1. The appellants have, in this case, sought for setting aside the order passed by the Collector (Appeals) in Order-in-Appeal No. 16/87 (M) A. No. 212/86 (M), dated 30-1-1987 confirming the Order-in-Original passed by the Assistant Collector, Madras. The Assistant Collector in the Order-in-Original has approved classification of item as 'Spindle HVI Oil' from 1982 cleared to L. 6 holder, under Chapter X procedure for use in the manufacturing of agricultural spray oil, under Item 11A(3)(b) at the rate of Rs. 1149.50 per M.T. with appropriate special excise duty as per the Notification No. 44/78, dated 1-3-1978 as amended and from 1-3-1986, the Assistant Collector has also approved the classification of the item at the rate of Rs. 1207/-per M.T. as per the Notification No. 75/84, dated 1-3-1984 as amended by Notification No. 120/86, dated 1-3-1986. Thereby, he has also demanded the differential duty due from the appellants for clearance of spindle HVI oil used in the manufacture of agricultural spray oil for the said period.
2. Collector (Appeals) after hearing the appellants has confirmed the order of the Assistant Collector.
3. The appellants have, in this appeal, submitted that the condition under Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 is applicable to the mineral oil so long as HVI spindle oil satisfies the specifications stipulated in the Notification in relation to such mineral oil and spindle HVI oil. HVI spindle oil is also intended for use in the manufacture of agricultural spray oil, and, therefore, the benefit of exemption cannot be denied to them. They have submitted that the intended use in the manufacture of agricultural spray oil is not disputed by the authorities. They have also submitted that the Collector (Appeals) does not dispute in his order that HVI spindle oil satisfy the specification of the mineral oil stipulated in the Notification itself. They have submitted that the generic description in Notification would, therefore, include HVI spindle oil of the kind stored and removed by them under Chapter X procedure for purposes of manufacture of agricultural spray oil.
3. Shri N.V. Raghavan, learned Adviser on behalf of the appellants submitted that it is well settled principle of law that the intention of the law makers can be gathered only from the language employed. He submitted that there is nothing in the Notification to suggest that HVI spindle oil satisfying this specification mentioned in the Notification will be disqualified from the exemption especially, when such oil is intended for use in the manufacture of agricultural spray oil. The language of the concessional Notification cannot be modified on supposed intentions. No intention, other than what the Notification conveys can be inferred by reading into Notification's intentions, which the language of the Notification does not justify. He further submitted that the intention of the legislature was to continue the benefit. The claim for benefit was genuine. He further submitted that by reading of the Notification it cannot be made out that the impugned goods do not satisfy the conditions laid down in it. He further submitted that the Notification has to be strictly construed and nothing can be gathered from the Notification when it does not satisfy or stipulate it. He relies upon the following rulings in support of his contentions :-Hemraj Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Surat and Ors 2. Suhrid Geigy Limited v. Union of India, and Anr. - 1980 (6) ELT 759 (Guj.) Para 5 3. Kirloskar Cummins Ltd. v. Union of India and three Ors -1982 (10) ELT 29 (Bom.).
4. Indian Lead Private Ltd. v. Union of India -1988 (38) ELT 23 (Bom.) Para 9.
5. Jain Soap Mills, New Delhi v. Union of India and Ors -1979 (4) ELT (J 147) Para 10.Collector of Central Excise, Madurai v. Shree Palraj Paper and Straw Board Mills Pvt. Ltd.Star Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors -1988 (34) ELT 542 (Del.).Bombay Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Appellate Collector of Customs -1990 (49) ELT 190 (Bom.)Foremost Dairies Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut -1987 (27) ELT 437 (Tribunal).
He further submitted that the Notification No. 41/82 is merely a clarificatory Notification and it does not in any way take away the benefit of the earlier Notification.
5. Shri L. Narasimha Murthy, learned JDR submitted that there was no anomaly in the Notification. Both the Notifications stipulate the same conditions with same products. Notification No. 44/78 clearly applies to mineral oils commonly known as spindle HVI oil. Therefore, both the Notifications have to be read together and it cannot be said that the Government has issued superfluous Notification. He submitted that the citations relied upon by the appellants are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of this case. He submitted that Notification No. 44/78 is more specific than the Notification No. 41/78 as Notification No. 44/78 clearly states spindle HVI oil.
