1. Validity of an adoption is the main point in issue in this appeal and it arises in the context of succession to the land left behind by Jhunda deceased, who died sometime in May 1969.
2. The plaintiffs-Baljit and others, filed the present suit seeking a decree for possession of the land in suit on the plea that being the grand-children of the said Jhunda; they were his nearest heirs and were thus entitled to succeed to his property. The defendant-Moman, on the other hand, put-forth the plea that he had been adopted by the said Jhunda and it was thus he, who was entitled to the land in suit.
3. The plea of adoption, as put-forth by the defendant-Moman is founded upon the registered adoption deed Ext. D/ 1, whereby Moman is shown to have been adopted by Jhunda. This adoption deed is dated February 4, 1969. It recites that all the necessary formalities relating to adoption were, gone through and that Moman was adopted by Jhunda with the consent of his natural parents. It is also mentioned therein that Moman could inherit the property of Jhunda after his death and all the last ritesincluding kirya would be performed by Moman.
4. In order to prove adoption, the defendants examined D.W. 1-Bhalla and D.W.2 Lal, who deposed that about 40 to 50 persons had collected on the occasion of the adoption of Moman by Jhunda and that havan was performed, sweets were distributed and there was singing by women. D.W. 6-Ram Singh, besides deposing in a like manner, also went on to testify to the giving in adoption of Moman by his natural parents and Moman being taken in adoption by Jhunda. This Ram Singh is also an attesting witness of adoption deed Ext. D/1.
5. Besides this, there is the testimony of both the natural parents of Moman, D.W. 3-Chameli and D.W. 4-Karam Chand that they gave Moman in adoption and that Moman was taken in adoption by Jhunda at a gathering in the village where havan was performed and sweets were distributed.
6. There is only the bald statement of P. W. 7-Ram Sarup to the effect that Moman had not been adopted by Jhunda, forthcoming from the side of the plaintiffs to counter the evidence led by the defendants on this issue.
7. In holding against the defendants on the point of adoption, what appears to have weighed with the lower appellate Court was the discrepancy appearing in the testimony of D.W. 3-Chameli, the mother of Moman and D.W. 4, Karam Chand his father, regarding the date of his adoption, vis-a-vis; the execution of the adoption deed Ext. D/l. Whereas, D.W. 3-Chameli had deposed that the writing, that is, adoption deed Ext. D/1 had been executed 15 to 20 days before the havan was performed and Moman was given in adoption, the father, D.W. 4-Karam Chand stated that this writing was executed 15 to 20 days after the ceremony of adoption had been performed.
8. The other circumstance which seems to have weighed with the lower appellate Court was that there was no evidence of the treatment of Jhunda towards Moman after the adoption, nor had any entry been made by thevillage Chaukidar or the revenue authorities regarding this adoption.
9. As is well known, a registered adoptiondeed raises a presumption of valid adoption.This presumption is rebuttable, no doubt, butnot by mere conjectures or discrepancies in evidence of little or no consequence, it is the totality of the circumstances and the evidence on record that must be taken into account and. weighed in deciding whether such presumption stands rebutted. Seen in this light, the lower appellate Court must indeed be held to have fatten in error in treating this presumption to have been rebutted merely by this discrepancy' in the testimony of the motherand the father of Moman regarding the dateof the adoption ceremony, vis-a-vis; that ofthe adoption deed Ext. D/1. It must not belost sight of here that D.W. 3-Chameli, themother of Moman, was an illiterate villagelady deposing to an incident which hadoccurred many years earlier. There was thusclearly no warrant for treating, such discrepancy, by itself sufficient to dispel the presumption in favour of the adoptions when seen in the contest of the entire material on record.
10. In dealing with this matter, it would be pertinent to advert to the feelings exhibited by Jhunda towards Moman and his father, as would be evident from the fact that earlier in 1963, Jhunda had gifted the land in suit to Moman's father. Karam Chand. This gift was, no doubt, subsequently set aside at the instance of the reversioners who filed a suit against it, but it does show how Jhunda felt towards the defendants. This cannot, but be treated as a strong circumstance corroborative of Jhunda having later adopted Moman.
11. The other relevant evidence is provided by the judgment Ext. D/2 in a suit for possession filed by the reversioners where the adoption of Moman by Jhunda was directly in issue and the adoption was held to be valid. The plaintiffs not being parties to the suit, would not, of course, render this, finding res judicata against them, but it is a piece of evidence which the defendant-Moman can rightly rely upon.
12. As for the fact that the adoption of Moman by Jhunda does not figure in the revenue record or in that of the chaukidar, this, circumstance cannot be construed as one of any significance keeping in view the fact that Jhunda died within three months of this adoption.
13. Taking an over all view of the relevant circumstances pertaining to the adoption, there can be no escape from the conclusion that Moman was indeed validly adopted by Jhunda and the finding of the lower appellate Court to the contrary, cannot, therefore, be sustained and is accordingly hereby set aside. It follows, therefore, that it is Moman, who is entitled to succeed to the property in suit and not the plaintiffs.
14. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is accordingly hereby set aside and this appeal is accepted with costs.
15. Appeal allowed.