Iqbal Singh, J.
1. Aggrieved by the order dated December 1, 1998, passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ludhiana, the defendant-petitioner i.e., Gulf Air Company (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner-company), has filed this revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code').
2. A suit for recovery of Rs. 22,39,450 including interest, was filed by plaintiff-respondent No. 1 i.e., Nahar Spinning Mills Ltd., Ludhiana (hereinafter referred to as the respondent-mill). The amount relates to the recovery of the price of goods sold by the respondent-mill to defendant respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The suit against the petitioner-company is based upon the air way bill dated December 14, 1992.
3. Along with the written statement, the petitioner-company filed an application under Order VII, Rules 10 and 11 of the Code and prayed for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the respondent-mill had not disclosed any cause of action and that the courts at Ludhiana did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Rule 29 of the Second Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
4. The trial court framed the following issue :
'Whether the courts at Ludhiana have jurisdiction to entertain any try the present suit against the defendants OPD.'
5. Vide impugned order dated December 1, 1998, the trial court decided the said issue against the defendants by holding as under :
'The perusal of Air Bill 072-2468-5990 072-2468-5990 shows that the name of the consignor in the left side of the said document was written as Nahar Spinning Mills, Industrial Area, Ludhiana. The name of the consignee is written just below the name of consignor as Vijay Hosiery Company, 75 High Street, Manchester. This further shows that this air bill has been taken at New Delhi on December 14, 1992. The perusal of this bill does not show that the jurisdiction of any dispute arising from this bill would be exclusively at Delhi.'
6. I have heard Mr. M. Wadhwani, advocate, assisted by Ms. Harleen Arora, advocate, for the petitioner and Mr. A.K. Mittal, advocate, for the respondent, and have gone through the records of the case.
7. The question required to be determined in this petition is--whether the courts at Ludhiana have the jurisdiction to try the matter or not. For deciding this point, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of Rules 18, 19, 24(1) and 29(1) contained in the Second Schedule (Chapter III) to the Act.
'18.(1) The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any registered baggage or any cargo, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air.
(2) The carriage by air within the meaning of the preceding sub-rule comprises the period during which the baggage or cargo is in charge of the carrier, whether in an aerodrome or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an aerodrome, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the carriage by air does not extend to any carriage by land, by sea or by river performed outside an aerodrome. If, however, such a carriage takes place in the performance of a contract for carriage by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or transhipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place during the carriage by air.
19. The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo.
24.(1) In the cases covered by Rules 18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought, subject to the conditions and limits set out in these rules.
29.(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court having jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or has an establishment by which the contract has been made or before the court having jurisdiction at the place of destination.' A perusal of the above provisions go to show that only those courts would have the jurisdiction to entertain an action against a carrier where (a) the carrier is ordinarily resident (b) or has his principal place of business (c) or has an establishment by which the contract has been made, and (d) or before the court having jurisdiction at the place of destination. Admittedly, the carrier is ordinary resident at Bahrain. Its principal place of office is at New Delhi. The destination in the present case was Manchester (U. K.). The parties entered into agreement in question at Delhi. A perusal of Air way bill dated December 14, 1992, a copy of which has been placed on the record, shows that the goods were handed over to the petitioner-company at Delhi for carrying the same by air for delivery to defendant-respondent No. 2 at Manchester (U. K.). Therefore, the courts at Ludhiana, by no stretch of reasoning, can be said to have jurisdiction in the present matter. The only courts that can have jurisdiction to entertain the action brought by the respondent-mill against the petitioner-company, are the courts at Delhi. The Carriage by Air Act, 1972, is a special Act and, therefore, its provisions will prevail over the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a general Act. Since the Act has stipulated the courts which have the jurisdiction to entertain an action for damages by a consignor/consignee against a carrier, the stipulations contained in Sections 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be ousted.
8. The Act was enacted by the Parliament of the Republic of India in 1972 to provide legislation for giving effect to international agreements as envisaged under Article 253 which reads as under :
'Legislation for giving effect to international agreements.-- Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement to convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body.'
9. Section 4(1) of the Act stipulates that the rules contained in the Second Schedule, being the provisions of the amended convention relating to the rights and liabilities of carriers, passengers, consignors, consignees and other persons, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the force of law in India in relation to any carriage by air to which those rules apply, irrespective of the nationality of the aircraft performing the carriage.
10. In view of the above provisions of Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the provisions of Article 253 of the Constitution, the courts are required to be careful not to attach to the words used in the said provisions anything more or less than their normal meaning consistent with the context in which they appear and consistent with the schedule of the legislation.
11. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent-mill that the jurisdiction of the civil courts at Ludhiana is not barred because the cause of action of the respondent-mill against the petitioner-company is joint with that of other respondents, has no force in view of the provisions contained in the Act, as reproduced and explained above, and Article 253 of the Constitution of India.
12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the jurisdiction of the courts at Ludhiana, qua the petitioner-company, is straightaway ousted. If the respondent-mill has any cause of action against the petitioner-company, the proper forum for it (respondent-mill) will be in courts at Delhi because the courts there havethe jurisdiction to entertain the cause of action against the petitioner-company. This petition accordingly succeeds and is accepted. The impugned orderpassed by the trial court is, accordingly, set aside. However, the respondent-mill is at liberty to pursue its case against the other defendants in the courts atLudhiana and the trial court shall proceed with the same in accordance with law.