6. We have heard both the sides and carefully considered their submissions and perused the records. The appellant's contention is that Notification No. 44/71-CE as amended covers their product HVI spindle oil. This Notification has been superseded in 1984. They had filed classification list for the item spindle HVI oil falling under the erstwhile TI ll(A)(3)(b) and claimed approval of the classification list at the concessional rate of duty at Rs. 110/- per M.T. for the clearance of the said HVI spindle oil intended for use in the manufacture of agricultural spray oil in terms of Notification No.44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982. They were clearing the said product @ Rs. 1149.50 as per the Notification No. 44/78, dated 1-3-1978 as amended. They claimed that their product conform to the specifications and conditions laid down in the Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982 and they claimed that they were eligible to pay duty at the concessional rate of Rs. 110/- M.T. as per above Notification. Both the Notifications are listed below :- "Concessional rate of duty on R.D.O. used for manufacture of agricultural spray oil:- In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts any mineral oil falling under Item No. 8 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is in excess of seventy-four rupees and twenty-four paise per kilolitre at fifteen degrees of Centrigrade thermometer, subject to the following conditions, namely :- (a) has its flashing point at or above two hundred degrees of Fahrenheit's thermometer; (d) has a viscosity of fifty seconds of more by Red-wood-I Viscometer at one hundred degrees of Fahrenheit's thermometer; (e) is not ordinarily used as an external fuel, or as fuel for internal combustion engines, or as an illuminant; (2) it is proved to the satisfaction of an officer not below the rank of an Assistant Collector of Central Excise that the mineral oil is intended to be used in the manufacture of agricultural spray oil; (3) the procedure set out in Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 is followed." "Partial exemption to spindle HVI Oil:- In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule (8) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts mineral oil commonly known as spindle HVI oil, falling under Item No. 11A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is in excess of one thousand one hundred and forty-nine rupees and fifty paise per metric tonne, subject to the following conditions, namely :- (i) it is proved to the satisfaction of an officer not below the rank of an Assistant Collector of Central Excise that such oil is used in the manufacture of any of the commodities specified in the Schedule thereto annexed and (ii) the procedure set out in Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 is followed.
The results of the test report are noted by the Assistant Collector in the Order-in-Original pertaining to HVI spindle oil and the report stated that it satisfied the conditions of Para l(a)(b)(c)(d) and (e) of the Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982 which is reproduced below :- "I have gone through the records carefully. I find from the test report on HVI spindle oil, given by M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Lube Blending Plant, Madras-81 that the HVI Spindle Oil manufactured by them satisfies the conditions of Para l(a), (b), (c), (d) & (e) of Notification No. 44/71-C.E., dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification 41/82-C.E., dated 28-2-1982.1 also find that the HVI Spindle Oil manufactured by them is being removed to M/s.
Wellington Island Installation under Chapter X procedure for the manufacture of Agricultural spray oil inasmuch as all the conditions under Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982 are satisfied by M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Lube Blending Plant, Madras-81. As the matter is not free from doubt I have referred the same to the High Authorities for clarification. However, I have taken a decision to approve the above classification list provisionally under Rule 9B of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 in terms of Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982." It has also been noted in the Order-in-Original that the item HVI spindle oil cleared by them also fulfills the conditions stipulated in the Notification No. 44/78, dated 1-3-1978 as amended. It has been noted by the Assistant Collector that in view of the position that there were two different Notifications at two different rates for the product under question, the classification of the item spindle HVI oil had been approved provisionally under Rule 9(b) with the concessional rate of duty as applicable under Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended. (i.e. lower rate of duty of Rs. 110/- per M.T.), vide Assistant Collector's Order-in-Original of even number dated 25-6-1982.
It has also been noted in his order that in order to determine the correct concessional rate of duty and to ascertain as to whether the HVI spindle oil cleared by the appellants is having the required specifications as given under the Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended, samples of the product had been drawn and sent to the Chemical Examiner for conducting the test.
It has been noted that the product conform to the specification and the conditions as stipulated in the Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended. It is noted by Assistant Collector that though the test report confirms that the impugned goods are having specifications and conditions as specified in the Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971, as amended, however as Notification No. 44/78, dated 1-3-1978 was specific in nature in regard to spindle HVI oil falling under TI ll(a), while Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 though in general application to any 'mineral oil' (falling under ll(a), the Assistant Collector has held that the conditions stipulated in the Notification No. 44/78, dated 1-3-1978 is more specific to the product in question and hence the assessee shall pay duty accordingly.
7. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether the item HVI spindle oil having all the characteristics of mineral oil and falling under Item ll(a) and also being utilized for the manufacture of agricultural spray oil can be granted the concessional rate of duty as per Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971.
8. The Assistant Collector while passing the Order-in-Original dated 25-6-1982 in which he has approved provisionally classification list filed by the appellants has observed that the product satisfies all the criteria of Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982. He has also observed that the product HVI spindle oil manufactured by them is removed to M/s.
Wellington Island Installation under Chapter X Procedure for the manufacture of agricultural spray oil in as much as all the conditions under Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982 are satisfied by them. However, as he had doubt in the matter, he had referred the same to the higher authorities for clarification. Pending decision from them, he had provisionally approved the classification list under Rule 9(b) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 in terms of Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971 as amended by Notification No. 41/82, dated 28-2-1982. The contention of the Department has been that Notification No. 44/78, dated 1-3-1978 as amended from 1-3-1986 is applicable to the product in question as the Notifications specifically mentioned mineral oil commonly known as spindle HVI oil falling under Item 11(a) of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. However, the appellants have submitted that Notification No. 44/71-C.E, dated 7-4-1971 exempts any mineral oil falling under Item No. 8 of the First Schedule of the Act.
As the Assistant Collector himself has observed in the Order-in-Original dated 25-6-1982 that their product complied with all the specifications of the Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971, they cannot be deprived solely on the ground that the subsequent Notification specified the spindle HVI oil. There is no dispute that this product is a mineral oil and it came up to the specification of Notification No. 44/71, dated 7-4-1971. When there are two Notifications which are in force simultaneously then that Notification which is beneficial to the assessee should be applied. This has been well settled law. In Hemraj Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Surat - 1978 (2) ELT (J 350) Para 5, Supreme Court has held that"...It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification. If the tax-payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. If such intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom, the matter is different but that is not the case here. In this connection we may refer to the observations of Lord Watson in Salomon v. Salomon and Co.
- 1987 AC 22 at p. 8: "Intention of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of . Law or Equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication." It is an application of this principle that a statutory notification may not be extended so as to meet a casus omissus. As appears in the judgment of the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner - (1846) 6 Moo PC 1(9): "...We cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of the Act, we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there." Learned Counsel for the respondents is possibly right in his submission that the object behind the two notifications is to encourage the actual manufacturers of handloom cloth to switch over to powerlooms by constituting themselves into Cooperative Societies. But the operation of the notification has to be judged not by the object which the rule-making authority had in mind but by the words which it has employed to effectuate the legislative intent. Applying this principle we are of opinion that the case of the appellant is covered by the language of the two notifications dated July 31,1959 and April 30,1960 and appellant is entitled to exemption from excise duty for the cotton fabrics produced for the period between Oct. 1,1959 to April 30,1960 and from May 1,1960 to January 3,1961. It follows therefore, that the appellant is entitled to the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise of Baroda dated November 26, 1962 and the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise dated November 12, 1963." 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court again has observed in Suhrid Geigy Limited v. Union of India and Anr. - 1980 (6) ELT 759 (Guj.) Para 9 that"...It is open to a Court of law either to discern from the pleadings the object of a notification or to discern it from the notification itself even if such object as is discernible from the notification has not been pleaded...."In Collector of Central Excise, Madurai v. Shree Palraj Paper and Straw Board Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. reported in 1990 (15) ETR 487, the Tribunal has held at Para 5 that "it is nobody's case that the respondent in case they had opted for availing of the benefit of Notification No. 175/86-CE. only they were in any way barred from the benefit of the said notification. It is also conceded that the appellants were at liberty to claim benefit under either of the two notifications. The Collector (Appeals) has merely extended in his order the benefit of Notification No. 175/86-CE to the respondents. Legally, there is no basis in the plea of the appellant that the respondent could not be forced to avail of the benefit of Notification No.138/86-CE when they are eligible for the benefit under Notification No.175/86-CE also and when this benefit under either of the two notifications is available to them under law. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order of the Collector (Appeals)." 11. The other citations relied upon by the learned Adviser have already been noted in the Supreme Court's ruling as referred to in the case of Hemraj Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Surat and Ors. as reported in 1978 ELT (J 350) and it will be repetition of the same. However, it is to be observed again that where there are two Notifications available for the party and for the assessee and if the assessee is able to establish that their product is satisfying the more advantageous Notification then the exemption provided therein cannot be denied on the ground that other less advantageous Notification is more specific to them.
