Judgment:
ORDER
A. Pasayat, J.
1. This is an application for exercise of revisional and inherent jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401, read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the 'Code').
2. This is the second journey of the petitioner to this Court. Earlier the petitioner was before this Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 1065 of 1991. From order dated 21-1-1992, it appears that the petitioner's prayer to quash the proceeding before the learned Judicial Magistrate, first class, Bhubaneswar (in short, 'JMFC') was not in essence accepted, and the learned counsel for petitioner wanted to withdraw the application stating that the petitioner shall raise objection relating to legality of cognizance under Section 408 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'IPC') at the appropriate stage. The plea relating to quashing of proceeding on the ground of passage of considerable time was not pressed as is evident from the said order, because the only ground on which the application was withdrawn was to assail correctness of the cognizance taken at the appropriate stage during trial. By the impugned order dated 23-7-1992, the learned Judicial Magistrate, first class, Bhubaneswar rejected the petitioner's fresh plea relating to lack of territorial jurisdiction. She also did not find any substance in the petitioner's plea that since there was considerable delay continuance of the proceeding would be an abuse of the process of Court. It is to be noted that the case was instituted in the year 1980. Two points urged before the learned JMFC are reiterated before this Court.
3. It is stated that the alleged occurrence having taken place outside the local jurisdiction of the Court of JMFC, it lacked territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter. According to Mr. S.S. Das, learned counsel for the complainant-opposite party, the sub-'mission has no substance because the offence is criminal breach of trust. Grime is in its essential nature local, and Section 177 of the Code, therefore, adopts common law of England that all crimes are local and justiciable only by the local Courts within whose jurisdiction they are committed. A Court has no power to try an accused for an offence committed wholly outside limits of its jurisdiction. Various sections in Chapter XII of the Code create several exceptions to the rule prescribed under Section 177. But those exceptions to the rule are to be reasonably and properly construed and their scope should not be enlarged on analogous considerations. If a particular act is complete offence by itself, the offence is to be enquired into and tried only by a Court within whose jurisdiction the act was committed. Sections 178 to 185 provide exceptions to this rule and provide circumstances in which an accused may be tried at a place other than the place of commission of offence. The word used in Section 177 is 'ordinarily' which according to Oxford Dictionary means 'regular; normal; customary; usual; not exceptional'. 'Ordinarily' must be taken to mean 'except in cases provided hereinafter to the contrary'. Territorial jurisdiction is a matter of convenience keeping in mind administrative point of view with respect to work of a particular Court, convenience of the accused and convenience of the witnesses. The rule laid down under Section 177 of the Code does not, therefore, go to the root of the matter and does not make trial of an accused by a Court having no territorial jurisdiction a nullity. Rule given in Section 177 is a general one. Exception to it may be found in various Acts which make special provisions for place of trial of offences created by those Acts. Section 4 of the Code seves those special provisions and limits application of general provisions enunciated in Section 177. Section 462 of the Code cures irregular proceedings wrongly held in a wrong Court unless it appears that error as to territorial jurisdiction has in fact occasioned failure of justice. In accordance with ordinary rules of construction, special provision in Section 181(4) is to ordinarily receive effect unqualified of general provision of Section 179. The accused may be prosecuted in terms of Section 181(4) in a Court within whose jurisdiction (a) offence was committed, or (b) any part of property which is the subject to the offence was received or retained, or (c) property was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person. The three requirements under Sub-section (4) are disjunctive, i.e., Court at any one of those places would have jurisdiction to try such an offence. These aspects were highlighted by me is Shri Dhirubhai Hirachand Ambani v. Shri Tulsi Bhayana (1995) 8 OCR 22. In view of the accusations, I find no substance that the learned JMFC, Bhubaneswar, lacks territorial jurisdiction.
4. The other question is whether prolongation of the proceeding entails quashing of the same. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard. It : would all depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It is a regrettable feature that a proceeding should be kept pending for years together. But the Court can take note of the nature of allegations, and availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, and decide whether it would be expedient to terminate the proceeding on account of lapse of. time. It is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time-limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. Wherever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made, the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceedings have been pending for an unjustifiably long period. In many cases, accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases, delays may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed, but the system itself. Such delays too cannot broadly speaking be treated as unjustifiable. Of course, if it is a minor offence, and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise. Each case must be left to be decided on its own facts. It is neither advisable, nor feesible to draw or prescribe an outer time-limit for conclusion of all proceedings. It is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speedy trial. The principles in this regard have been indicated by the Apex Court in Abdul Rahman Antuley v. R.S. Nayak : 1992CriLJ2717 .
5. In the case at hand, I find that witnesses have been examined before and after charge. The proceeding has been stayed by the orders of this Court at the behest of the petitioner on two occasions covering a period of about four years in total. In the circumstances of the case, appropriate direction would be to direct expeditious disposal of the pending proceeding. Let the trial be concluded within a period not exceeding one year from the date of receipt of the record. A similar course was adopted by the Apex Court in Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan (1990 1 SVLR (Cri) 51, which also involved an offence punishable under Section 408 IPC, and the pendency period was about 25 years.
The application is accordingly disposed of.