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Water Resources Survey Employees Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
CourtCentral Administrative Tribunal CAT Patna
Decided On
Judge
AppellantWater Resources Survey Employees
RespondentUnion of India (Uoi) and ors.
Excerpt:
.....the other. there was discussion in the meeting as to what should be the period, for which year to year appointments should be made. whereas the demand was for five months by the union, but the management was negotiating it with a shorter period. the extract of the minutes as given below would be relevant to determine the worth of this minutes. "it was explained by the chief engineer that the duration of 5 months, if accepted, involved additional financial burden in view of a large number of employees involved: however, having regard to the hardship faced and also the need the chief engineer expressed his view that the period could be increased to 4 1/2 months, subject to approval by cwc. in fact, effort would be made to seek approval for 5 months period, provided the additional.....
Judgment:
1. Heard learned counsel appearing on the either side. The applicant No. 1 in this case is Water Resources Survey Employees Union, having 156 members including the applicant No. 2. The members are Seasonal Khalasi employed in Central Water Commission, (CWC), Middle Ganga Division-IV Patna. The applicants seek direction upon the respondents i.e. the authority concerned of the CWC to employ all the members of the Union from 1.10.1999 to 30.10.1999 i.e. for a period beyond three and half months during the current monsoon season. There is an additional prayer also to direct the respondents to employ all those members of the Union year to year for a period of 4 1/2 months even in future.

2. The instant case centres around the orders of appointment dated 5.6.1999 in the nature of Annexure-1 issued to each and every member of the Union. Be it recorded here that this order of appointment speaks of engaging the applicants (members) on the post of Seasonal Khalasi for a limited period from 15th of June to 30th September, 99. The order has further made it clear in no uncertain terms that the services of those employees would terminate automatically even without any order on expiry of 30th September, 99 or even earlier. Be that as it may, we have been convinced on the point without any controversy raised by either side that the appointment was pure and simple in the nature of ad hoc appointment for the period already defined therein. Therefore, in the light of relief as sought for, the sole point arises for consideration is whether the members of the Union were entitled to any extension of the period as already determined and defined in their respective appointment letters.

3. Before we go into the merit of the case, it would be apt to point out that the instant case was not a new one, rather the parties have been litigating on the issue for the last several years, and, from time to time, this Tribunal has been passing order one after another with regard to contractual service established for a particular year from time to time. We were taken through the order passed by this Tribunal in a similar case in the year 1994 as also in the year 1995 vide Annexure - 3 and 4 which are reported cases, the first being DA 548/94 and the other is OA 545/95. Even subsequently in the year 1996, this Tribunal passed an order granting interim relief to the applicants. In this context, we would like to observe that since the services of the applicants were purely of ad-hoc nature, brought into existence for a particular year, each of such contract has to be viewed independently depending upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case as existing in a particular year. This we say being alive of the fact that in earlier orders, the applicants have been favoured with interim relief for a certain period, either because there was step taken on behalf of the respondents to terminate their services mid-way or on some sympathetic ground, the interim prayer for extension was accommodated for a particular year. We have gone through the earlier orders passed by this Tribunal, but we find that no ratio has been determined for future guidance and, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the instant case has to be determined on individual merit depending upon the terms and stipulations clearly defined in the appointment letters in the nature of Annexure-1. Shri Amit Srivastava, the learned counsel for the applicant has drawn our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madan Lal v. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 1994 SC. 647, wherein it has been observed that as long as the earlier order passed in a particular case remained operative it has to be treated as law for the case and obeyed.

In our opinion, this verdict was not applicable here for the simple reason that, as we have observed, the instant case as also the earlier cases were to be determined individually on the basis of the service contract arrived at between the parties as per the letters of appointments issued year to year. That being as such, it may not be necessary to proceed on the lines of the earlier orders passed by this Tribunal.

4. Now, coming to the merits of the case, we have seen above that the service contract for the present year was purely ad-hoc in natural and the period of the need-based-service, for which appointments have been made, had been determined with particular dates, such as from 15.6.1999 to 30.9.1999. Therefore, if we go for any sort of extension of the period, that will amount to infringement on the right of the employer to take decision as to the need for the service contract or even to the resources for payment of the salaries. To put it in other words, the extension, if granted, may fall heavily on the State Exchequer. Since it was a need based service contract, we cannot allow ourselves to go beyond the terms as determined and defined in the letter of appointment. In this context, Shri D.K. Jha, the learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, who has not filed written statement because of time constraint, has preferred to argue orally, and has drawn our attention on the basis of the telephonic message received from the Meteorology Department that the monsoon season for the current year has come to an end. Therefore, there was no necessity for further extension. We would like to place here on record that if the respondents have already suo moto given extension of 15 days of the service, that was as per their need and decision taken in the matter.

5. Probably, the necessity for the applicants to seek legal remedy year to year originates from a so-called agreement arrived at between the employer and the employees, which was have had in the year 1988, vide Annexure-2. On being very much insisted upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, we were made to go through this Annexure, which was dated 2.11.1988. First, we may say that this was not and never an agreement or a contract in true sense of the terms. It was just minutes of the meetings held between the Chief Engineers on one side and the representatives of the CWC Employees Association, i.e. the resent applicant No. 1 on the other. There was discussion in the meeting as to what should be the period, for which year to year appointments should be made. Whereas the demand was for five months by the Union, but the Management was negotiating it with a shorter period. The extract of the minutes as given below would be relevant to determine the worth of this minutes.

"It was explained by the Chief Engineer that the duration of 5 months, if accepted, involved additional financial burden in view of a large number of employees involved: However, having regard to the hardship faced and also the need the Chief Engineer expressed his view that the period could be increased to 4 1/2 months, subject to approval by CWC. In fact, effort would be made to seek approval for 5 months period, provided the additional financial burden could be absorbed within the alloted budget. The Association also welcomed the contract on the part of the staff side." In our considered opinion, the conversation held between the Management and the Association as per the minutes, referred to above, leads us to nowhere, and, in no case it was enforceable in a Court of law. It will not be out of place to point out, as orally submitted by the Counsel for the respondents, that the proposal with regard to extension of the period has been turned down by the CWC as per their letter dated 4.11.1993, which is said to be available with the record of the earlier OA 545/95. We could not look into the letter, but even without looking into it, we can take a decision on the basis of the minutes itself (A/2) that this conversation is not going to substantiate any legal right in a Court of law. It is a matter apart that the Association may negotiate with the Management, and if the negotiation succeeds, it has to be left to the discretion of the employer to determine the period as per the need arising in a particular year and also subject to service contract of the year.

6. We feel very much tempted even to refer to our earlier order dated 11.10.1995 passed in OA 545/95, wherein this Tribunal has observed that the minutes of the aforesaid meeting were not finally approved by the CWG. However, in the given facts of a particular year, it is true that the applicants have been favoured with an interim order, but in view of what has been notiped above, it would not entitle them as a matter of course year to year. We are afraid that if any such extension is granted, that will be travelling beyond the limit of the contractual service of the present year as already determined in Annexure-1. We may further observe that by granting extension, we would be stepping into the shoes of the respondents in taking a policy decision with regard to the need-based service contract. The appointment, being contractual and ad-hoc which came to an end by efflux of time, the applicants had no right to continue and to claim extension as prayed for.

7. For the reasons, aforesaid, the applicants are not entitled to any interim relief, and further in the light of the observations made hereinabove, there remains nothing to be adjudicated upon, and, accordingly, this OA is dismissed at the admission stage. There shall be no order as to costs.


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