1. The relief sought for in this application is to call for the records comprised in O.P. No. 2/96 pending before the third respondent and direct deferment of the said departmental disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant till the completion of the criminal proceedings which are the subject matter of F.I.R. No. 81AC/96/HQ dated 27.8.1996 in respect of the very same charges and incidents pending on the file of Superintendent of Police, Central Range, Vigilance and Anticorruption, Chennai-6.
2. The applicant served as Chief Secretary Government of Tamil Nadu during the period 1994 to 1996. In May, 1996 the applicant was kept under suspension for having allegedly committed certain acts of misconduct during his tenure as Chief Secretary. It seems that action under criminal law has also been taken against the applicant and a criminal case is registered against the applicant in Crime No.8/AC/96/HQ dated 27.8.1996. The applicant has been shown as accused No.2. The substance of the allegation in the said complaint seems to be that the applicant along with four others gave favoured treatment to M/s. Meena Advertisers represented by V.Krishnamoorthy through a waiver of Rupees Iwo crores allegedly due from them.
3. A charge memo has been issued to the applicant on 17.7.1996 and the third respondent has been appointed as an Inquiry Officer. According to the applicant Charge Nos. 5 and 6 are based on the very same incidents which are the subject matter of the criminal proceedings. The applicant alleges that a perusal of Charge Nos. 5 and 6 of the charge memo issued in the departmental enquiry and the contents of the F.I.R. would reveal that the charges are one and the same and emanate from the very same incidents. The applicants states that without going into the merits of the allegations, since the matter is the subject matter of the criminal proceedings, the applicants wants a relief in this application to defer the disciplinary proceedings departmentally till the completion of the criminal proceedings. The applicant further states that it is to protect the interests of the applicant as against self-discrimination particularly in the light of the fact that the charges are grave in nature involving serious questions of fact and law. It is pointed out that the applicant has made a representation to the respondents to defer further actions in the departmental enquiry and he has approached this Tribunal only now till the evidence of the disciplinary authority has been let in for charges 1 to 4. The applicant has stated that one Sri P.V. Rajaraman, Finance Secretary is the witness to speak on charges No. 5 and 6 and his chief examination has been commenced. As the enquiry authority did not accept for deferment of the proceedings, the applicant has approached this Tribunal.
4. It is mainly contended in the application that the action of the Inquiry Authority in proceeding against the applicant departmentally in respect of the very same charge arising out of the very same incidents particularly when the allegations are grave in nature and involving serious questions of law and fact before the competent criminal Court is pending, is arbitrary and unjustified. It is also pointed out that on a perusal of the FIR in the criminal proceedings and the charges 5 and 6 in the departmental enquiry can be seen that the charges are the same and arising out of the same incidents. As such, the applicant alleges that when the charges are grave and involve serious questions of law and facts, the applicant is entitled to protection under Article 20 of the Constitution of India against self-discrimination and cannot be compelled to give any incriminating evidence against himself in any parallel enquiry. It is further submitted that the refusal of the inquiry authority to even consider the applicant's claim for deferment of departmental proceedings is without due application of mind and contrary to the settled principles of law. According to the applicant that his defence in both the criminal case and the departmental enquiry would involve same set of evidence and witnesses and if the applicant is honourably acquitted in respect of the criminal charges then it would follow that there would be no expediency for proceeding against his departmentally, so far as charges 5 and 6 are concerned. It is stated that otherwise, the applicant's defence in the criminal case would suffer grave prejudice. That is why the applicant is before us.
5. A reply has been filed by the second respondent. In the reply, it is seen that while the applicant was holding the post of Vice-Chairman, State Planning Commission, was placed under suspension on 5.6.1996 under Rule 3(i)(a) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. The applicant has been issued a charge memo on 17.7.1996 under Rule 8(4) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 and the applicant has submitted his explanation on 15.8.1996 and 16.8.1996. The allegations made that the applicant has been harassed is denied in the reply. It is stated that the applicant is facing the charge memo and the criminal proceedings for the misconduct and criminal offences as set out in the respective chargememo and the charge-sheet. It is further stated that the applicant was served with the charge memo dated 17.7.1996 on 18.7.1996 and the applicant took time for submitting his reply by letters dated 5.8.1996, 9.8.1996, 15.8.1996 and 16.8.1996. It is also stated that before framing charges, the applicant filed O.A. 1351 of 1996 before the Principal Bench of the Tribunal in New Delhi on 20.6.1996 and after the issuance of charge memo, the applicant filed another O.A. before this Tribunal in O.A. 581 of 1997 challenging the charge memo. This Tribunal disposed off the application on 18.11.1997. A retired District Judge has been appointed an Inquiry Authority to inquire into the charges and the inquiry is being proceeded with and the applicant is responsible for the delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings.
