Judgment:
ORDER
Harjit Singh Bedi, J.
1. This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ Petition No. 10681 of 1998 (Vandita Babarwal v. State of Haryana and others), Civil Writ Petition No. 13685 of 1998 (Kalpana Ahlawat v. State of Haryana and others), Civil Writ Petition No. 14057 of 1998 (Vandana Khurana v. State of Haryana and others) and Civil Suit No. 225 of 1998 (Neelam Gupta v. M. D. University, Rohtak and others).
2. The facts of the case have been taken primarily from Civil Writ Petition No. 13685 of 1998, supplemented wherever necessary from the other matters.
3. The Government of Haryana issued a notification dated April 7, 1997 appointing Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak (hereinafter called the 'University') to conduct the entrance test for admission to the MBBS/BDS course, to be started in the year 1997, in the Medical colleges/Institutes in the State. The University thereafter issued an information brochure laying down the eligibility conditions for taking the test. The petitioner being eligible thereunder applied for and took the test on July 13, 1997. On the release of the first merit list in theTribune dated August 5, 1997, the candidates up to the merit position No. 391 were called for the first counselling, to be held on 18/19-9-1997. Vide another advertisement dated September 22, 1997, the University called an additional 313 candidates for the second counselling, to be held on September 15, 1997 and for third counselling, to be held on September 29, 1997. As the petitioner did not come within the merit, she was not called for the counselling. It appears that most of the seats were duly filled in though some seats remained vacant in the B. R. S. Institute of Medical Science, Kotbilla, respondent No. 4 (hereinafter called the 'Institute'). The Director/ Principal of the Institute thereafter issued an advertisement in the Tribune dated October 9, 1997, Annexure P-1 to the writ petition, calling candidates to appear for interview on October 20, 1997 and it was further stipulated that the admissions would be made as per the merit in the entrance test. It appears that despite this advertisement, some seats still remained unfilled whereupon the Institute issued yet another advertisement in the Tribune dated October 24, 1997, Annexure P-2 to the writ petition, notifying that some seats were still lying vacant and students, who had appeared in the entrance test conducted by the University, could contact the Institute by November 4, 1997. The petitioner's father accordingly submitted an application dated November 3, 1997 Annexure P-3 to the writ petition, seeking admission for his daughter. He was, however, directed to bring the result and ranking of the petitioner, in the entrance test conducted by the University. As the petitioner's result was not being declared despite repeated requests made in this regard, she filed Civil Writ Petition No. 17375 of 1997 in this Court seeking an order that her result be declared. On the issuance of notice of motion, the University put in appearance and declared the petitioner's result showing her at merit position No. 1030 in the General Category. This information was conveyed to the Institute by the petitioner on which she was admitted to the B.D.S. course on January 19, 1998 against a payment seat. The petitioner accordingly deposited a sum of Rs. 1,29,000/- as fee for the first year and attended the classes for that year and also deposited a further sum of Rs. 89,000/- on June 8, 1998 as fee for the second year. The admission granted to the petitioner was, however, cancelled by the University vide communication dated July 22, 1998, Annexure P-10 to the writ petition, which was conveyed to the petitioner with a covering letter written by the Institute dated July 25, 1998, Annexure P-11 to the writ petition. Annexure P-10 has been impugned by the petitioner in the present writ petition.
