1. The matter relates to an application under Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ('the RDDBFI Act', for short).
2. The appellant No. 1 is a company of flour mills and appellant No. 2 is its Managing Director who borrowed money from the respondent-Bank by deposit of title deeds in respect of immovable properties situated at Malda. The business failed due to reasons beyond their control and the company closed down. The appellants wanted the respondent-Bank to sell the secured properties for liquidating the claim.
3. Proceedings for recovery of debt in Original Application No. 29 of 2004 before the D.R.T. ensued. That still pendsan admitted fact.
4. However, sale of the secured properties to liquidate the loan was underway and in August, 2005, the Tribunal proceeded to confirm sale of the assets in favour of Sarada Cereals Pvt. Ltd. (respondent No. 2) for a sum of Rs.'71.51 lacs in spite of an offer of Rs. 80 lacs being available before the Tribunal by one intending buyer, Maa Kami Finance Pvt. Ltd. Objections were raised to the confirmation of sale by the appellants but that were refused by the D.R.T. By the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 25th August, 2005, the sale was confirmed, sale consideration was ordered to be deposited with the Registrar of the Tribunal, any deposit with the application by the said Maa Kami Finance ordered to be returned to the party, sale certificate and delivery of possession were ordered to be given to Sarada Cereals Pvt. Ltd. (respondent No. 2) in whose favour the sale was confirmed.
5. Importantly, there was an application for amendment by the Bank still awaiting disposal and the Tribunal fixed 5th September, 2005 for disposal of the same.
6. Following is the mainstay of the submission made on behalf of the applicant-appellant. The Original Application No. 29 of 2004 between the Bank and Neelam Roller Flour Mills (P.) Ltd. is still pending and the claim has not yet been adjudicated. Or, in other words, the actual amount of the debt due has not yet been determined by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. Hence, there cannot be any application of Section 21 of the said Act that mandates pre-deposit of 75% of the amount so due from the appellant before the appeal is entertained. The appeal is only from an "interlocutory order" in the process of the debt to be determined by the Tribunal but not actually determined. The appellants, therefore, cannot be legally saddled with the liability of payment of any amount under Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act. Moreover, it is further submitted by the learned Advocate for the applicant that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is wholly without jurisdiction, null and void and if not set aside, would occasion grave miscarriage of justice. It is further submitted that the language of Section 21 is plain and clear and there is no scope of any interpretation to distort the meaning of the section to the detriment and prejudice of the petitioner-appellant by compelling them to make a pre-deposit before entertaining the appeal which has strong grounds for success.
7. But the learned Advocates for the respondents have other ideas to fit in with the language of Section 21 trying to make it effectual. It is argued by the learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank strenuously enough that the claim of the Bank is admitted by the applicant-appellants and the properties in question have been put to sale with the consent of the appellants without any objection and/or hindrance from any quarter. The appellants being in the knowledge of the said sale proceedings, are precluded from retracting from the proposition as laid down by the learned Tribunal. As such, the appellants are liable to make the deposit of the amount equivalent to the sale proceeds on principles of equity and also as stipulated by the statute. What remains to be adjudicated for the purpose of determination as the amount of debt due to the appellants when the borrower himself writes to the Bank that the property should be sold out to recover the debt, the learned Advocate for the respondent-Bank argues. The debt stands determined and there can be no re-adjudication, he maintains. The appellants must pay to comply with Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act, otherwise they cannot enter the appeal.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank then embarks on an exercise of the principles of interpretation of statute in an attempt to enlarge the ambit and scope of Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act. He refers to the basic object and purpose of the RDDBFI Act which is to recover without delay debts due to Banks and other financial institutions often running into large sums of money which after all is public fund. Section 21 primarily requiring the party to make, the hefty deposit of 75% of the amount of debt due as a condition precedent to the appeal being entertained is quite in conformity with the basic object or purpose of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. The learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank argues that this is a special Act with those objectives in view and Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act should be interpreted in a manner which serves and satisfies the RDDBFI Act's basic objectives.
Language of the section should be perused and probed to find the true intention of the legislators. It is important to see not only the language in which a particular provision in a section, such as Section 21 is couched but also to understand in what context, what basic object in mind, the language of section must be construed. The learned Counsel for the respondent then turns to authoritative citations of legal eminence like what Lord Halsbury has said "that you must look at the whole instrument inasmuch as there may be inaccuracy and inconsistency; you must, if you can, ascertain what is the meaning of the instrument taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it is possible to do so, to the intention of the framer of it". He has also referred particularly to an appeal before the House of Lords to say that where the question was of the true import of the statute, the Attorney General wanted to call in aid the preamble in support of the meaning which he contended should be given to the enacting part, but in doing so was met by the argument on behalf of the respondent that where the enacting part of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it cannot be controlled by the preamble which cannot be read. The House of Lords rejected the objection to the reading of the preamble, although, ultimately it came to the conclusion that the enacting part was clear and unambiguous, A.G. v. H.R.H. Prince Earnest Augustus (1957) 1 All E.R. 49 (H.L.). However, the gist of the whole point he wants to drive at is, statute must be read as a whole in its context.
