M.M. Das, J.
1. This Writ Appeal has been filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against an order dated 1.7.2005 of the Learned Single Judge passed in O.J.C. No. 17341 of 2001.
2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No. 1 filed Title Suit No. 164 of 1979 against the appellant to set aside a sale deed, which was executed and registered by one Gajendra Acharya in favour of the appellant with respect to the 'A' Schedule property of the plaint for a consideration of Rs. 2000/-. The grounds taken in the plaint were that the sale deed was obtained by playing fraud and coercing the vendor. The appellant's case was that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 realizing that the suit would be dismissed got a compromise petition filed in the suit, which according to the appellant was obtained by the respondent No. 1 by playing fraud on the appellant. However, on the Court causing an enquiry under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC, held that the compromise was lawful and the same was made a part of the decree. The said decree was challenged by the appellant in Title Appeal No. 21 of 1982, which was being dismissed, Second Appeal No. 109 of 1984, which was being dismissed, Second Appeal No. 109 of 1984 was preferred by the appellant before this Court. The said Second Appeal was also dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 levied execution of the decree in Execution case No. 2 of 1991. During the pendency of the said execution case, the appellant filed a misc. case under Section 47 of the CPC being Misc. Case No. 52 of 1992 challenging the executability of the decree. During pendency of the said misc. case, the appellant filed an application to amend the said misc. case filed under Section 47 of the CPC. The prayer for amendment being rejected, the appellant filed a Civil Revision against the said order of rejection of the application for amendment. The said Civil Revision was also dismissed and the appellant challenging the said order of dismissal passed in the Civil Revision filed O.J.C. No. 17341 of 2001. The Learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 1.7.2005 after analyzing the facts of the case in detail dismissed the Writ Application holding that it is devoid of merits. Aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this Writ Appeal for appropriate relief.
3. At the outset, Mr. S. P. Mishra, Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the Writ Appeal against the order dated 1.7.2005 of the Learned Single Judge is not maintainable. In support of his contention, he relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chunta Nayak and fifty Ors. v. State of Orissa, represented by Collector, Kendrapara and five Ors., 2002 (I) OLR 139. Mr. Mukherjee, Learned Counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, contended that the ratio of the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the facts of the said case are distinguishable from that of the present case.
4. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties and keeping in view the fact that this is a Letters Patent Appeal, Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is quoted hereunder:
'An appeal shall lie...from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of High Court ... and not being an order made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction...) of one Judge of the said High Court ... and in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal....'
Interpreting the above Clause 10 in the case of New Kenilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. v. Orissa State Finance Corporation and Ors., : [1997]1SCR395 , the Supreme Court in paragraph-7 of the judgment held as follows :
'It would, thus, be seen that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent consists of only two parts. In the fist part, an appeal shall lie from a judgment of a Learned Single Judge to the Division Bench not being a judgment passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction. In other cases, where the Learned Single Judge exercises the appellate jurisdiction, if he certifies that it is a fit case for an appeal to the Division Bench. Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in the latter part of Clause 10, an appeal would lie....'
In the said case which went up to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court overruled the Full bench decision of this Court in the case of Birendra Kumar Majhi v. Sitamani Bewa, 74 (1992) CLT 389 (FB) : 1992 (34) OJD 473 (Civil), and further observed that the very object of introducing these amendments was to cut-down the delay in disposal of suits and to curtail spate remedial steps provided under the Code.
5. In the present case, however, it would be seen that O.J.C. No. 17341 of 2001 was filed by the appellant against an order passed by the subordinate revisional Court in a Civil Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court in the Case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, : [1966]3SCR744 while considering the question as to issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 32 of the Constitution of India observed that a judicial order passed by the High Court is not amenable to be challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution and no Writ of certiorari can be issued to quash such order. Drawing this analogy, we are of the view that order passed by a Learned Civil Court is not amenable to the Writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such order may be open to challenge by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Thus, we are of the view that the Writ Application filed by the appellant was one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the Learned Single Judge exercised the supervisory jurisdiction under the said Article. Further, we find that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this High Court is in pari materia with Clause 10 of the Letters patent of the High Courts of Calcutta and Madras. The said High Courts have taken a view that no appeal shall lie against an order passed by a Learned Single Judge in exercising of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
6. The use of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order passed in a Civil Revision under Section 115, CPC came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Gobinda Chandra Tripathy and Anr. v. Rama Chandra Tripathy and Ors., 85 (1998) CLT 261. Hon'ble Shri Justice A. Pasayat (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Court, while taking note of the case of Mahadeo Savleram Thalka and Ors. v. Puna Municipal Corporation and Anr., : [1995]1SCR543 held in paragraph-6 of the aforesaid judgment, as follows :
'...Power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals within bounds of their authority, and not for correcting mere errors. A mere wrong decision without anything more is to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred under the said Article is limited seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. In exercising the supervisory power, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based on to correct errors in the decision. The power of superintendence being extraordinary is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases. The power of superintendence is not intended to confer in the High Court an unlimited prerogative to interfere in every case where a wrong decision has been arrived at by a judicial or quasi-judicial, Court or Tribunal, either in fact or in law. The High Court will refuse to issue a Writ in the event it is found that substantial justice has been done to the parties or in larger interest it would not be prudent to issue such a writ.'
7. It would be further seen that there has been drastic/basic amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to Letters Patent Appeals, which were provided previously under Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The amendments have been given effect to from 1.7.2002 creating a bar for filing further appeal in certain cases. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure after the amendment, reads as follows :
'100-A. No further appeal in certain cases: Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letter Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge.'
Similarly, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has also been amended by restricting the revisional power under the Code of Civil Procedure to a large extent. These amendments to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure were under consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Shakti Co-op. Hosing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and Ors., : [2003]3SCR762 .
8. The legislative intention and the public policy in bringing such amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure are for attaining finality to a lis by cutting short the provisions, which would otherwise be misutilised by a litigant for prolonging the litigation to the prejudice of the opponent.
9. Keeping in view the above position of law and considering the facts of the present case and the submissions made before us, we are of the view that no appeal against an order of the Learned Single Judge passed in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable under the Letters Patent, to a Division Bench.
10. In the result, the Writ Appeal is not maintainable and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
Sujit Barman Roy, C.J.
11. I agree.