of the aforestated suits was that Kashmiri Lal had entered into an agreement to sell on 14-8-1984prior to the alleged sale-deed and had received a consideration of Rs. One Lac at that time. As such Banarsi Dass was in possession in his own right and not a licensee. In addition to this, various objections have been taken in the written statement. During the initial stages of the suits, which are pending, Kashmiri Lal filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code, for being impleaded as a defendant in the suit. The case pleaded in the application is that Kashmiri Lal had never executed the sale-deed dated 7-6-1985 and the same is a forged and fabricated document. Kashmiri Lal claimed to continue to be owner of the half share of the property, which he was admittedly having prior to the execution of the alleged sale-deed. The application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code for impleadment by Kashmiri Lal was filed in both the suits. The application was allowed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 20-1-1997, which has been impugned in the present revisions. The order passed by the learned trial Court on this application in Civil Suit No, 326 of 1995 has given rise to Civil Revision No. 1204 of 1997 while'in another suit No. 74 of 1995 has given rise to Civil Revision No. 1706 of 1996.
5. As common question of law based on more or less similar facts arise in both the revision petitions, where the plaintiffs and applicants are even the same, it is considered expedient to dispose of both these revisions by a common order.
6. The provisions of Order 1 give amontagious but clear picture as to who should be the paries to the suit. The parties are left at their discretion to choose the defendants in a claim or suit. The other party has a right to raise an objection with regard to non-joinder and/or misjoinder of necessary and proper parties by taking appropriate objections in their pleadings. The Court may direct impleadment of necessary and proper parties in accordance with the provisions of Order 1 and its various Rules. Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code in elaboration deals with the striking out or adding of parties by the Courts in addition to the suit being instituted in the name of a wrong party. The provisions read as under:--
'Order 1, Rule 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff :-- (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has beeninstituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
(2) Court may strike out or add parties :-- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.
(4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended:-- Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant.
(5) Subject to the provisions of the 'Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.'
7. The power vested in the Court under sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code is of vide magnitude and is intended to cover a larger field. The cumulative effect of this Order 1 and its Rules read in entirety is obviously intended to vest the Court with wide discretion in regard to the question of impleadment of the party in a suit or proceedings pending before it. This judicial discretion vested in a Court has to be exercised in consonance with the settled principles of law. Though it is certainly impossible to prescribe a standard formula or a straight-jacket principle which would govern all the cases, where such question arises for the consideration of the Court, in view of the various pronouncements by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the High Courts.
8. The Code of Civil Procedure provides as to how a suit has to be instituted and how would it end. The Code provides a thread of continually, which would regulate various stages of the suit. In other words, the intention of the legislation must and has to be gathered from the various provisions of the Code read collectively and in conjunction with each other. Whereas Order 1, Rules 1 and 3 of the Code provides who arc the persons who could be joined as plaintiffs and/or defendants, Rule 10 gives power to the Court to add parties to direct addition and impleadment of parties and Rule 8-A gives right to a party to approach the Court for being impleaded as a party, if the applicant has an interest in any question which directly and substantially arise in the suit. The provisions regulating impleadment of necessary and proper parties, whose presence is necessary before the Court for proper and final adjudication, must be construed in a wider perspective, as the provisions of Order 2, Rule 1 of the Code clearly indicate that every suit, as for as practicable, be framed so as to afford grounds for final decision upon the subjects in disputes and to prevent further litigation concerning them. To hold that avoidance of multiplicity of litigation in regard to the same subject matter is not even relevant factor while considering the application for impleadment, to my mind, would be an approach not in line with the spirit of the procedural law.
9. In order to have a pervasive and baroque approach to the provisions of the Code which would be also in consonance with the scheme of the Code, would be to read the provisions of Order 1 and other effecting provisions of the Code collectively, rather than to read and construe Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code in abstract or isolation. Interpretation of construction of procedural laws or provisions related thereto must be read to achieve the ends of justice which is an indispensable object of basic rule of law. With the modern development in all spheres of life the Courts must mould the procedural laws to further the cause of expeditious disposal and determination of all questions in one proceedings, if permissible in law, rather than to direct the parties to create multiplicity of litigation.