9. Now, having gone through the relevant materials on record including the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal and the entire fact-situation relating to the provision of Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act in question and having given due regard to the submissions made on behalf of the applicant-appellants, I am inclined to sustain the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and find no force in those done on behalf of the respondents.
10. I am inclined to have a plain reading of the section to see what it meansinterpretation, if necessary and permissible, afterwards.
Section 21. Deposit of amount of debt due, on filing appealWhere an appeal is preferred by any person from whom the amount of debt is due to a Bank or a financial institution or a consortium of Banks or financial institutions, such appeal shall not be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal unless such person has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal 75% of the amount of debt so due from him as determined by the Tribunal under Section 19: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under this section.
Having had a close look at the section and the language conveying the clear meaning of the legislation, there cannot possibly be any doubting the fact that for preferring an appeal, while it is necessary to deposit with the Appellate Tribunal 75% of the amount of debt due by the person preferring the appeal, that 75% of the amount of debt so due from him must be as determined by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. The main application is still pending. Virtually the appeal is against a sort of an interlocutory order in the process of debt to be determined but actually not yet determined by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act as mandated by Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act. So, to my mind, there is no question of making any deposit under Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act by the appellant before the appeal can be entertained.
12. In the next place, I am afraid, I see absolutely no point to contextualise the language of the section in terms of the preamble or object and purpose of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. This is neither necessary nor permissible because the language of the section is plain, positive, clear and unambiguous. There is nothing vague, obscure or absurd about it. There is no apparent conflict or confusion here in the language of the law and we get the right meaning straightaway. It admits of no interpretation of statute as such to probe or grope for a meaning which is simply not there.
13. We need not drift from the basics of interpretation of statute and indeed the golden rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute must 'prima facie' be given their plain, ordinary meaning. Way back in the early eighties, the Apex Court did settle the point right. Thus, in Om Prakash v. Dig Vijendra Pal , the Supreme Court had this to lay down: The primary purpose of interpretation or construction of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. Since language is the medium through which the Legislature manifests its intention, the question of construing or interpreting a statute will arise only when the language used by the Legislature does not yield a clear and unequivocal intention, but is obscure, ambiguous, uncertain clouded and susceptible of more than one meaning. If the words employed are clear the Courts must accept them and must give full effect to them regardless of the consequences.
And yet again down the line the same principle is echoed in Keshavji v.IT. Commissioner : If the language of a statute be unambiguous, resort to interpretative process to unfold it is unwarranted.
14. The proposition holds firm in a very recent judgment of the Supreme Court in C.C.E. v. Bhalla Enterprises (2005) 8 SCC 308 : AIR 2005 SC 2891: With regard to basic rule of interpretation, plain words of the statute must be given effect to. The question of applying the principle of strict/liberal interpretation would arise only in case of ambiguity.
15. In fact, the rule of construction is "to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used "....Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 28.
16. Here, under Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act, the Legislature has meant what they have actually expressed...that 75% of the amount of debt so due from him must be as determined by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. There is plainly no such determination. The 'determination' must be in the specific manner and due process as spelt out above in clear and unambiguous terms. No other mode of determination is contemplated or conceived for the limited purpose of Section 21 that requires the pre-deposit of 75% of the amount. As a matter of fact, it would also be not within the competence or jurisdiction of the Court to look for any other determination than what is so clearly and unambiguously spoken to and apparently meant by the legislation of Section 21. And here is a recent decision of the Supreme Court to buttress the point. Thus, the Apex Court in Prakash Kumar v.State of Gujarat , has held that jurisdiction of the Court to interpret a statute can be invoked only in case of ambiguity, that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language, that Court cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language is plain and unambiguous and that Courts should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility.
17. To conclude, I might say that while it is always important to see what is there in the language of the law, it is equally important to perceive what is not there in the letters of law. After all, judicial decision-making is an onerous and weighty business that cares to know its bounds, not where it oversteps its limits.
18. I, therefore, find that Section 21 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, has no application here and no pre-deposit as mandated by Section 21 is necessitated.
19. Accordingly, the appeal is entertained. The respondents are directed to file affidavits-in-opposition to the memorandum of appeal within three weeks and reply thereto, if any, by the appellants within two weeks thereafter.
20. The matter shall appear in the list after exchange of affidavits on 30th March, 2007 for hearing of the appeal.
21. A xerox of this order may be made available to the Advocates for the parties.