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Puspak Behera and Etc. Vs. Vice-chancellor, Utkal University and ors. Etc. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectConstitution
CourtOrissa High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR2007Ori58; 103(2007)CLT445; 2007(I)OLR157
AppellantPuspak Behera and Etc.
RespondentVice-chancellor, Utkal University and ors. Etc.
DispositionPetition allowed
Cases ReferredV. Sasidharan v. Peter
Excerpt:
.....a lawyers office or the office of a firm of lawyers. studies would equip him with better knowledge for a better legal career. course is a professional course requiring a purely intellectual skill as is required for the courses like m......hearing and are being disposed of by this common judgment.2. the petitioner in each of the three writ petitions calls in question the cancellation of his admission to the ll. m. part-1 course during the session 2004-05 (annexure-1) as illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice.3. brief facts of the petitioner's case is that pursuant to the prospectus issued by opposite party no. 1, each of the petitioners applied for admission to the ll. m. part-1 course. the opposite parties in letter dated 10-11-2004 called upon the petitioner to attend the entrance test on 19-11 -2004. the petitioner in all the writ petitions appeared at the entrance test and having been successful were called upon to take admission on 25-11 -2004. on 25-11 -2004, they deposited the.....
Judgment:

P.K. Mohanty, J.

1. As common question of law and fact are involved in these three writ petitions, they were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The petitioner in each of the three writ petitions calls in question the cancellation of his admission to the LL. M. Part-1 Course during the session 2004-05 (Annexure-1) as illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice.

3. Brief facts of the petitioner's case is that pursuant to the prospectus issued by opposite party No. 1, each of the petitioners applied for admission to the LL. M. Part-1 Course. The opposite parties in letter dated 10-11-2004 called upon the petitioner to attend the entrance test on 19-11 -2004. The petitioner in all the writ petitions appeared at the entrance test and having been successful were called upon to take admission on 25-11 -2004. On 25-11 -2004, they deposited the required fees and were admitted to the LL. M. Course. Petitioner in the first two writ petitions were admitted in M.S. Law College, Cuttack whereas the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 298 of 2005 was admitted to P. G. Department of Law, Utkal University. Each of them was issued with the identity card by the concerned College, a copy of which has been annexed as annexure-3 in W.P. (C) No. 14442 of 2004, Annexure-2 in W.P. (C) No. 13210 and Annexure-1 in W.P. (C) No. 298 of 2005. The petitioner in each of the writ petitions attended classes but on 30-11-2004, each of them was issued with a letter cancelling his admission, as in Annexure-1 W.P. (C) No. 14442 of 2004 and Annexure-2 in W.P. (C) No. 298 of 2005 on the ground that he had obtained a P.G. Degree earlier and, therefore, cannot pursue his second Post-Graduate Degree. Hence, these writ petitions.

4. Counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties sworn to by the principle, M.S. Law College, Cuttack denying the claim of the writ petitioners. It is stated that Clause B (xi) of the Eligibility for Admission contained in the Information bulletin stipulates that no admission shall be given to a candidate for a P. G. course for the 2nd time except for professional courses like M.B.A., M.C.A. and P.M.I.R. and, as such, candidates applying for Second P. G. Course are not eligible for admission except for professional courses like M.B.A., M.C.A. and P.M.I.R., LL. M. Course not being a professional course has not been included in the clause. However, LL. M. Course is essentially for a P. G. specialized course. During course of admission it having been found that some of the applicants including the petitioner in each of the writ petitions have completed P. G. Course, the college placed a note for necessary decision to the Chairman of the P. G. Council. The Chairman placed the matter before the Administrator/Vice-Chairman (sic Vice-Chancellor). The Vice-Chancellor having declined to accept the claim that LL. M. Course is a professional course notice was issued and the provisional admission was cancelled. It is submitted that the course neither forms the basis of undertaking profession after obtaining license from the Bar Council nor does it constitute any character so as to bring it within the fold of professional course.

5. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the only question that needs determination is as to whether LL. M. is a professional course so as to come within the exception for admission to a P.G. Course for the second time, as stipulated in the prospectus.

