M. Papanna, J.
1. Invoking inherent as well as extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner sought for quashing the Charge Sheet dated 9.2.1995 laid by the police against him in G.R.Case No. 2361 of 1994, now subjudice in the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar as well as order taking cognizance of offences under Section 279/337 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act against him.
2. On the accusation made by one Khadala Sahu, to the effect that on 26.7.1994 at 5 P.M. while he was going along C.B.I. Road after selling mixture at D.A.V. School Chhak, an Ambassador Car bearing Registration No. ORO 1141 being driven by its driver came from his backside at a very high speed and dashed against him, as a result of which he sustained bleeding injuries on his head for which he was immediately shifted to the City Hospital, Bhubaneswar for his treatment, Capital P.S.Case No. 599 of 1994 was registered and on completion of investigation, the police laid charge sheet against the present petitioner.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that though he claims to be the owner of the vehicle ORG 1141 he is not aware of any accident with which the vehicle is alleged to have met particularly when he was not intimated by its driver Sanatan Dash regarding any such accident. His further contention is that the police seized the said vehicle from his residence and took away the same to the Police Station. But, however, on production of R.C.Book, Insurance Papers etc. relating to the said vehicle they gave the same in his zima. That apart, as the petitioner was not driving the vehicle at the time of the alleged accident he is not liable to be prosecuted under Section 279/337 of Indian Penal Code read with Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. He has also pleaded that on the date of the alleged accident, the petitioner was on his business tour to Sambalpur, Bargarh and Bhawanipatna from 21.7.1994 and returned to Bhubaneswar on 28.7.1994 whereas the alleged accident was taken place on 26.7.1994. The Police of the concerned P.S.submitted charge sheet showing him illegally as an accused therein. On these grounds, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner persuaded this Court to quash the charge sheet as well as the order of cognizance passed against him by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar without any basis.
4. The learned Addl. Govt. Advocate, on the other hand, fairly admitted that there are no incriminating materials available on the record to. fasten the liability under Section 279/337 of the Indian Penal Code to the petitioner.
5. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties, I am called upon to examine questions of fact as well as law involved in the case at hand while considering the petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of charge sheet as well as order passed by the trial Court taking cognizance of the alleged offences against him.
6. So far as the factual aspect of the case is concerned, FIR lodged by the victim Khadal Sahu indicates that the offending vehicle bearing Registration No. ORO 1141 came from his back side at a high speed and dashed against him causing head injury. As he became unconscious he could not know the name of the driver of the offending vehicle nor he could identify him properly. However, basing on his written complaint Capital P.S.Case No. 599/94 was registered. During investigation of the case, the I.O. visited the spot, examined the injured and the witnesses, seized the offending vehicle from its owner and left the same in his zima. As prima facie evidence under Section 279/337, IPC was well established against the accused driver, the I.O. submitted the charge sheet basing on which the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar took cognizance of the offence against the accused on 9.2.1995.
7. The present petitioner has approached this Court seeking justice to be rendered in terms of provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that admittedly he is the owner of the vehicle in question but not its driver who was actually driving the vehicle on 26.7.1994 being engaged by a partnership firm by name 'M/s. G.N.Mohanty and Company' and that being so he is not liable to be prosecuted under criminal law. Therefore, in view of the submission made by the petitioner, it is necessary to examine the question of law involved in the case.
8. In the case of K.Ramakrushna and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in AIR 2000 SC 3330 the Supreme Court has laid down the law on the subject as follows :
'The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised to quash proceedings in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily the criminal proceedings which are instituted against the accused must be tried and taken to logical conclusions under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the proceedings at an interlocutory stage. However, there may be cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings can and should be exercised. Where there is legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged offence, the High Court should not be reluctant to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. Similarly, where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value do not constitute the offence alleged or without appreciating the evidence, but only merely by accompanying documents, the offence alleged is not disclosed, the person proceeded against in such a frivolous criminal litigation has to be saved.'
Their Lordships also made the following observation in the reported case :
'The trial Court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an enquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not, or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed.'
9. In 1999 Cr.L.J. 1833, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of N.C.T., Delhi, their Lordships have held that High Courts or the Magistrates are also not supposed to adopt a strict hyper-technical approach to sieve the complaint through a cullender of the finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with which the accused is charged. Such endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage.