It is also stated that the applicant has examined the documents lastly on 19.5.1997 and the applicant has taken several adjournments defending himself in the departmental proceedings and that the applicant did not raise these contentions which has raised in this application in any other earlier proceedings before this Tribunal and as such this application is barred by res judicata. So far as charges 5 and 6 are concerned, it is stated that it relates misconduct as per the service rules and so far as the criminal prosecution is concerned, it is pertaining to the criminal aspect of the matter. It is pointed out in the reply that there is no prohibition for conducting parallel departmental disciplinary proceedings while the individual is facing criminal prosecution in respect of the same incidents. It is also stated that the departmental enquiry is distinct from the criminal prosecution. It is further stated that the standard of proof, appreciation of evidence, consideration of materials and the probabilities of the case are entirely different in departmental disciplinary proceedings from that of the criminal prosecution. It is also pointed out that pendency of criminal prosecution is not a bar to proceed departmentally and as such, it is not open to contend that the charges in respect of charge Nos. 5 and 6 of the charge memo dated 17.7.1996 should be deferred till the criminal proceeding is over. It is also pointed out that keeping the departmental disciplinary proceedings in abeyance may lead to avoidable delay in finalisation of the departmental proceedings and y" no prejudice would be caused to the applicant by proceeding with the departmental proceedings. It further stated that the wordings in the First Information Report and the charge memo issued to the applicant is not a material factor for deferring the departmental proceedings. It is also pointed out that the incidents could not be cited as a primary decisive factor for deferring the departmental disciplinary proceedings. It is further pointed out the contention that Article 20 of the Constitution is violated is not correct. It is also pointed out that anticipating the same evidence in criminal case and the departmental enquiry is not a sustainable ground to defer the departmental proceedings. It is staled that it is just and fair to complete the departmental proceedings in the interest of the applicant himself.
6. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Counsel for the applicant referred to us charges 5 and 6 in the charge memo and the First Information Report filed. After referring these materials, the learned Counsel contended that charges 5 and 6 overlapse with the subject matter of the criminal proceedings. According to the learned Counsel that charges 5 and 6 are grave in nature, though the criminal prosecution is in FIR stage, the same set of charges are framed in the departmental enquiry. Charges 5 and 6 involve intricate questions of fact and law, like the obligation of the Chief Secretary to take a decision according to the cabinet decision, etc. The learned Counsel points out that the FIR filed is a verbatim repetition of charges 5 and 6 in the charge memo, as such the Inquiry Officer should be asked to defer the enquiry with regard to charges 5 and 6 at this stage. The learned Counsel referred us to the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K.Meena and Ors. (1996(6) SCC416) and Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C.v. Mohd.
Yousuf Miya (1997(2) SCC 699) in support of his contention that when the charges are grave in nature and involve serious questions of law, the Tribunal should exercise its discretion and direct the Inquiry Officer to defer the inquiry with regard to charges 5 and 6 of the charge memo.
7. Per contra, Mr. N.S. Nandakumar, learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent contended that the applicant is not prejudiced in anyway. What is considered in the disciplinary proceedings is only the misconduct and the criminal proceedings are only in the F.I.R. stage and no charge-sheet has been issued so far, as such it cannot be said that there is a simultaneous enquiry or trial. According to the learned Counsel for the second respondent, it is stated that the applicant is participating in the inquiry and in his explanation he has given his defence is complete, as such it is not a fit case where this Tribunal should grant the relief as asked for by the applicant. The learned Counsel for the second respondent also relied upon the very same judgments of the Supreme Court cited supra, apart from a judgment of the Supreme Court in Govind Das v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1997 (11) SCC 361). The learned Counsel also pointed out that settled law is that there is no bar for taking simultaneous proceedings and it depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and castended. On the facts and circumstances of this case, it is not necessary to defer the inquiry with regard to charges 5 and 6.
8. We have considered the arguments of Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Counsel for the applicant and Mr. N.S. Nandakumar, learned Counsel for the second respondent. We have gone through the application filed and the reply filed by the second respondent.
