A.S. Naidu, J.
1. Both appellants were charged underSections 332 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code for having voluntarilycaused hurt to an employee of the Steel Authority of India Limited, Rourkela, a Government Company. Bereft of unnecessary details,the short facts of the case as revealed from the FIR are that on23rd of November, 1984, P.W.6 along with P.Ws. 1 and 14 whowere employed as Land Guards of the Land Office of SAIL wentto Sector 18 Jhumpudi Market to prevent the accused-appellantsfrom attempting to unauthorisedly occupy a piece of land whichwas acquired by the State Government and allotted in favour ofSAIL. The Land Guards when tried to demolish and remove theencroachments, it is alleged, the appellants got enraged andassaulted them with lathis. It was also stated that the peopleof the locality also gathered there and they pelted stones, as aresult of which the personnel of SAIL wore injured. On the basisof the said FIR, G.R. Case No. 2321 of 1984 was registered whichwas subsequently converted as S.T. No. 39/11 of 1986. LearnedAdditional Sessions Judge, Rourkela who tried the case, by hisjudgment dated 24th of October, 1986 has convicted the appellantsunder Section 333, IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorousimprisonment for three years. He further convicted the appellantsunder Section 332, IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorousimprisonment for one year with direction that both the sentenceswould run concurrently. The said judgment is Impugned in thisappeal.
2. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants andthe learned counsel for the State at length and perused thelower Court records and the documents.
3. To prove its case, prosecution examined eleven witnesses,out of whom P.W.I was the injured. P.Ws 2, 3 and 4 were theLand Guards of SAIL who had accompanied P.W.I to the spotat the relevant time in course of discharging their duties. P.W.5was the doctor who had examined P.W. 1 on police requisition.P.W.6 was the informant who had accompanied P.W.I to thespot. P.Ws. 7, 8 and 9 were the local residents having theirshops in Sector 18. P.W. 10 caused production of Exts.4 and 5(gazette notifications) and P.W. 11 was the investigating officer.
The defence of the appellants was complete denial. It wasfurther stated by them that the employees of SAIL used to collectmoney unauthorisedly from the small shop owners. On the dateof the occurrence while some of them came and forcibly tried tocollect money that was resented by the populace of the localityand there was a tussle. Being enraged by such unauthorisedand illegal acts of the employees of SAIL, the local inhabitantsalso assaulted them and pelted stones, as a result of whichP.W.I got injured. The appellants had actually not assaultedP.W.I.
4. Admittedly the land in question was acquired byGovernment of Orissa under Ext.4, the gazette notification.The said land was transferred to Hindusthan Steel Limited,Rourkela under Ext.5. Both the documents reveal that the landwas transferred free from any encroachment. According to theprosecution, some local inhabitants forcibly tried to enter intothe said land allotted in favour of SAIL and raise unauthorisedconstructions thereon. Coming to know about such fact, onthe date of occurrence, officers/employees of SAIL were deputedto prevent such unauthorised construction. Ext.6 is a copy ofthe Office Order which reveals that the aforesaid duty hadbeen assigned to P.Ws. 1 and 6 on 23.11.1994. The evidence ofP.W. 1 clearly reveals that when the officials of SAIL tried toprevent the encroachment and used force to remove the unauthorisedconstructions raised on the land of SAIL, the appellants assaultedP.W. 1. The said statement is corroborated by some other prosecutionwitnesses. It is a fact that some of the prosecution witnesses,i.e. P.Ws. 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9, were declared hostile as they didnot supports the prosecution case,
5. In support of the defence story that being arrayed bythe illegal collection of gratification by the employees of SAILthe people of the locality pelted stones, and attacked the saidemployees, four witnesses were examined.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants in course of havingsubmitted that SAIL being a company, its employees cannot be'public servants' so as to attract the provisions of Sections 332and 333 of the Indian Penal Code. But the definition of 'publicservant' in Sub-clause (b) of twelfth clause of Section 21 of theIndian Penal Code which states that 'public servant' denotes aperson failing under any of the descriptions and every personin the service or pay of a Government company as defined inSection 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 squarely covers theemployees of a Government Company like SAIL. In view of thisposition, the submission made by the learned counsel for theappellants does not merit consideration.