10. In the light of the dictum quoted above, it is necessary to see whether the FIR or the documents accompanying the final report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code including the statements recorded by the prosecution under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure discloses the commission of any offence against the petitioner. In the present case the charge sheet placed against the petitioner appears to be based on no evidence which the prosecution intends to use against the accused (petitioner). On 26.7.1994, the alleged accident took place and after a lapse of time i.e. on 10.8.1994 the offending vehicle was seized by the police from the premises of M/s. G.N.Mohanty and Company as revealed from the seizure list prepared by the I.O., who released the vehicle in favour of the petitioner on execution of a zimanama with a direction to hand over Sanatan Das who was actually engaged by the aforesaid partnership firm in driving the vehicle. However, the petitioner failed to produce the driver Sanatan Das before the police in connection wit this case. It appears that Driver Sanatan Das absconded from the date of the alleged incident. After a lapse of time, to his utter surprise, the petitioner received summons as accused in G.R.Case No. 2361 of 1994 from the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar, who took cognizance of the offence against him without perusing the case diary, and the statements of the witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C., if any, recorded by the I.O. during the investigation of the case. A perusal of the L.C.R. reveals that, in fact, the I.O. has not recorded statements of witnesses including the victim under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No T.I.Parade as such for identification of the suspect, who was actually driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident, was also conducted. Instead of apprehending the real culprit, the police submitted charge sheet against the present petitioner who is not liable to be prosecuted under criminal law as owner of the offending vehicle for the accident caused by his driver. In course of hearing of this petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner produced the bus ticket of the O.T.D.C.bus in which the petitioner travelled from Bhubaneswar to Sambalpur and the bills of the hotel where he was staying during his business tour to Western Orissa from 21.7.1994 to 27.7.1994 vide Annexures 3 and 4 series which indicate that on 26.7.1994, the petitioner was not present physically at Bhubaneswar. That apart, there is no iota of evidence on record to show that the present petitioner was driving the offending vehicle.
11. The apex Court in AIR 1997 SC 3976, Ashim K. Roy v. Bipin Bhai Vadilal Meheta and Ors. has taken the view that in this connection, though it is very well settled that the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should be spairingly invoked with circumspection, this Court consistently has taken the view that it should be exercised to see that the process of law is not abused or misused.
12. In AIR 1960 SC 866, R.K.Kapoor v. State of Punjab, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court while considering the exercise of power under Section 561-A of the Code (predecessor for Section 482) held as follows (at p. 869) :
'It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.......It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused persons may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice........ Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and acceptance in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused persons.'
13. Therefore, in my considered view the observations made by the apex Court as above with all force apply to the facts of the case at hand. It is profitable also to quote the authority reported in (1996) 7 SCC 705 : (1996) AIR SCW 1229, State Of U.P. v. O.P.Sharma on the subject. In the reported case a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following passage from the State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agra walla, (1996) 8 SCC 164 : (1996) AIR SCW 591, (Para - 5) :
'It has been held by the Court in several cases that the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the Court comes to the conclusions that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of process of the Court, if such power is not exercised. So far as the order of cognizance by a Magistrate is concerned. the inherent power can be exercised when the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint together with the other materials collected during investigation taken at their face value do not constitute the offence alleged. At that stage, it is not open for the Court either to sift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusions that no prima facie case is made out.'
14. Therefore, reading the FIR, the final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Seizure List made by the I.O. in respect of offending vehicle and other documents accompanying it. I am satisfied that no case is made out against the present petitioner and that being so the pendency of the proceedings in G.R.Case No. 2361 of 1994 against the petitioner before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar is held to be an abuse of process of the Court. When the offences under Section 279/337 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 187of the M.V.Act alleged against him have not been disclosed from the documents referred to above, the petitioner is entitled to be saved from being proceeded against such a frivolous criminal litigation otherwise a great deal of injustice is likely to be done to him. Thus, in the premises, when the criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioner is quashed, then only abuse of process of the Court can be prevented and ends of justice can be secured.
15. Ultimately, the result is that the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is allowed and the charge sheet submitted by the police of Capital Police Station. Bhubaneswar in G.R.Case No. 2361 of 1994 on file of the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar and his order dated 9.2.1995 are hereby quashed and the petitioner is discharged in terms of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Criminal Misc. Case is, accordingly disposed of.