1. These tax appeal cases have been filed against the orders of the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes-Ill (SMR), Chepauk, Chennai, in Ref. No. MM2/ T3/64403/94 dated October 16, 1995.
2. The tax appeals relate to the years 1989-90 to 1991-92. The common issue involved in all these appeals relates to levy of tax on groundnut shell and coconut shell used as fuel in the manufacture of paper boards. The disputed turnover for the said three years is as given below : The levy of purchase tax on coconut shell and groundnut shell was deleted by the first appellate authority, on the ground that groundnut and coconut shells used as fuel cannot be said to be consumed in the manufacture of the end-product so as to levy purchase tax. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner followed the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 and that of the Madras High Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arcot Cans [1993] 88 STC 285.
3. This order was revised by the Joint Commissioner in the suo motu revision, by holding that levy of tax under Section 7A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act is contemplated under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, even if the goods are used in the manufacture of paper boards, inasmuch as the manufacturing process warrants the use of coconut shell and groundnut shell also as fuel. The Joint Commissioner relied on the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K. Kandaswami [1975] 36 STC 191 and also the ratio of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Sri Ram Khandsari Sugar Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1988] 71 STC 392.
Hence, the present appeals.
4. Mr. V. Sundareswaran, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the present case is identical to the issue considered by the Supreme Court in the case reported in [1988] 69 STC 320 [Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v.Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd.]. It was categorically held by the Supreme Court in [1988] 69 STC 320 that fuel cannot be considered for levy of purchase tax, inasmuch as the goods used as fuel are not identifiable in the final product. The decision reported in Sri Ram Khandsari Sugar Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1988] 71 STC 392 (AP) relied on by the Joint Commissioner was rendered in the year 1987 whereas the decision of the apex Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 was rendered in the year 1988. The apex Court has categorically stated in the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 that the word "consumed" must be as raw material or component part of the end-product and not for ancillary purpose like fuel. Even on today, this decision is applicable and this decision was not overruled in the decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427 (SC). In fact, in [2000] 117 STC 12 (SC) (Coastal Chemicals Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, A.P.), it was categorically held that the word "consumables" refers only to the materials used as an input in the manufacturing process, but is not identifiable in the final product for the reason that it got consumed therein, by following the earlier decision in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 (SC).
Therefore, to levy purchase tax, not only the raw materials should have been purchased from sources where no tax was paid, but such goods should have been used as the raw materials and got mixed as the component part in the final product. Therefore, the raw materials should be used in the manufacture or consumed in the manufacture and should be transferred as some other goods and in such circumstances, use of the raw material as fuel would not attract purchase tax. The intention of the Legislature could be seen with reference to the Amendment Act No. 60 of 1997 whereby only fuel was brought for assessment under Section 7-A of the Act. Only in terms of the Amendment Act No. 60 of 1997, the purchase of the fuel is taxable, if the goods have been purchased without sufferance of tax at the earlier stage. As held in Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu [1977] 39 STC 12 by the apex Court, the subsequent legislation may be looked into to see proper construction to be put upon the earlier Act. This Special Tribunal has also in T.C. (R) Nos. 3041 of 1997 and 2929 of 1997 dated August 20, 1999 State of Tamil Nadu v. Montech Hydraulics [2000] 120 STC 641 referred to the subsequent amendment to consider the classification of the commodity, "hoists" with reference to the earlier classification of the commodity, "lifts". Unless there is a transfer of the goods in the manufactured product, the levy of purchase tax is not in order, as held in the decisions reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arcot Cans [1993] 88 STC 285 (Mad.), P.C. Balaramaraja v. State of Tamil Nadu [1994] 94 STC 212 (Mad.) and State of Tamil Nadu v. P.C. Balaramaraja [1992] 85 STC FRSC 5. Unless there is a transfer of goods relating to the raw materials in some other form, there is no case to levy purchase tax and in any event, the goods used as fuel cannot attract purchase tax, as clearly held by the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320. As observed by the apex Court in [1992] 198 ITR 297 in the case of Sun Engineering Works, the decision of the apex Court shall take its colour and context only from the facts of the case and not divorced from the facts of the case, since it cannot be applied universally. Reference was also made to the decisions reported in Nandanam Construction Company v. Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence), No. IV, Hyderabad [1983] 53 STC 42 (AP), Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v: Thomas Stephen & Co.
