K. Kannan, J.
1. The tenant, who has been evicted on the twin consideration of subletting and dilapidated condition of the building before both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, is the revision petitioner before this Court.
2. The counsel for the revision petitioner addressed the argument that the landlord had not examined himself but he had examined only his power of attorney, who was not competent to give such evidence and consequently there was no material on the basis of which eviction could have been awarded. When it was pointed out to him that such a wide proposition could not be countenanced for the petitioner, that landlord was the master of his own case and it was open to him to place such evidence as he deemed proper and the evidence of power of attorney cannot be rejected any more than an inference that was possible, that if he had been examined he would have been forced to admit some material facts, the landlord himself must have been examined and he was evading the witness box for an oblique purpose, that the landlord. The counsel did not persist on that argument and was prepared to address his contention on the evidence available on the issues of subletting and the alleged inhabitable nature of the building.
3. The counsel stated that at the outset that the petition for eviction has been filed in the year 1986 and the person Banarsi Dass, who was examined on the side of the landlord had admitted that the respondent had been in possession of the premises right from the year 1973. This conduct, according to him, would show that there could not have been any subletting and the respondent was himself a direct tenant. The adjudication regarding subletting ought to be placed on firm basis and not on conjectures and vague inferences that the counsel canvassed for. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have considered the fact that the rent deed had been executed in favour of Muni Lal in the year 1960 and he had put the revision petitioner in possession as a sub-tenant. The petitioner's witness however had admitted that he had himself never seen Muni Lal in the possession of the property as tenant. The counsel for the revision petitioner wanted to contend that the lease deed in favour of Muni Lal was a sham document and the plea of the landlord that he had sublet the property in favour of the revision petitioner was false. The petitioner has also relied upon rent receipts R-l and R-2 issued by the petitioner's father who had issued receipts and also relied upon Ex.R-9 and R-13, the assessment registers containing reference to the petitioner's father's name as the owner and the revision petitioner's name as a person in occupation. The contention of the counsel was, therefore, that if the revision petitioner's name was found alongside the petitioner's father's name in the assessment registers, it could not be correct that he was inducted into possession as a sub-tenant by the tenant. The courts below rejected the evidentiary value of these documents by observing that there was nothing in the respective documents that connected the petitioners' mentioned property to the petitioner. The counsel for the revision petitioner also concedes that it was not possible to discern with reference to documents that they related to the petition mentioned property. Unfortunately, the petition mentioned property is described only by boundaries and no door number is given and both in the assessment registers and the rent receipt there is no reference to any door number. Being a finding of pure appreciation of factual evidence. I am loathe to interfere with the finding of fact on the said issue. The counsel is also not able to point out any piece of evidence that the landlord or his father did not have any other property in the town and this property cannot be with reference to any other property. If there were two ways of looking at the same issue on the strength of evidence and by a proper consideration, the Courts below have approached the issue of fact in one particular way, the Revisional Court would rather subscribe to the view that is taken by a Court of fact and not take another view which may also be possible. I, therefore, affirm the finding of the Courts below that there had been subletting and having regard to the fact that the rent deed had been only in the name of Muni Lal and the property had been shown in exclusive possession of the revision petitioner, the obvious inference is that he is a sub-tenant in respect of the premises.
4. Even apart from the ground of sub-letting that the landlord had to tread, he is placed on a firm footing on the other ground namely, of the building, being in a state of dilapidation and being unfit for human habitation. It is admitted in the evidence of the tenant himself that the wooden rafters that support the ceiling have fallen and the ceiling is now supported by erecting two pillars at different places. It is also in evidence that there is seepage of water along the wall and the building is dilapidated. The counsel for the petitioner sought to place reliance on a report that it was still fit for habitation. The lower Appellate Court has considered the rival contentions in its proper perspective and has made a reference to the decision of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a landlord in order to secure eviction on this ground need not prove that the building is in a ruinous condition. The finding of the trial Court and the Appellate is, therefore, well reasoned on the said ground also and I am not persuaded to take a different finding from how the Courts below have approached the issue. The revision petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.
5. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner pleads that his client has been carrying on the avocation as gold smith in the premises and he would require some time to re-locate himself. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, I accede to his request and grant 9 months for eviction. Revision petition, therefore, stands dismissed and the time for eviction shall be 9 months from the date of passing of the order.