10. Without being innovative and primarily on reiteration of the settled principles and in a derivative manner, it is possible to indicate certain factors which may be considered by the Courtwhile determining such a question :--
a) Whether the applicant is a necessary and proper party keeping in view the facts and circum-stances of the case?
b) Whether presence of such a party before the Court is necessary for effectively and completely adjudicating the matter and granting a complete and effective decree to the party entitled to?
c) Whether such a party interested would be directly effected as a result of cul ruination of such persons into decree or it would only be effected remotely, indirectly and distantly?
11. In addition to above, where the Court considers the presence of a party necessary for proper and complete adjudication, then it may well be considered relevant whether non-impleadment of such a party would result in avoidable multiplicity of litigation, then effort should be to implead a party rather than to force the party to go to a fresh litigation.
12. The above principles are not exhaustive but are merely indicative what may be considered by the Court in addition to such consideration, which may be appropriately considered by the Court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a given case. The legislative intent to provide an effective protection to a party who may be affected by the questions to be determined by a Court in a suit or proceedings and to have complete adjudication is clear from the introduction of Rule 10-A in Order 1 of the Code vide Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1976.
13. In order to further the cause of this procedural legislation and to achieve the ends of justice it would be appropriate to liberally construe these provisions without causing detriment or prejudice to the interests of the parties to the Its. Where a case cannot be completely adjudicated upon or decided in absence of the party who approaches the Court for, impleadment in that event the application would have to be considered favourably to avoid incomplete and ineffective conclusion of the suit. At this stage it may be appropriate to refer to the following observations made by this Court in the case of Kaka Singh v. Rohi Singh, AIR 1978 Punj & Har 30, as under (at Page 32) :--
'In allowing or disallowing an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code, what has to be seen is whether the addition of a new party would be consistent with the scope of the enquiry as necessitated in the pending suit and whether in the absence of such a party it would not be possible to completely and effectively dispose of the controversy in the pending suit.
xx xx xx What the Court ought to see is whether there is anything in the suit which cannot be determined owing to his absence or whether there would be prejudice by his not being made a party.'
14. The object of this Rule in bringing before the Court at any time of the proceedings, all persons who arc directly interested in the subject-matter of the suit so that all disputes in relation to such parlies and same subject-matter could be decided together and finally without inconvenience and expense of separate action and trials. Reference may be made to the case of Razia Begum v. Sahcbzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 195.
15. The mere fact that a party could bring a suit in its own right by itself or could not be the sole reason for refusing impleadment of a party who may otherwise satisfy the criterion referred supra. Wide discretion is vested in the Court and so far such an exercise of jurisdiction is not arbitrary, such an order may not call for interference. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1975 Punj & Har 184, held as under (at Page 185):--
'Order 1, Rule 10(2) gives wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties, but the power must be exercised on judicial principles and not arbitrarily. One of the well-known principles is that the person to be added must be necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the points in the suit and that a party should not be added merely to avoid multiplicity of suits.'
16. The jurisdiction of the Court under this Rule has been held to be not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but one of judicial discretion, which has to be exercised keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a given case. At this stage, it may be more appropriate to refer to the following observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 1992 (2) SCC 524 : (1992 AIR SCW 846) as under (at Page 849 of AIR SCW):--
'Though the plaintiff-appellant is dominus litis and is not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit and he may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom he wishes to proceed, but the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of parties: A party can be joined as defendant even though the plaintiff does not think that he has any cause of action against him. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1, Rule 10 which provides only a necessary or a proper party may be added. In the light of the clear language of the rule, it is not open to the appellant to contend that a person cannot be added as defendant even in a case where his presence to enable the Court to decide the matter effectively. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the Court has power tojoin the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions.'
17. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, there is no dispute that the applicant and plaintiff in the suit were joint owners of the property in question. There is a direct dispute between the brothers in regard to the same property. While plaintiffs raise their claim on the basis of being the sole owners on the basis of a registered will giving them title of the property as sole owners, the other brother claims rights in the property on the basis of an agreement to sell. Both these documents are alleged to have been executed by the applicant and that too long back. But for execution and validity of these documents, the applicant would admittedly be the co-owner inboth the suits. It was conceded before me that no partition of the property had taken place even on the basis of the alleged sale-deed. The defendant has also relied upon the documents executed by the applicant. In these circumstances and especially when the applicant has taken the plea of the sale-deed being forged and fabricated document, his interests are bound to be affected prejudicially and to his detriment, which obviously would be at his back if he is not impleaded as a party. The Court would have to give a finding on the issue whether the plaintiff is the sole owner of the property as claimed, and is entitled to possession of the portions of the property, subject-matter of both the suits, to the exclusion of all others.
18. It does not stand to reason that such determinations should be permitted to be concluded at the back of the applicant petitioner. Further more, to require the same parties to file different suits and proceedings in relation to the same property, based on the same documents, would neither be in the interest of justice nor would be proper. Avoidance of multiplicity and unnecessary expenses is a relevant factor, which needs to be considered by the courts concerned. Here it would be relevant to refer to the following observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Chandigarh Housing Board v. K. K. Kalsi 1996 (2) All Instant judgments 554, as under :--
'The purpose of determining the dispute between the parties is primarily to attach finality to their disputes and not to determine partial dispute and relegate the parties to different legal forums for determination.'
19. Looking the present case from any angle, would the Court be able to effectively and completely decide the disputes pending before it for determination which could give a complete and effective decree or relief to either party keeping jn view facts and circumstances of this case. Without hesitation answer has to be in the negative. Should the Court be instrumental in directing the parties to enter into litigation where they would challenge the same decree which is still to be passed in the present proceedings. Certainly all these factors prima facie are tilted in favour of the applicant rather than the plaintiff. The plea of the applicant cannot be said to be an irrelevant matter or a matter which has no nexus or a party whose interest has no nexus to the subject matter of the suit.
20. In the case of Prithi v. Yatinder Kumar, AIR 1985 Punjab and Haryana 238 a co-owner had alienated part of the joint property and other co-owners sued the vendee for a declaration that alienation was bad and void and the Court held that vendor was a necessary party to the suit.
21. The applicant was admittedly the joint owner of the property and licence was also granted to Banarsi Dass jointly as back as in 1972 when none of the documents i.e. sale deed and agreement to sell in favour of different parties was even in existence. Therefore, to say that Banarsi Dass would have no interest would be a far fetched assumption at this juncture of the proceedings. At this time the Court is not to determine the final merits of the case but is merely to look whether the above criterion are satisfied or not.
22. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the cas of Ved Parkash v. Amar Singh, 1995 PLJ 12 andHarbhajan Singh v. Sarup Singh, 1993 PLJ 274.in the case of Ved Parkash (supra) the applicant claiming to be impleaded as a defendant had relied upon an agreement to sell while not being in possession nor being a party to the agreement to sell on the basis of which the suit was filed. Thus, the decisions referred by the learned counsel for the respondents would have no application to the facts of the present case. The said judgments were on distinct and different facts and the Hon'ble Judge indicated no principles of law which would apply to the present case.
23. All co-owners are necessary party to a suit to recover properly belonging to them jointly was so held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kanakarathanammal v. V. S. Loganatha Mudaliar, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 271, as under (at page 276) :--
'It is unfortunate that the appellant's claim has to be rejected on the ground that she failed to implead her two brothers to her suit.
xx xx xx xx xx Once it is held that the appellant's two brothers are co-heirs with her in respect of the properties left intestate by their mother, the present suit filed by the appellant partakes of the character of a suit for partition and in such a suit clearly the appellant alone would not be entitled to claim any relief against the respondents.'
24. In somewhat similar circumstances a Benchof Allahabad High Court held that permitting co-sharers to be impleaded as defendants to the suit was pre-eminently just and was made in order to do complete justice in the matter as the person so permitted to be impleaded as defendants were claiming to be co-shares in the suit properties on the basis of the will (1988 Allahabad Law Journal 243).
25. For the reasons aforestaled, I am of the considered view that the impugned orders passed by the learned trial Court do not suffer from any jurisdictional or other error apparent on the face of the record. On the contrary the impugned orders appear to be quite in consonence with the aforestated well settled principles of law leaving no scope for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the revision petitions are dismissed without any order as to costs.