9. The short point for consideration is, whether the departmental enquiry with regard to charges 5 and 6 has to be deferred till the criminal proceedings are over. It is necessary to extract charges 5 and 6 of the charge memo dated 17.7.1996 which read as follows : That you, Thiru N. Haribhaskar, IAS, while you were Chief Secretary to Government, in collusion with the Member-Secretary and Vice-Chairman of the Publicity, Sponsorship and Souvenir Committee of South Asian Federation Games and others, had, with malafide intention to confer undue pecuniary benefit to M/s. Meena Advertisers, Madras-18, played an active role in the issue of orders on filmsy grounds for the waiver of Rs. 2 crores due to the Government from the said firm, and by supporting the cause of the firm inspite of strong protests from the Secretary to Government, Finance Department, caused loss to Government to the extent of Rs. 2 crores. Thereby you failed to safeguard the financial interests of the Government failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and exhibited unbecoming conduct.
That you, Thiru N. Haribhaskar, IAS, while you were Chief Secretary to Government, with ulterior motive and evincing undue interest acted in injustified hurry and haste by issuing the Government orders for the waiver of Rs. 2 crores to M/s. Meena Advertisers, Madras-18, before the constitution of the duly elected Government, even though the polling in the General Elections was over, and thereby you failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, exhibited unbecoming conduct." The statement of imputations of misconduct in respect of charges 5 and 6 clearly show that the charges are framed for violation of Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and that the applicant has failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and exhibited unbecoming conduct. A copy of the F.I.R. is produced before us. Paras 10 and 11 of the F.I.R. read as follows : "10. Thus, M/s. Meena Advertisers, Madras-18, represented by Tr. V. Krishnamoorthy, (A-6) was given a favoured treatment, through a waiver of Rs. 2 crores due from them and given an undue pecuniary advantage and wrongful gain to the extent of Rs. 2 crores, which would have otherwise gone to the State exchequer. There is reliable information that M/s. Meena Advertisers were given such undue preferential treatment, at every stage, because of the close association of Tr. V. Krishnamoorthy, (A-6) with the then Chief Minister, (A-6).
(i) Selvi J. Jayalalitha, former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, (A.1) alongwith (v) L.N. Vijayaraghavan, I.A.S. (A-5) who are all public servants, had convicted and colluded with each other and with (vi) Tr. V. Krishnamoorthy, Proprietor, M/s. Meena Advertisers, Madras-18, (A-6), Committed criminal breach of trust and cheating of Government funds, and abusing their official positions had obtained an undue pecuniary advantage of Rs. 2 crores, without any public interest, for the said Tr. V. Krishnamoorthy. In this transaction, Government was cheated of a sum of Rs. 2 crores, which could otherwise have come to the State exchequer. Offences under Section 120-B IPC, 409, 420 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) and (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are disclosed against A-1 to A-6." 10. It is well settled in law, there is no bar or prohibition against initiating simultaneously criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings. In fact, it it is found necessary even an action in civil suit can also proceed simultaneously. In Kusheswar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Ors. (AIR 1988 SCC 21 18) a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has considered all the earlier cases and held as follows at page 2120 para 6.
"6. The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent-employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline." 7. In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was not right in interfering with the Trial Court's order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal." On the facts of that case, it has been held that the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon, the same set of facts and the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed. In that case, the appellant was an employee of Singanari Colliery of the first respondent and he physically assaulted a supervising officer and he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and a criminal prosecution. When the disciplinary proceeding as also the criminal prosecution were taken simultaneously, the appellant employee in that case filed a suit in the District Munsif Court, Dhanbad asking for injunction against the disciplinary proceedings pending criminal trial. The learned District Munsif stayed further proceedings in the disciplinary action till disposal of the criminal case, but when the matter came to the High Court, the High Court allowed the appeal of the opposite party and set aside the order of the District Munsif granting injunction. That was the subject matter of appeal before the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case. While considering the question, the Supreme Court has held as stated supra. This was considered later by a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors.
(1996(6) SCC 417). In that case, the very same issue was raised before the Jaipur Bench of this Tribunal and the Tribunal stayed the departmental enquiry till the conclusion of the criminal trial. The Supreme Court, after referring to all the earlier cases, distinguished the case cited supra and held as follows at paras 14 and 15 (pages 422 & 423).