Ltd. [1987] 66 STC 34 (Ker), Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. A.B.Ismail [1986] 62 STC 394 (SC) and State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K.Kandaswami 5. Mr. R. Mahadevan, learned Government Advocate, contended that the order of the Joint Commissioner is in order, in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427. This decision squarely covers the present case. It has been categorically stated by the Supreme Court that levy of purchase tax is warranted, even if there is consumption of goods in any other manner and such consumption applies to utilisation of the goods also. Therefore, there is no case to interfere with the order of the Joint Commissioner.
6. We have considered the contentions carefully and perused the records. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 has not been over-ruled in the decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427 and that decision still holds the field, as considered in the decision reported in Coastal Chemicals Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, A.P. [2000] 117 STC 12 (AP). Further, with reference to the amended Act No. 60 of 1997, which came into effect from April 1, 1996, it was urged that the amendment to Section 7-A(1)(a) was introduced with a view to clear the ambiguity to tax consumables like fuel. Therefore, the intention of the Legislature was not to tax the fuel earlier to the amended Act No. 60 of 1997. We find that the contentions of the petitioner have no force at all, in view of the categorical decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v.Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427. In fact, in that case, the learned counsel for the respondent/assessee submitted that the view taken in Pio Food Packers case reported in [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC), which was followed in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 (SC), must be accepted and that at any rate, if two views are possible, the assessee should get the benefit of doubt and tax ought not to be imposed. The Supreme Court, on considering the submission, categorically overruled the view expressed in Pio Food Packers case [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC), which was followed in the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 (SC).
The Supreme Court approved the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad Dixit reported in [1969] 24 STC 343 (SC). The relevant portion for consideration in Section 7-A of the Act for levy of purchase tax, reads as follows : "(1) Every dealer who in the course of his business purchases from a registered dealer or from any other person, any goods (the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act) in circumstances in which no tax is payable under Section 3, 4 or 5, as the case may be, and either,-- (a) consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise ;" 7. A similar provision in the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act in Section 6A of the Act was considered in the decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandaham Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427 (SC). The following observation of the Supreme Court are very relevant to decide the present issue before us : "We are concerned in this case only with clause (a) of subsection (ii) of Section 6-A, that is, either consumption of such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise. Clause (ii) of Section 6-A of the Act postulates levy of tax on purchase of goods from a person other than a registered dealer for consumption or disposal or despatch of goods outside the State. So the scheme of clause (ii) of Section 6-A of the Act is that when the goods cease to exist in the original form or cease to be available in the State for sale or purchase, the purchasing dealer of such goods is liable to tax if the seller is not or cannot be taxed. To our mind, it appears that the object of Section 6-A(ii)(a) of the Act is to levy purchase tax on goods consumed either for the purpose of manufacture of other goods for sale or consumed otherwise. If the view in Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC) ; [1980] 3 SCR 1271, is accepted the result would be that the expression 'otherwise' will qualify the expression 'sale' and not the expression 'manufacture', which appears to us to be erroneous on a plain construction of the provision. The intention of the Legislature, it appears to us, is to bring to purchase tax in either event of consumption of goods in the manufacture of goods for sale or consumption of goods in any other manner. Once the goods are utilised in the construction of buildings the goods cease to exist or cease to be available in that form for sale or purchase so as to attract the tax and, therefore, the correct meaning to be attributed to the said provision would be that tax will be attracted when such goods are consumed in the manufacture of other goods or are consumed otherwise. Therefore, while agreeing with the view in Ganesh Prasad Dixit [1969] 24 STC 343 (SC) ; [1969] 3 SCR 490, on this aspect, we overrule to this extent the view expressed in Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC) ; [1980] 3 SCR 1271."Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC) related to pineapple sliced for being sold in sealed cans. It was held that there was no consumption of the original pineapple fruit for the manufacture of sliced pineapple, by removing the ineligible portion. It was contended by the learned counsel for the Revenue that even if no manufacturing process was involved, still the case would fall under Section 5A(1)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 because the statutory provision speaks not only of goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale, but also goods consumed otherwise.