7. The plea taken by the defence that being enraged bythe illegal collection of gratification by the officials of SAIL, thelocal people pelted stones thereby causing hurt to P.W.I cannotalso be accepted especially in view of the fact that no FIR tothat effect was lodged nor any complaint was made before thehigher authorities of SAIL. Thus the only question that needs tobe considered is as to whether the appellants assaulted P.W. 1and as to whether P.W. 1 was discharging any duty he was legallyauthorised to do. Admittedly, as would be evident from the statementof P.W. 1, the land in question was not in exclusive possession of SAIL. It also appears that on the date of the occurrence theunauthorised structure raised by the appellants was existingover the disputed land and P.W. 1 directed the other officials ofSAIL who had accompanied him to demolish the said structures.It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants that suchaction of P.W.I was in excess of his jurisdiction, inasmuch asthere was no order of the competent authority authorising P.W. 1or any other official of SAIL to remove the said existing structures.Admittedly no proceeding was initiated for removal of such unauthorisedstructures and thus P.W. 1 and other officials of SAIL acted beyondtheir jurisdiction. It was further submitted that though the appellantshad no title over the land in question, admittedly they weretrespassers and were possessing the land by raising constructions.It was forcefully submitted by the learned counsel for the appellantsthat a trespasser has a right to protect his possession and hecan only be evicted under due process of law and not by showof muscle power.
8. Be that as it may, the fact remains that P.W. 1 was apublic servant and he had directed the other employees of SAILto remove the unauthorised constructions made by the appellantson a land of SAIL. Further, the appellants had no semblance ofright or title either to possess the said land or to make anyunauthorised construction thereon. Admittedly, P.W. 1 and otheremployees of SAIL were public servants and they were dischargingtheir lawful duties. In such circumstances, the appellants hadno right to take the law into their own hands and assault thepublic servants. But then question arises as to whether P.W. 1and other employees of SAIL in fact sustained injuries due toassault by the appellants or got injured due to pelting of stonesby the nearby shop owners.
9. The prosecution has not come with clean hands. Mostof the independent witnesses have turned hostile. As would beevident from the deposition of P.W.5, the treating physician,the injuries found on P.W.I could be caused by blunt objectsand all the injuries excepting one were simple in nature.
10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the caseand in view of the fact that prosecution has failed to establishits case beyond all reasonable doubts that in fact the injurieswere caused to P.W. 1 by the appellants, and in absence of evidenceas to which of the injuries could be attributed to which of theappellants, more so when there is evidence to show that therewas pelting of stones from all sides, I am not in a position toaccept the prosecution case and confirm the finding of the Courtsbelow that the appellants were solely responsible for the injuriescaused to P.W.I. However, a perusal of the statements of thewitnesses, leads to an irresistible conclusion that the appellants had no authority to possess a land which did not belong to themand further to raise unauthorised constructions thereon. They didnot stop there, and tried to prevent the public servants from dischargingtheir duties. There is also evidence to show that the appellantstried to physically prevent P.W. 1 and other employees of SAIL whowere discharging their duties and caused hurt. Thus I am satisfiedthat the charge under Section 332, IPC is established against theappellants. In view of the discussions made above, while acquittingthe appellants of the charge under Section 333, IPC, I uphold theconviction of appellants under Section 332, IPC.
11. The occurrence was of the year 1984 and almost nineteenyears have passed in the meanwhile. On a cumulative assessmentof the facts and circumstances of the case, I feel that ends ofjustice would be better served if instead of substantive sentenceof imprisonment, a sentence of fine is imposed on the appellants.Accordingly, I sentence the appellants under Section 332, IPCto pay a fine of Rs. 3,000.00 (Three thousand) each within amonth hence, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment fora period of one year.
The Criminal Appeal is thus allowed in part.