"14. It would be evident from the above decisions that each of them starts with the indisputable proposition that there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously and then say that in certain situations, it may not be "desirable', 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges. The staying of disciplinary proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case and that no hard and fast rules can be enunciated in that behalf. The only ground suggested in the above decisions as constituting a valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is that "the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced". This ground has, however, been hedged in by providing further that this may be done in cases of grave nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful opinion, it means that not only the charges must be grave but that the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. Moreover, 'advisability', 'desirability' or 'propriety', as the case may be, has to be determined in each case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. The ground indicated in D.C.M. (AIR 1960 SC 806) and Tata Oil Mills (AIR 1965 SC 155) is also not an invariable rule. It is only a factor which will go into the scales while judging the advisability or desirability of staying the disciplinary proceedings, One of the contending considerations is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be - and should not be - delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons holding high public offices are involved. They get bogged down on one or the other ground. They hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion.
That is the reality in spite of repeated advice and admonitions from this Court and the High Courts. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. The interests of administration and good government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour is enquired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest of delinquent officer also lies in prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. It is not also in the interest of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be continued in office indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest. While it is not possible to enumerate the various factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings, we found it necessary to emphasise some of the important considerations in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal proceedings. Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of course. All the relevant factors, for and against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in view the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above.
15. We are quite aware of the fact that not all the disciplinary proceedings arc based upon true charges; some of them may be unfounded. It may also be that in some cases, charges are levelled with oblique motives. But these possibilities do not detract from the desirability of early conclusion of these proceedings. Indeed, in such cases, it is all the more in the interest of the charged officer that the proceedings are expeditiously concluded. Delay in such cases really works against him." After examining the fact of that case, the Supreme Court has found that the disciplinary proceeding was stayed by the Tribunal as it was not even after six years. Before the criminal Court, the respondent has disclosed his defence in his elaborate and detailed statement filed in 1993, as such, it is stated by the Supreme Court that there is no question of being compelled to disclose his defence in the disciplinary proceedings which would prejudice him in the criminal case. The Supreme Court has also held at para 17 at page 424 as follows : "17. There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are established and, if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed." The Supreme Court seems to have taken note of the fact that the delinquent employee in that case has filed his defence on 9.2.1993 itself and the FIR was filed in 15.5.1993 in the criminal Court. In this case, the Supreme Court has also take a note of the factual position at paras 8 and 9 (page 420).
"8. When the original application came up for final hearing, the only ground urged by the respondent was that the departmental proceedings be not allowed to go on so long as the criminal proceedings are pending against him. It was opposed by the State of Rajasthan stating inter alia that in as much as the respondent has filed a detailed written statement of defence on 9.2.1993 (in response to memo of charges framed against him) and because the respondent has disclosed all possible defences in the said written statement, there is no occasion or warrant for staying the disciplinary proceedings.
9. The Tribunal found that the charge-sheet in the criminal case and the memo of charges in the disciplinary proceedings are based upon same facts and allegations. It rejected the State's plea that the respondent having already disclosed his defence, will not be prejudiced in any manner by proceeding with the disciplinary enquiry. The Tribunal observed : "We cannot say at this stage what will emerge during the enquiry proceedings after examination of the evidence. The applicant may well have to put forward further defence as and when material against him emerges during the enquiry proceedings and disclosure of his defence at that stage could well prejudice his defence in the criminal trial." The question was again considered by a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya (1997 (2) SCC 699), the Supreme Court considered all the cases including the cases cited supra, The Supreme Court has held at para 8 (page 704) as follows : "8. We are in respectful agreement with the above view. The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are completed as expeditiously as possible.
It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offences in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial.
The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to he seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338, IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings." Having held so, the Supreme Court has observed that what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case and it is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending upon the fact and circumstances.
11. In G.K. Murugan v. Union of India (1990 (6) SLR 380), Ernakulam Bench of this Tribunal has held as follows : (para 7 at page 382) " 7. Recently, the question was considered by the High Court of Karnataka in the decision reported in 1989(1) LLJ 245 (Between Kalyani and Superintending Engineer), following the Supreme Court decision having regard to the facts and circumstances whether in a case it should continue the same or stop it awaiting the outcome of the criminal proceedings initiated against the delinquent officer and not for the Court or other authorities. In that case, the head note reads as follows :-- "There is no bar holding disciplinary proceedings during the pendency of a criminal trial though the basis or subject matter of the charge in both the proceedings is one and the same. The Full Bench in T.V. Gauda v. State of Mysore (1975 II LLJ 513) has held that there is no bar for holding disciplinary proceedings even after acquittal on a charge by the Criminal Court. This view has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Nagpur Corporation V.R.G. Modak (AIR 1984 SC 626).