12. In this connection in the ruling of the Delhi High Court as given in Indian Aluminium Company Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India as reported in 1983 (12) ELT 349 (Del.), the observations made in Para 14 are relevant :- "...The exemption clause appearing in taxation laws should be reasonably interpreted. It should be given its full and reasonable scope and amplitude so long as violence is not done to the language used. The exemption is 'from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon" as is in excess of 75% of such duty. It would include the auxiliary duty of excise and there is nothing in the language to restrict its scope of application only to the basic duty of excise.
The exemption notification must be interpreted in a way so that the remedy provided by the legislature may be availed of by the tax-payer. The Finance Minister's statement is to the effect that the Central Government would introduce what was called a "Production Incentive Scheme" to encourage higher industrial production by providing relief in excise duty., The main notification was to give effect to the policy statement. The relief in excise duty is intended to cover in its scope both the basic duty of excise and the auxiliary duty of excise. For these reasons, I am inclined to hold that the exemption under the main notification covered the auxiliary duty of excise leviable under Section 36 of the Finance Act, 1976." Therefore, it cannot be doubted that the Government of India did not intend to give benefit to spindle HVI oil used for manufacture of agricultural spray oil. It is well known that the Government of India has been extending benefits to the agricultural sector. Therefore, it cannot be taken to mean that the appellants' product was not to get the benefit merely because there exists another Notification which should specifically describe the product. This is what Bombay High Court has observed in the case of Deccan Sales Corporation and Anr. v. R.Parthasarthy and Ors. as reported in 1982 (10) ELT 885 (Bom.) at Para 27, which is reproduced below :- "...It is now well settled that where a taxing provision or an exemption provision is capable of more than one interpretation, then that interpretation must be put which would reduce the incidence of tax or enlarge the ambit of the exemption provision." "...If two interpretations of a provision are permissible and one interpretation may render the provision subject to serious constitutional challenge, the other interpretation ought to be preferred. In other words, the provision must be read down and given a restricted meaning to protect it from a legal challenge as to its vires or validity." 13. In the case of Swishflo Private Limited v. N.R. Jadav as reported in 1979 (4) ELT (J 153), the High Court of Gujarat has allowed the writ petition of the assessee and accepted the submissions made by them that there is nothing to indicate that the exemption granted by Notification dated 1-3-1969 to electric motors used as component parts in the manufacture of electric fans is taken away by Notification dated 17-3-1972. The Court has also accepted the contention that had the intention of the Government been so, they would have rescinded, amended or issued the Notification dated 17-3-1972 in supersession of their earlier Notification. On the other hand, another subsequent Notification dated 15-9-1973 enlarges the scope of exemption by including electric fans on which the duty of excise is leviable "whether in whole or part". Therefore, the contention that the Notification dated 17-3-1972 has withdrawn the exemption granted by Notification dated 1-3-1969 to component parts used in electric fans was held as untenable.
14. Applying this ratio, we have also to hold that if the Government intended to withdraw the earlier Notification then they would have rescinded or amended or issued the subsequent Notification in supersession of earlier Notification as the Government has not done so, the benefit of Notification cannot be denied to the appellants in this case.German Remedies Limited, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay as reported in 1987 (28) ELT 144 (Tribunal), the Tribunal has held in Para 6 as follows :- "We have heard both the sides and have gone through the facts and circumstances of the case. In terms of the Notification No. 161/66-C.E., dated 8-10-1966 the Central Govt. exempts patent or proprietary medicines falling under TI 14E of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is in excess of the duty calculated on the basis of the value arrived after allowing a discount of 25% on the price specified in the price list showing the retail prices referred to in the said order. The appellant had opted to avail the benefit of Notification No. 161/66-C.E., dated 8-10-1966. The Tribunal in its earlier order in the case of Indye Chemicals, Ahmedabad v. Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad reported in 1986 (25) ELT 318 cited by Shri Engineer, Advocate had held that if the exemptions have been granted separately the benefits thereunder should be available to the assessee separately unless there is any specific provision to the contrary. We have gone through both the exemption notifications. Both the notifications are independent of each other and not inter-connected and in the subsequent Notification No. 161/66-C.E., dated 8-10-1966 there is no proviso that this notification is subject to earlier notification No. 117/66-C.E., dated 16-7-1966. We do not find any reason why the appellant should be denied the benefit of the subsequent notification No. 161/66-C.E. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hemraj Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Ors reported in 1978 (2) ELT J-350 had held that it is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words.