4. On notice of motion, various replies have been filed by the respondents. In the reply filed on behalf of the University, respondent No. 2, the fact that the counselling had taken place on the dates mentioned in the writ petition and the advertisements issued thereafter by the University, have been admitted. It was, however, pleaded that according to the information brochure/prospectus issued by the University for the conduct of the entrance test, it had been specifically provided that admissions to the Medical Colleges as also the Institute would be made strictly on the basis of merit as determined by the common entrance test and no College/Institute was authorised to make admissions on its own in any other manner. It was also pointed out that the information brochure/prospectus laid down a detailed method for the determination of merit, the process of selection and the method of admission against the seats in the various medical Institutes and that all the candidates were required to appear before an Interview Board before the selection could be finalised. It was also admitted that initially 211 candidates and thereafter an additional 303 candidates up to the rank of 509 had been called for the counselling, held on September 29, 1997 and that the admission had been granted to candidates up to merit position No. 269 in the general category and 34 in the Backward Class (A) category whereas the remaining candidates were kept on the waiting list. It was further pleaded that the Chairman of the Interview Board had thereafter supplied the waiting list to all concerned including the Head of the Institute with instructions that seats should be offered to candidates on the basis of merit and as per the options exercised by them at the time of counselling and it was further clarified that if the said waiting list was exhausted, they could approach the University for another merit list of candidates, who had passed the entrance test. This information was conveyed vide Annexure R-2/1 dated October 13, 1997 and thereafter reiterated through another communication addressed to the Institute on November 3, 1997, Annexure R-2/2. It has further been pleaded that after the second counselling held on September 29, 1997, the vacancy position was reviewed by the Interview Board of which the Director Principal of the Institute was one of the Members and the Board had taken a decision to hold the third counselling on December 5, 1997 so as to fill up the vacant seats. The third counselling was accordingly notified through ad advertisement in the newspaper and an additional merit list up to the rank of 617 in the general category and 54 in the BCA category was supplied to the Institute for making admissions by January 31, 1998 against the seats still lying vacant in order of merit and as the petitioner still did not fall in the merit, her name did not figure in that merit list as well. It has also been highlighted that Civil Writ Petition No. 17375 of 1997 filed by the petitioner seeking the declaration of her result was dismissed by this Court on December 17, 1997 on the ground that the petitioners merit precluded her from getting any relief whereas Civil Writ Petition Nos. 18887 of 1997 and 2788 of 1988 filed by Neelam Gupta and Vandita Babarwal respectively had been disposed off after the declaration of the result with similar observations as to their merit, the Institute had nevertheless granted admission to them on January 19, 1998, December 27, 1997 and January 31, 1998 respectively.
5. Mr. C. M. Chopra, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the petitioner had been granted admission on the basis of the advertisement issued by the Institute, Annexure P-2 dated October 24, 1997 and as no candidate higher in merit had appeared on the date fixed i.e. November 11, 1997, no fault could be found with the action of the Institute in granting admission to the petitioner. He has also urged that as per Regulation 7 of the Dental Council of India Regulations, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulations') issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause I of Section 20 of the Dentists Act, 1948, the Institute was competent to make admissions at its own level after the last date for the admissions fixed by the University had expired and as September 30, 1997 was notified as the last date, the admission given to the petitioner on January 19, 1998 was fully justified in law. It has also been urged that thepetitioner had in fact given up her admission to the B. Sc. course at Faridabad so as. to take admission in the B. D. S. course and as she had now completed the first year's course of study, equity now required that she be allowed to continue with the course.
6. Similar arguments have been addressed by the counsel appearing for the other claimants.
7. Mr. Baldev Krishan Gupta, the Secretary of the Institute, who appeared in person, supported the petitioner's case and further argued that from the reply filed by the Institute in the connected Writ Petition No. 10681 of 1998, it was evident that repeated efforts had been made by the Institute to secure more candidates for admission to the B. D. S. course and it was only after no name had been forthcoming that the petitioners had been granted admission so as to avoid the wastage of a number of seats.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record very carefully.