6. The term 'profession' as per the Concise Oxford Dictionary is a vocation or calling especially one that involves some advanced branch of learning or science. In Black's Law Dictionary, the term 'profession' is defined as follows:

'Profession'- A vocation or occupation requiring special usually advanced education, knowledge, and skill; e.g. law or medical professions. Also refers to whole body of such profession.

The labour and skill involved in a profession is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual.

The term originally contemplated only technology, law and medicine, but as applications of science and learning are extended to other departments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name, which implies professed attainments in special knowledge as distinguished from mere skill.

Act of professing; a public declaration respecting something. Profession of faith in a religion.

The apex Court in Management of Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi v. Kuldip Singh Sethi : (1970)IILLJ266SC has observed that a profession ordinarily is an occupation requiring intellectual skill, often coupled with manual skill. Thus a teacher uses a purely intellectual skill while a painter uses both. In any event, they are not engaged in an occupation in which employers and employees co-operate in the production or sale of commodities or arrangement for their production or sale or distribution and their services cannot be described as material services. In Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha : AIR1996SC550 , the apex Court while considering the meaning of the word' profession' has observed that profession in the present use of the language involves the idea of an occupation requiring either purely intellectual skill, or of manual skill controlled as in painting and sculpture, or surgery by the intellectual skill of the operator, as distinguished from an occupation which is substantially the production or sale or arrangement for the production or sale of commodities. The line of demarcation may vary from time to time. In Dr. Devendra M. Surti v. State of Gujarat : 1969CriLJ285 , the Apex Court observed that a '[profession' involves the idea of an occupation requiring either purely intellectual skill or of manual skill controlled, as in painting and sculpture, or surgery, by intellectual skill of the operator, as distinguished from an occupation which is substantially the production or sale or arrangement for the production or sale of commodities. A professional activity must, therefore, be an activity carried on by an individual by his personal skill, and intelligence, and unless the profession carried on by a person also partakes of the character of a commercial nature, the professional activity cannot be said to be an activity of a commercial character. The apex Court in Chairman, M.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. v. Shiv Narayan andanother 2005 (5) Supreme 829 : 2005 AIR SCW 4439 while considering the fundamental distinction between a professional activity and an activity of a commercial character has observed that a professional activity must be an activity carried on by an individual by his personal skill and intelligence. There is a fundamental distinction, therefore, between a professional activity and an activity of a commercial character. The Court took note of the definition of the word 'profession' from the Advanced Law Lexicon and the earlier decision of the Court but referred the matter to a larger Bench. The Court took note of the earlier decision in V. Sasidharan v. Peter andKarunakar : (1984)IILLJ385SC and the observation made therein to the effect that it does not require any strong argument to justify the conclusion that the office of a lawyer or a firm of lawyers is not a 'shop' within the meaning of Section 2(15). Whatever may be the popular conception or misconception regarding the role of today's lawyers and the alleged narrowing of the gap between a profession on one hand and a trade or business on the other, it is trite that traditionally lawyers do not carry on a trade or business nor do they render services to 'customers'. The context as well as the phraseology of the definition in Section 2(15) is inapposite in the case of a lawyers office or the office of a firm of lawyers. The analogy given in the counter affidavit on the face of it is illogical. LL. B. is a basic qualification for entry into the legal profession and has been treated by the opposite parties as a professional course and there can be no reason why the LL. M. degree which is a higher degree course cannot be treated and has not been treated as not a professional course, when MBA, MCA and PMIR have been treated as such. A person may feel that instead of LL. B., LL. M. studies would equip him with better knowledge for a better legal career.

7. In the conspectus of the decisions of the apex Court there cannot be any manner of doubt that the LL. M. Course is a professional course requiring a purely intellectual skill as is required for the courses like M.B.A., M.C.A. and P.M.I.R. or LL. B. The opposite parties in their counter affidavit have admitted that earlier LL. M. Course was treated as one of the professional courses but that has deliberately been deleted since according to the Chairman of the P. G. Council, LL. M. course is not a professional course.

8. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we find no justification for the opposite parties to treat LL. M. Course as not a professional course to exclude persons prosecuting the said course at the second P.G. stage. The notices issued to the petitioners cancelling their admission to LL. M. Course, therefore, cannot be sustained in law and Have to be quashed. We accordingly quash the same and allow the Writ petitions.


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