ORDER
S.C. Parija, J.
1. This application under Section 482, Cr. P. C. has been filed by the petitioner assailing the order of cognizance dated 29-8-2003 passed by the learned S. D. J. M., Bhubaneswar, in G.R. Case No. 3572 of 2000, taking cognizance of offences under Sections 294/506/384/504/34, I.P.C.
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 20-10-2000, the informant, opposite party No. 2 filed a complaint/report to the effect that on 14-10-2000 morning at 10.30 a.m. Sri Pradip Mohanty, Secretary, Dr. Moses Sukumar Das, Principal and three other teachers namely, Sri Rupa Kamal Mandal, Sri Milu Chandra Tripathy and Sri Ronald Baren, committed house trespass in his absence and abused his wife Smt. Rama Jena insulted her and threatened as to why her brothers were staying in the school campus to which she politely replied that since all of them are her own brother-in-laws, they can stay with her. But Pradip Mohanty abused her in obscene language which were witnessed by other Class-IV employees of the school. On his return from duty, the informant found his wife was weeping and on being asked she narrated the entire episode and as to how she has been humiliated and abused. The informant immediately went to the office of the Secretary to ask the cause of all these nuisance but surprisingly he was again abused by the Secretary and was threatened and asked to resign from the service or else he would be dismissed from service immediately. The informant was asked to kneel-down and rub his nose on the floor as well as on the shoes of all the persons present inside the office of the Secretary. Besides that, the Secretary directed the informant to clean the shoes of all the persons present by his tongue. The informant was compelled to do all these things and he did accordingly out of fear.
Subsequently on 19-10-2000 the petitioner called the informant to Cuttack on official work. Accordingly, the informant along with his wife came to Cuttack office where the petitioner showed him some typed Court papers, which were typed in English language and the informant was told to accompany one Surya Singh and Jogendra to Court in order to sign the paper so that there would be no danger to his service and that they will take care of him. On account of such inducement the informant accompanied Surya Singh and Jogendra in the office vehicle and went to the Court, where nothing was explained to him with regard to the contents of the Court papers and being afraid and in order to save his service and under compulsion, the informant signed the papers, without understanding the contents of the same. Apprehending that the above noted Officers of the school may use the said Court papers/documents to put the informant to trouble, the report was filed.
3. On the basis of the said report of the informant, the IIC, Nayapalli Police Station registered the FIR as Nayapalli P.S. Case No. 224, dated 20-10-2000 under Sections 294/506/384/504/34, I.P.C. and the Investigating Officer was directed to investigate into the allegation. During investigation of the case, the I.O. had medically examined the informant and the report of the treating doctor with regard to the injury was obtained, who opined that there was healed abrasion and scab formation on the bridge of the nose which was simple in nature and caused by hard and blunt instrument and that the injuries were caused within 3 to 4 days. During investigation witnesses were examined and their statements were recorded under Section 161, Cr. P. C. and after completion of the investigating charge sheet was submitted against the present petitioner and others. The learned Magistate after perusal of the police report and the documents being prima facie satisfied, took cognizance of offence under Sections 294/506/384/504/34, I.P.C. against the accused persons including the present petitioner.
4. Sri I. C. Dash, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that allegations made in the FIR does not make out offence under Section 384/34, I.P.C. so far as the present petitioner is concerned and therefore the order of cognizance is bad in law. According to Sri Dash even taking the allegation at their face value and accepting the same in its entirety do not make out any cognizable offence against the petitioner and therefore the continuance of criminal proceeding against the petitioner is an abuse of process of the Court. It is specifically submitted that the affidavit signed by the informant, opposite party No. 2, is neither coming within the scope and ambit of property or valuable security in order to bring the same within the purview of Section 384, I.P.C. In this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay and Anr. reported in : 1986CriLJ1922 and contends that the ingredient of the offence has not been prima facie established so as to justify the order taking cognizance of offence under Section 384, I.P.C. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner 'Extortion' is defined in Section 383, I.P.C. and the present case does not come within the purview of the said definition.
Section 383, I.P.C. defines 'Extortion', which reads as under:
Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits 'extortion'.
5. The main ingredients of the offence 'Extortion' are:
(i) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person or any other person;
(ii) the putting of a person in such fear must be intentional;
(iii) the accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, and
(iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly.
6. Sri Dash, learned Counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that before a person can be said to put any person to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held out some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound to do in future. If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him he would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence of extortion.
7. With reference to the above, Sri Dash, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the present case there being no such allegation either in the FIR or the subsequent evidence collected during investigation, the impugned order of cognizance is improper and illegal. It is further submitted that as no offence is made out against the petitioner, this is a fit case where the impugned order of cognizance as well as further proceeding in G.R. Case No. 3752 of 2000 pending in the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar, should be quashed.
8. Sri B. Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 2 (informant) refers to Illustration (d) given under Section 383, I.P.C. and contends that the allegations made in the FIR prima facie make out a case of 'Extortion' and therefore no illegality or impropriety can be said to have been committed by the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance of offence under Section 384, I.P.C. against the present petitioner. Illustration (d) reads as under:
A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly indices Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z signs and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the papers so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion.
9. Sri Mohanty for the informant relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Chander Kala v. Ram Kishan and Anr. reported in : 1985CriLJ1490 in support of his contention that preparing blank Court papers (meant for preparing affidavits) before the informant and asking him to put his signatures thereon under threat and coercion would constitute an offence of 'extortion' punishable under Section 384, I.P.C. Sri Mohanty further submits that in view of the allegations made in the FIR and the subsequent evidence collected during investigation, including statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161, Cr. P. C, does prima facie establishes the commission of offences under Section 384/34, I.P.C. for which cognizance has been taken and therefore no interference is warranted as a legitimate prosecution cannot be stifled at such initial stage.
10. The inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The rule of inherent power has its source in the maxim 'Quando lex aliquid alique, concedit conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest' which means that when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which the thing itself cannot exist. While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully, and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
11. In the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab reported in : 1960CriLJ1239 , the Supreme Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings.
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
12. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would bean instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.
13. The scope of exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. reported in : 1992CriLJ527 . The Hon'ble Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
14. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors. reported in AIR 2004 SC 517 : 2004 Cri LJ 598, while referring to earlier decision of the Apex Court came to hold that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole, if it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then, the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person.
15. These aspects were highlighted in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Anr. reported in : 2002CriLJ998 , wherein it was held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge. Even when charge is framed, at that stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on record but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.
16. Applying the principles of law, as discussed above, to the facts of the present case and keeping in view the nature of allegations made in the impugned F.I.R. and the offences alleged therein, and considering the materials on record, including the statement of witnesses recorded during investigation under Section 161, Cr. P. C, I am of the view that, no interference is warranted at this stage with the impugned order of cognizance, in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
17. The CrlMC is accordingly dismissed.