If the tax payer is within the plain terms of an exemption he cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. In a Court of law or Equity what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact either in express words or by reasonable or necessary implication."Indian Oil Corporation, Barauni v. Collector of Central Excise, Patna reported in 1985 (19) ELT 145 (Tribunal) it has been held at Paras 3 and 4 as follows :- "3. The fuel oil used as fuel for production of steam and electricity can be said to have been used as fuel within the same premises for the production and manufacture of finished petroleum products. Nobody has stated that the steam and electricity has not been used for the production of finished petroleum products in the refinery; to be sure, the process is a trifle roundabout but modern technology being what it is, it would be folly to require that only a particular kind of use should qualify when we know that there can be various methods depending on the technology employed by the factory. The exemption notifications themselves have nothing in them which would support an interpretation that holds that when steam and electricity is produced and used in this way, the fuel that was used to generate them cannot be said to have been used as a fuel in the manufacture or production of finished petroleum product. Neither electricity nor steam are themselves fuels but were produced by the fuel oils. The steam and electricity generated by means of the fuel oil are in turn used in the manufacture of the finished petroleum products. Indeed we are not a little impressed by the counsel for the appellants' statement that direct use of the fuel oils as a fuel is all but impossible in a modern refinery. At the very least, the loss of heat and efficiency from such direct use is such as to discourage economic operation.
4. But our chief reason is that we are of the opinion that giving the exemption in these circumstances would not do violence to the law but would be well within the scope and compass of the exemption notifications." 16A. In view of the case law noted by us, the appellants' contention has to be accepted by allowing the appeal. The appeal is, thus allowed.
17. I have perused the order written by learned brother Shri S.L.
Peeran, Member (Judicial). I agree with his conclusions. I would, however, like to add as follows :- 17.1 Learned JDR, Shri L.N. Murthy in the course of arguments before the Tribunal had also urged that the two notifications Nos. 44/78 and 44/71 will have to be read together. Reading together, he submitted, that the Notification 44/71 giving exemptions generally to all mineral oils will have to exclude HVI spindle oil for which there is a specific exemption in Notification No. 44/78. I do not agree with this proposition. Each exemption notification is a piece of subordinate legislation issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. No two exemptions can be read together unless there is a cross reference in one or the other.
If there had been any intention of the Central Government to read Notification 44/71, as learned JDR, urges us to do, Notification 44/71 would have carried the words to that effect. In other words, it would not have given the exemption to all mineral oils generally but it would have been to the effect namely "mineral oils other than HVI spindle oil".
17.2 It is also to be noted that in point of time Notification 44/71 is a much older notification than Notification 44/78. In view of the sheer difference of time regarding issue of the two notifications the proposition put forward by the learned JDR, that the two notifications should be read together is not tenable for that reason too.
17.3 In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned JDR draws attention to Notification 75/84 which he points out has both the entries namely 11A.07 and 11A.17 [S. Nos. 31 and 50 respectively of the said notification (as amended)]. He submits that both the entries being part of the same Notification 75/84, dated 1-3-1984 the two entries should be interpreted harmoniously. If Entry 11A.07 relating generally to mineral oil is interpreted to include HVI spindle oil, Entry 11A.17 of the said notification would be redundant. Such an interpretation, therefore, according to the learned DR should not be placed on the said two Entries of the Notification 75/84.
18. Countering this plea, the learned counsel Shri N.V. Raghavan Iyer for the appellants has urged that each entry in the Notification 75/84 is a self-contained exemption. The principle for interpreting the notification cannot, therefore, be different from interpreting two separate notifications. He has further urged that in the matter of two exemptions available to the assessee it is the option of the assessee as to which exemption will be availed by him. In any case better exemption cannot be denied to the assessee. He has further placed reliance on well known principle of interpretation of law. According to him, if there is an ambiguity in the notification in the matter of granting exemption the benefit of such ambiguity should go to the assessee.
19. I have carefully considered the pleas advanced by both learned DR for the Revenue and the learned counsel for the appellants. I am in agreement with the latter. Looked at from any angle, the benefit of lower rate of duty to the appellants cannot be denied.