Judgment:
A.P. Chowdhri, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the complaint Annexure P. 1 dated 14-9-1988 under Sections 405, 406 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against the petitioners and their son Rameshwar Dass as also the summoning order Annexure P. 2 dated 13-4-1989 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Chandigarh.
2. The facts leading to the present petition are that one Sushma Devi daughter of Des Raj Bansal respondent was married to Rameshwar Dass on 11-3-1986. According to the respondent the marriage was performed and various articles of dowry were entrusted to the accused-persons, Sushma, however, died an un-natural death within less than three months of her marriage and in this connection a criminal case has been registered which is pending. After the death of Sushma her father-filed the complaint referred to above on 14-9-1988. In the complaint both parents of Rameshwar Dass, his two brothers and their wives were impleaded as accused. After recording preliminary evidence learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, summoned the two petitioners and their son for the offences above mentioned. Initially petition for quashing of complaint was filed by the parents Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2744 of 1990 was moved by Rameshwar Dass for permission to join as a co-petitioner, it was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 16-3-1990. Again, another petition was moved by Rameshwar Das for joining as petitioner No. 3 which was registered as Criminal Misc. No. 3692 of 1990. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the miscellaneous application is allowed and Rameshwar Dass is permitted to be joined as petitioner No. 3.
3. The first contention of Mr. M.M. Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the proviso to Section 6(3) of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, has not been brought into force and, therefore, with the death of Smt. Sushma, the alleged criminal misappropriation had come to an end as her husband Rameshwar Das was her heir. It will be recalled that the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was inserted by Amending Act No. 43 of 1986. The proviso is to the effect that where a woman dies within seven years of her marriage, otherwise than due to natural causes, the property in question shall be transferred to her parents if she has not left any children and shall be held in trust for such children where she has left some children and shall be ultimately transferred to such children. Shri V.K. Jhanji, learned counsel for the respondent referred to the notification G.S.R. 1185-E dated 5-11-1986 whereby the Central Government appointed 19th day of November, 1986 as the date on which the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (No. 43 of 1986) came into force. The said notification is published in Part VI at page 36 of 1987 Lahore Law Times. In view of the notification the proviso referred to above came into force with effect from 19-11-1986 and Sushma having not left any child her Ishtri Dhan has to be transferred to her parents. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, therefore, without any merit.
4. The next contention is that no permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained under Section 8-A as amended by the Dowry Prohibition (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1976. Reliance was placed on Deepak Kumar and another v. State of Punjab, 1989(1) C.L.R. 575 in which it was held that sanction of the District Magistrate was a condition precedent for the institution of the complaint in so far as the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 are concerned. The reply of Shri Jhanji, on the other hand, is two fold. In the first instance, it is pointed out that it has not been shown that the aforesaid Punjab amendment was extended and made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. In the absence of such extension the Punjab Amendment was not applicable in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and, secondly, reference has been made to Harinder Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab, 1989 (I) C.L.J. (C, Cr. & Rev.) 238. A learned single Judge of this Court took the view that there had been substantial amendments carried out in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 since 1984 and, therefore, the Punjab Amending Act adding Section 8-A had ceased to be applicable. I regret my inability to agree with that view. Unless the amendment made by the Punjab Act is undone either expressly or by necessary application the amendment holds the field and prior sanction of the District Magistrate is necessary. However, as it has not been shown that the aforesaid Punjab Amendment had been extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the absence of sanction cannot stand in the way.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners then contended that a general and vague allegation had been made regarding alleged entrustment of the dowry articles to all the seven accused. Four of the accused had not been summoned by the Court. The allegation being common to all seven and four persons having been dropped, it could not be said whether allegation could survive against the remaining accused. The person who have not been summoned are two brothers of the husband and their wives. The persons summoned are the husband and both his parents. It follows that on the basis of the preliminary evidence produced before the Magistrate, he found a prima-facie case only against the persons summoned. It does not mean that the Magistrate had either to summon all the seven or dismiss the complaint against all the seven. The contention is altogether untenable.
6. Lastly it was argued that Rameshwar Dass and his wife lived at Bhatinda while the parents live at Mansa. It was also submitted that petitioner No. 1 had not been able to attend the marriage on account of illness and, therefore, there was no question of entrustment of any dowry articles to him. These are all questions of fact. It is open to the accused in the course of the trial to cross-examine the witnesses and to produce material on record to substantiate their stand. Obviously the complaint itself cannot be quashed on pleas of fact of this nature at this stage.
7. For these reasons the petition has no merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Parties through their counsel are directed to appear in the trial Court on 8-6-1990 for further proceedings according to law.