This submission was rejected by the Supreme Court by observing as follows : "The clause, truly read, speaks of goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale or goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for purposes other than sale."Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 was followed by the Supreme Court in Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. case reported in [1988] 69 STC 320. It is true that the issue considered in the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 (SC) related to cashew shell used as fuel in the kiln and assessed to purchase tax. The Supreme Court, by applying the ratio of the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers "Consumption must be in the manufacture as raw material or of other components which go into the making of the end-product to come within the mischief of the section. Cashew shells do not tend to the making of the end-product. Goods used for ancillary purposes like fuel in the process of the manufacture, do not fall within Section 5A(1)(a) of the Act. Cashew shells, therefore, do not attract levy of tax under the said section." 10. In that case, the Revenue placed reliance on the following observation of the Supreme Court in Ganesh Prasad Dixit v. Commissioner of Sales Tax "Mr. Chagla for the appellants urged that the expression 'or otherwise' is intended to denote a conjunctive introducing a specific alternative to the words 'for sale' immediately preceding.
The clause in which it occurs means, says Mr. Chagla, that by Section 7 the price paid for buying goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods, intended to be sold or otherwise disposed of, alone is taxable. We do not think that that is a reasonable interpretation of the expression 'either consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise'. It is intended by the Legislature that consumption of goods renders the price paid for their purchase taxable, if the goods are used in the manufacture of other goods for sale or if the goods are consumed otherwise." 11. But, the apex Court held that the above observations are not relevant and made the following observations : "These observations, in our opinion, have no relevance to the present facts of the case. Further this very contention was negatived, though without reference to Ganesh Prasad's case [1969] 24 STC 343 (SC) ; [1969] 3 SCR 490 in the passage set out hereinbefore in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC). The expression consumption otherwise must in the context mean consumption of other goods for purposes other than sale." 12. Thus, it is quite clear that the apex Court in the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320, categorically held that the expression "consumption otherwise" must in the context mean consumption of other goods for purposes other than sale. In arriving at this decision, the apex Court followed the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Pio Food Packers case reported in [1980] 46 STC 63.
13. In the decision reported in [1999] 115 STC 427 (SC) in the case of Nandanam Construction Co., this decision in Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63 (SC) relating to the expression "consumption otherwise" which was followed in the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co.
Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320, has been overruled. The Constitution Bench of the apex Court in the decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427, categorically held that the intention of the Legislature was to levy purchase tax either in the event of consumption of goods in the manufacture of goods for sale or consumption of goods in any other manner. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Advocate, though the goods utilised in the construction of building cease to exist or cease to be available in the form for sale or purchase, still purchase tax is attracted, as the goods have been consumed otherwise.