9. The sequence of events leading to the admission granted to the petitioner has been set out above and the facts, broadly speaking have not been disputed by the parties. The basic question that arises for decision is as to whether the petitioners were entitled to admission at the hands of Institute itself ignoring the merit list that had been prepared by the University on the basis of the entrance test. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Unnikrishnan J. P. and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1993 (1) SCC 645 : (AIR 1993 SC 2178) had laid down that admissions to the medical institutes were to be made by a centralised agency and no individual Institute was permitted to do so and it was in pursuance of these directions that the Stale Government had, vide notification dated April 7, 1997, appointed the University as the competent authority to conduct the entrance test for admissions to the M. B. B. S./B. D. S. course in the five medical/ dental colleges in the State of Haryana including the Institute and it was specifically mentioned therein that 'admissions in all_the above mentioned Colleges/Institutes will be made strictly on merit determined on the basis of common entrance test examination and no College/Institute is authorised to make admission on its own in any other manner.' Clause 15 of Chapter II of the information brochure also provided that apart from the entrance test, the selected candidates would also have to appear before, an Interview Board to be appointed by the Vice Chancellor and that 'under no circumstances will any relaxation will be given to the candidates, who are unable to appear before the Interview Board on the date fixed. Interview will carry no marks.' It is, therefore, apparent that it was the Interview Board, which would be the final authority to make the selection as per merit determined on the basis of the result of the common entrance test. The petitioner herein was shown at merit position No. 1030, the petitioner, Vandana Khurana at No. 957, and Neelam Gupta, the plaintiff in the civil suit at No. 714 (all three in the general category) whereas Vandita Babarwal, the writ petitioner in C. W. P. No. 10681 of 1998 at merit position No. 142 in the BCA category. It is evident from the facts given above that though general category candidates up to merit position No. 609 in all had been summoned for counselling, this category had exhausted itself at merit position No. 269 whereas the BCA list had likewise been filed at merit No. 41. It is, therefore, obvious that the four candidates now in Court had not been selected on the basis of merit. It also bears notice that the Institute despite having been conveyed a merit list of 100 candidates even after the third counselling held on December 5, 1997, chose to ignore the same and granted admission ignoring merit. It also needs to be emphasised that Vandita Babarwal, Vandana Khurana and Neelam Gupta had been granted admission even before the declaration of the result of the entrance test as a sequel to the orders made by the High Court in the writ petitions filed by them earlier. The admissions were granted as under :
Name of thecandidate
Admission grantedon
Order of High Courton
Vandita Babarwal
January 31, 1998
May 4, 1998
Vandana Khurana
January 29, 1998
February 23, 1998
Neelam Gupta
December 27, 1997
January 23, 1998
whereas, the present petitioner, Kalpana Ahiawat got admission after the declaration of her result on December 17, 1997. It is also relevant that under the advertisement dated January 27, 1998, Annexure R-4/15 (filed with the reply in C. W. P. No. 10681 of 1998) issued by the University that only candidates up to merit position No. 617 had been called for interview on December 5, 1997, which would make it evident that even on that date candidates up to that position had not been admitted whereas the petitioner and the others had been granted admissions much earlier, though being far and away below position No. 617.
10. Reference has nonetheless been made by the petitioners as also by respondent No. 6 in support of their case to Annexure R-6/1, a communication dated November 7, 1996 appended with C. W. P. No. 10681 of 1998, from the State Government to the various medical institutes in which it had been directed that henceforth casual/ unfilled vacancies could be filled in at the level of the Institute itself. The argument is that as the competent authority, that is the Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Haryana, Health and Medical Education Department, had authorised the Institute to fill up all vacant seats at the level of the Institute itself, the admission granted to the petitioner was fully in order. This argument also lacks merit. The contents of the Annexure are reproduced below :--
'The competent authority has decided that hence casual/unfilled vacancies, if any, of the institute are to be filled as under :
i) All vacant seats will be filled in at the level of Instt. itself as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. M. A. case and all related judgments in this regard.
ii) Waiting lists be obtained from Dr. Arora, Academic Officer, PGIMS Rohtak.
iii) Casual/unfilled vacancies will be filled up after giving advertisement in two MCWS papers, one should be national level newspaper.
It is further reiterated that all such vacancies be filled strictly in accordance with the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard. Inter se-merit and reservations are not to be ignored.'
11. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph would clearly indicate that though liberty had been given to the medical institutes to make admissions at their own level so as to fill up the casual/unfilled vacancies yet it was implicit therein that the aforesaid seats would be filled in from the waiting list to be obtained from the University and that all such vacancies would be filled up in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard without ignoring the inter se merit etc. From the resume of the facts given above, it is evident that the Institute had in fact obtained the waiting list from the University on January 7, 1998 but had made admissions in some cases even earlier to that date ignoring the inter se merit of the candidates concerned.
12. Mr. Chopra's second argument needs to be examined in this background. He has pointed out that as per Regulations 7(d) of the Regulations, casual or drop out vacancies arising after the admissions had been finalised could be filled in by the Institute itself and that any vacancies still remaining after the last date could be filled in by the Management at its own level. He has also urged that as the last date for filling up the vacancies was September 30, 1997 and the petitioner herein had been granted admission subsequently at the level of the Institute itself, it was authorised by clause 7(d) (ibid).
13. Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel representing the University has, however, pointed out that a bare reading of the clause would show that it was not applicable to the facts of the present case and in any eventuality, it had been held by the Supreme Court in Medical Council of India v. State of Kamataka and others, 1998 (3) RSJ 424 : (AIR 1998 SC 2423) that regulations framed by the Medical Council with regard to the procedure for admissions were directory whereas the regulations pertaining to the laying down of professional standards were mandatory and as such the regulation could not bind the University. Regulation 7(d) is reproduced below :--'(d) The competent authority shall also prepare and publish a waiting list of candidates along with the marks. The said list shall be followed after the last date for allotment is over for filling any casual vacancies by drop out vacancies arising after the admissions are finalised. These vacancies shall be filled until such date as may be prescribed by the competent authority. Any vacancies still remaining after such date can be filled by the management.'
14. It will be seen that this regulation pertains to at least three different situations and visualises that the waiting list of the candidates would be utilised after the last date for allotment was over for filling any casual vacancies or dropout vacancies arising after the admissions are finalised, secondly that these vacancies could be filled until such date as may be prescribed by the competent authority and thirdly any vacancies still remaining after such date could be filled by the management. It is, therefore, apparent that this Regulation would become enforceable after the admissions had been finalised up to the last date. It is the positive case of the respondents and not denied by the petitioners that the competent authority had extended the last date for admissions up to January 31, 1998 and in that eventuality Clause 7(d) could not be applied till that date. Moreover, the Regulation explicitly provides that admissions given would have to be from the waiting list. Admittedly, none of the petitioners were in that list as they were far below in the merit. Even otherwise, the Supreme Court in Medical Council of India's case (supra) has held that the regulations framed by the medical council with regard to the procedure for admissions were only directory in nature and in this situation, Regulation 7(d) could not supplant the procedure laid down in the information brochure.
15. Mr. Chopra has finally argued that as the petitioner had already undergone a course of study of one year and had incurred a great deal of expense for the first year and had also deposited the fee for the second one to which she had been granted admission before it was cancelled by Annexure P-10 dated July 22, 1998, and had also given up her seat in the B. Sc. course at Faridabad, her admission to the Institute should in all fairness not be disturbed. In this connection, he has cited Mohd. Sharif v. Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering and Technology, Longowal and others, 1998 (4) SLR 506 and Ajeet Kumar Tripathi and another v. State of Haryana and another, 1998 (2) SLR 652.
16. Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the University, has on the contrary placed reliance on Ashok Kumar Maheshwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1998 (1) SCT 735: (AIR 1998 SC 966) and A. P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and another 1986 (2) SCC 667 : (AIR 1986 SC 1490) and has argued that equity could not supplant or displace the law and even otherwise no equity existed in the petitioner's favour.
17. I have considered this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner and find no substance in it. It will be seen from the facts earlier narrated that admission had been granted to the petitioner and the others though they were far below in the merit and that three of them had got admission even before the declaration of the result of the entrance test on the intervention of the High Court. Moreover, it is evident that the procedure for admission was completely short-circuited by the Institute, merit totally ignored and a back door entry given to the petitioners by resorting to a subterfuge. It bears notice that even in the advertisement dated January 24, 1998 (which was issued after the admission had been granted to the petitioner), the Institute itself had called candidates up to merit position No. 617 for interview although the petitioner had been granted admission much earlier. The judgments cited by Mr. Chopra, therefore, do not come to the petitioners' aid. The observations of the Supreme Court in the two cases cited by Mr. Gupta, therefore, become relevant as would be evident from all that has been written above. The method and procedure for admission having been notified in the Information Brochure/Prospectus had the force of law and bound the petitioners as much as it did the Institute and the University. The petitioners had been granted admission although they could not have got it on the basis of their merit. Any sympathy, therefore, shown to the petitioners would be wholly misplaced and would have the effect of nullifying the procedure laid down in the information brochure for admissions.
18. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the writ petitions as also the civil suit. They are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Dasti order.