The Supreme Court has clearly held in Delhi Cloth Mills case (1969-1 LLJ 520) that the principles of natural justice do not require that an employer must at least wait for the decision of the Criminal Trial Court. Having stated that, the Supreme Court has observed that in case of a grave nature it is advisable for the employer to wait the decision of the Trial Court so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. It would be difficult to hold that when departmental inquiry is not barred even after acquittal, the same is barred before acquittal. Therefore, all that can be said is that it is for the disciplinary authority to decide as to whether in a given case it should keep the domestic enquiry pending till the outcome of the criminal trial or not".In Sufal Kumar Naskar v. Union of India (1991(1) SLR 658) the Calcutta Bench of this Tribunal has held as follows : "16. We have carefully considered the respective submissions and the facts of the instant case as also the charges framed in the criminal proceeding and the scope of the domestic enquiry. We humbly agree with the findings of the A.I.R. 1954 S.C.R. 1150 (A.S. Venkataramam v. The Union of India and Anr.) as well as the Corporation of Nagpur v. Ramachandra G. Modak and Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1984 SC 636 referred to above and hold that no question of double jeopardy arises in this case." In K. Ramulu v. The Secretary to Government, Department of Posts (1992 (4) SLR 165) the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal has held as follows at para 15 (page 170).
"15. In view of the Supreme Court decision referred to above and the other decisions including the recent Judgment in "Sundararajan and Anr. v. The Deputy General Manager, Unit Trust of India, Madras Regional Office and Anr." (1991 (1) SLR 448) of the High Court of Madras, we are not in a position to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant that the disciplinary proceedings taken against the applicant when criminal case and civil suit are pending cannot be continued. As a matter of fact, the judicial trend seems to be not to stay the departmental proceedings pending criminal proceedings even though the subject matter in the departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings is one and the same. Unless it is so, there is the danger of departmental proceedings never being completed within a reasonable time, as there might be undue delay in the final termination of the criminal proceedings. The civil suit filed for recovery of amounts against the applicant has nothing to do with the departmental inquiry as against the applicant has nothing to do with the departmental inquiry as against the applicant. In view of this position, we do not have any hesitation to hold that the application filed by the applicant is liable to be dismissed." 12. In the backdrop of these decisions what has to be considered is the facts of the case before us. We have extracted charges 5 and 6 and the relevant portion of the F.I.R. above. No charge-sheet has been filed so far in this case. It is only at F.I.R. stage and it is not known when the investigation will be over and a charge-sheet will be filed based on the F.I.R. This is not a case where simultaneous proceedings after framing of charges the trial is on and the departmental proceedings are being proceeded with. As on date, only the departmental proceedings are on. The fate of the F.I.R. filed is yet to be known. It cannot be presumed that the charges filed will be of the same nature. Just because, the facts are same i.e. in the F.I.R. filed and the charge memo issued, we cannot come to the conclusion that the inquiry with regard to charges 5 and 6 has to be deferred. It has been clearly held by the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. v.Mohd. Yousuf Miya (supra) as extracted above, the purpose of departmental inquiry and criminal prosecution is on two different and two distinct aspects. Crime is an act of commission in violation of law or omission of public duty and the departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency in public service. The inquiry in this case relates to the conduct of the applicant or breach of duty of the applicant, in other words for violation of the Conduct Rules. The F.I.R. filed is entirely based on the criminal law of the land for various offences under the Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act as seen from the F.I.R. as extracted above. We are not able to appreciate the argument of Mr.
Mohan Parasaran that intricate question of law and facts arise and as such the depart mental inquiry with regard to charges 5 and 6 of the charge memo dated 17.7.1996 has to be stayed. If is intricate questions of law on facts, it is always open to the applicant to bring to the notice of the Enquiry Officer and raise all the contentions before him, so the Enquiry Officer can decide about it. We are of the view, that the departmental inquiry in this case with regard to charges 5 and 6 will not prejudice the applicant in his trial of the criminal case. It is too early to decide about that question in so far as no charges have been framed against the applicant on the basis of the F.I.R. We cannot also presume in what form the charges will be framed against the applicant. As such, we are of the view that the question of violation of Article 20 of the Constitution will not arises on the facts and circumstances of this cave. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena (1996(6) SCC 417) considering the 'advisability', 'desirability', and propriety' whether to stay the departmental inquiry with regard to charges 5 and 6 of the charge memo dated 17.7.1996 and taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the applicant has not made out a case for granting the prayer as prayed for.
13. In the result, there are no merits in this application. The application is dismissed.