14. Thus, in the present case also, the goods consumed otherwise as fuel in the manufacture have been rightly brought to assessment by the Joint Commissioner and the ratio of the decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427 (SC) squarely applies.State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K.Kandaswami [1975] 36 STC 191 (SC) also, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ganesh Prasad Dixit v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh [1969] 24 STC 343 has been approved, so as to construe Section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
16. The reference to the decision reported in [2000] 117 STC 12 (SC) in the case of Coastal Chemicals Ltd., is not relevant to the issue. In that case, the point considered was whether the natural gas used for the manufacture of paper and paper products, was a consumable entitled for concessional rate of tax, as contemplated under Section 5-B of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The relevant section reads as follows : "Section 5-B(1). Notwithstanding anything in this Act, every dealer shall pay, in respect of any sale of goods to another dealer for use by the latter as raw material, component part, sub-assembly part, intermediate part, consumables and packing material of any other goods which he intends to manufacture inside the State, a tax at the rate of four paise in the rupee or the rates specified in sections 5, 5A and 6B in respect of goods other than declared goods, or sections 6, 5A and 6B in respect of declared goods, whichever is lower on the turnover relating to such sale," 17. It was contended that the natural gas is a consumable within the meaning of the aforesaid provision and therefore, entitled to the concessional rate of tax. Only in that context, the Supreme Court observed as follows and referred to the earlier decision in the case of Thomas Stephen & Co. reported in [1988] 69 STC 320 (SC) as indicated below : "The word 'consumables' in the said provision takes colour from and must be read in the light of the words that are its neighbours, namely, 'raw material', 'component part', 'sub-assembly part' and 'intermediate part' : So read it is clear that the word 'consumables' therein refers only to material which is utilised as an input in the manufacturing process but is not identifiable in the final product by reason of the fact that it has got consumed therein. It is for this reason that 'consumables' have been expressly referred to in the said provision, though they would fall within the broader scope of the words 'raw material'.
In the case of Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320 (SC) relied upon in the impugned judgment, it was held that cashew shells used as fuel did not get consumed in the manufacture of other goods and that 'consumption must be in the manufacture as raw material'."Coastal Chemicals Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, A.P. [2000] 117 STC 12 (SC) has not considered the expression "or otherwise" considered for levy of purchase tax in the decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427 (SC). The reference to the case of Thomas Stephen & Co. [1988] 69 STC 320 (SC) in the context of the interpretation of the word "consumables" in the decision reported in Coastal Chemicals Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, A.P. [2000] 117 STC 12 (SC), has no relevance to the present case. As indicated earlier, the ruling of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v. Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427 squarely covers the present case and in such circumstances, the various decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner so as to show that for levy of purchase tax, the raw materials should get mixed as a component part in the final product, have no relevance at all.
19. The next contention strongly urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. V. Sundareswaran, is that the amended Act 60 of 1997 alone brought to levy of tax on fuel and therefore, having regard to the intention of the Legislature, it should be held that no purchase tax on fuel could be levied prior to April 1, 1996. It is true that the amended Act 60 of 1997 made the following change in Section 7-A(1)(a) of the TNGST Act : "(a) consumes or uses such goods in or for the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise, or." 20. It is also true that the clarificatory notes on the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1997 passed by the Legislature on October 28, 1997 states as follows in regard to purchase tax on consumables used for manufacture (Section 7-A) : Inputs purchased from unregistered dealers (and hence not suffering tax) used in the manufacture are now liable to purchase tax in the hands of the manufacturer under Section 7-A. However, in the wording of this section, there is an ambiguity on account of which consumables like fuels which are used for the manufacture but not in the manufacture escape purchase tax. With a view to curb this loophole, suitable rephrasing of the section has been made." But, on the basis of the Sixth Amendment Act (Act No. 60 of 1997) alone, it cannot be said that levy of purchase tax on fuel could be levied only from April 1, 1996 inasmuch as in terms of the Supreme Court decision reported in Assistant Commissioner (Intelligence) v.Nandanam Construction Company [1999] 115 STC 427, the purchase tax could be levied even with reference to the earlier expression of "or otherwise" found in Section 7-A(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
21. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Aluminium Company Limited v.Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) reported in [2001] 121 STC 510 ; JT 2001 (2) SC 66. Though this case related to levy of entry tax, still the principle in regard to Legislature intent is quite relevant to the present case before us. In that case, entry tax was levied on furnace oil with reference to entry 11 of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 pertaining to petroleum products, which reads as follows : "All petroleum products, that is to say, petrol, diesel, crude oil, lubricating oil, transformer oil, brake or clutch fluid, bitumen (asphalt), tar and others, but excluding LPG, kerosene and naphtha for use in the manufacture of fertilisers." 22. The State of Karnataka took the stand before the single Judge of the High Court that furnace oil was lubricating oil and therefore, covered by entry 11. By order dated January 28, 1992, the learned Single Judge held that furnace oil was not lubricating oil and therefore, no tax could be levied on the said furnace oil, which was brought into Karnataka. An appeal was filed before the division Bench and during the pendency of the appeal, by an Amendment Act of 1992, the Act was amended. The amended Act included a residuary item in the First Schedule and entry No. 67 corresponding to the earlier entry No. 11, reads as follows : "Petroleum products, that is to say, petrol, diesel, crude oil, lubricating oil, transformer oil, brake or clutch fluid, bitumen (asphalt), tar and others, but excluding aviation fuel, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene and naphtha for use in the manufacture of fertilisers." 23. On 30th March, 1994, by a notification, different rates of tax have been specified and the relevant notification pertaining to petroleum products and furnace oil, reads as follows : "4. Petroleum products, that is to say petrol, diesel, 2% crude oil, lubricating oil, transformer oil, brake or clutch fluid, bitumen (asphalt), tar and others but excluding liquid petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene and 24. Thereafter on June 28, 1996, the division Bench held that the entry 11 and the corresponding entry 67 of the First Schedule, after the amendment in 1992, contemplated the inclusion of furnace oil in the said entry and, therefore, the tax could be levied thereon. As a result, the earlier decision of the single Judge was set aside. The apex Court approved the order of the division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. Before the apex Court, among others, it was contended that having regard to the notification dated March 30, 1994 wherein the table provided a specific rate for furnace oil, the court could look at the subsequent legislation in order to find out the legislative intent.
The following observations of the apex Court in regard to the notification dated March 30, 1994, are quite relevant to the present case before us : "Coming to the notification of March 30, 1994, it is quite obvious that as on that day the judgment of the single Judge in Indian Aluminium Co.'s case held the field and as a result thereof the State was unable to impose entry tax on the import of furnace oil into the State. The only way by which this could have been done, pending the outcome of the letters Patent Appeal, was to make a specific provision which it did by the said notification of March 30, 1994. The entries being clear, the subsequent notification of March 30, 1994, cannot be invoked for the purpose of creating ambiguity where none exists." 25. Thus, in the present case before us also, an amendment to Section 7-A(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, was brought into effect retrospectively with effect from April 1, 1996 by the Amendment Act No. 60 of 1997, so as to overcome the situation that has arisen as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v.Thomas Stephen & Co, Ltd. [1988] 69 STC 320, which was followed by the other decisions of the High Courts. The note to the Amendment Act No.60 of 1997 clearly explained this position. However, when the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on September 21, 1999 in the case of Nandanam Construction Co. reported in [1999] 115 STC 427, clearly held that the levy of purchase tax even with reference to a similar provision in Andhra Pradesh, prior to the amendment Act No. 60 of 1997, was in order, it cannot be argued that no purchase tax could be levied, having regard to the legislative intent as reflected in the Amendment Act No. 60 of 1997. The Amendment Act No. 60 of 1997 was brought so as to levy tax on the consumables like fuels, in view of the ambiguity prevailing in the light of the decision rendered by the courts. When the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court categorically held that the levy of tax was proper even in the context of the earlier provision of law, which is similar to the Andhra Pradesh general sales tax provision considered by the Supreme Court, the plea that the legislative intent has to be construed with reference to the Amendment Act No. 60 of 1997, clearly fails. Thus, on the whole, we find no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners in these cases before us.
26. We once again reiterate that groundnut shell and coconut shell used as fuel in the manufacture of paper boards, warrant levy of purchase tax, in terms of Section 7-A(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, as rightly held by the Joint Commissioner. Therefore, there is no case to interfere.
And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned.
Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 24th day of April, 2001.