Judgment:
B.L. Hansaria, C.J.
1. An important point needs our determination in this case. The same is whether the power conferred by Section 17 (2) of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1975 (for short, 'the Act') can be invoked to seize a motor vehicle where tax relating to the vehicle is outstanding for a period beyond the one for which tax is required to be paid in advance.
2. The facts of the case need not detain us because whether the vehicle was being plied without paying arrear tax is not the question to be determined in this proceeding for two reasons. The first is that a writ Court is not the proper forum to decide this controversial question relating to fact, and secondly, because the petitioner has already taken recourse to the remedies available under the concerned Act for determining the question relating to the , amount of tax in arrear, if any.
3. The sole submission of Shri Dash is that even if the owner be guilty of being in arrears, Section 17 (2) of the Act cannot be invoked. According to the learned counsel, the proper provision to be pressed into service for realisation of the arrear amount of tax is Section 14 (1) of the Act. This proposition of law is disputed by Shri Mohanty appearing for the opposite parties.
4. To decide the point, let us note the relevant provisions of the Act. These are Sections 4 (1), 14 (1) and 17 -(1) and (2) which are extracted below:
'4. Payment of tax and declaration of liability-
(1) The tax shall be paid in advance within such time and such manner as may be prescribed, to the taxing officer by the registered owner or person having possession or control of the vehicle.'
'14. Recovery of tax and penalty-
(1) Any tax due and not paid as provided for by or under this Act and any sum directed to be recovered by way of penalty Under Section 13 may be recovered as arrears of public demand'.
'17. Powers of Police Officer and other officers-
(1) Any taxing officer, any Police Officer in uniform not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, or any officer of the State Motor Vehicles Department not below the rank of Junior Inspector of Motor Vehicles or any other officer specially authorised by the Transport Commissioner in this behalf may-
(a) enter at any time between sunrise and sunset any premises where he has reason to believe that a motor vehicle is kept ; or
(b) require the driver of any motor vehicle in any public place to stop such vehicle and cause it to remain stationary so long as may reasonably be necessary.
for the purpose of satisfying himself that the amount of tax in respect of such vehicle has been paid and the tax taken has been obtained.
(2) While proceeding under Sub-section (1), the officer may, if the tax has not been paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act, seize the motor vehicle and detain it till the tax rs paid on such seizure the officer shall take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle ; and the registered owner, the person having possession or control of the vehicle and the driver there of shall be bound to comply with all orders and directions as the said officer may in respect of the movement of such vehicle, issue for giving effect to such seizure :
xx xx xx xx'
We may also note Rule 21(1) of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1976, which reads as below :
'Where an officer authorised under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 has reason to believe that the tax/additional tax payable in respect of any motor vehicle has remained unpaid without submitting any declaration as required Under Section 10, such officer by an order in Form 1 and served on the registered owner or the person in possession or control of such vehicle or its driver, shall seize the vehicle. After such order, the officer concerned shall direct that the vehicle be taken to the nearest police station or any other place recognised by State Government mentioned in such order for safe custody.'
5. It is strenuously contended by Shri Dash that Section 14(1) provides the only mode of recovery of 'any tax due and not paid'. His further submission is that Section 17(2) comes into operation when 'tax has not been paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act', which would attract Section 4(1) of the Act inasmuch as that section deals with the question of payment of tax. Learned counsel has taken pains to submit that because of what has been stated in Section 4 (1) of the Act, which requires payment of tax in advance, it is only non-payment of current tax (which is required to be paid in advance) as stated in Section 4(1), which would bring the case within the fold of Section 17 (2) of the Act. This submission is fortified by stating that Section 14 (I) specifically takes care of 'tax due', i.e., the tax which has fallen in arrear. So, argues the learned counsel, where tax is in arrear, the same can be recovered only as arrears of public demand, as permitted by Section 14(1) of the Act and not by taking recourse to seizure of the vehicle till the tax is paid of which Section 17 (2) speaks. To bring home his submission, Shri Das draws our attention to the use of the word 'has' in Section 17 (2) of the Act which, according to the learned counsel. signifies non-payment of current tax, and so, if the legislature would have desired invocation of this provision to realise arrear tax also, the proper word to be used would have been 'had'.
6. According to Shri Mohanty, however, the aforesaid two provisions provide separate and independent powers to realise tax which has not been paid and as such has become due. Learned Counsel further submits that Section 14 is to be pressed into service when the vehicle is out of hand because of which Section 17 (2) cannot, operate.
7. At first, we shall examine the soundness of the contentions on the plain language of the two provisions. There can be no dispute about the applicability of Sectio 14(1) to realise arrear tax inasmuch as this section clearly speaks about recovery of 'any tax due and not paid'. The question is what meaning could be attributed to the expression 'tax has not been paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act' finding place in Section 17(2) of the Act. According to Shri Dash, the words 'in accordance with the provisions of this Act' attract Section 4 (1) which opens the mind of the legislature about the mode of payment of tax- the same being that the tax shall be paid in advance. So, when tax. which is required to be paid in advance, has not been so paid, it is only with regard to that tax that it can be said that the same has not been paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
8. The argument is subtle and attractive on the face of it. A deeper probe would, however, show that the contention of Shri Dash is not tenable. We have said so for two reasons. The first is that the word 'accordance' means 'agreement; harmony; concord; conformity,'' as stated in Black's Law Dictionary. The appropriate meaning for the purpose at hand would be 'conformity'. So even if tax on motor vehicle has been paid by the liable person, but if the same be not in a conformity with Section 4(1) of the Act, i.e., if the same be not paid 'in advance within such time and such manner as maybe prescribed', the same would not be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that only the tax which is required to be paid in advance would be the subject-matter of Section 17(2) of the Act. Secondly, if attention is paid to what has been stated in Rule 21(1), it would be clear that when tax 'payable in respect of any motor vehicle has remained unpaid', the authorised officer can seize the vehicle. This rule does not confine itself to tax payable in advance only.
9. Let us now see whether the contention of Shri Dash can be accepted on the basis of the use of the word 'has' in Section 17 (2) of the Act instead of 'had'. According to the learned counsel, the use of the word 'has' signifies non-payment of the current tax. As to this submission, we would state that the connotation of the expression 'has been' will depend upon the- intention of the legislature to be gathered from the provision in which the said expression occurs or from other provisions of the statute, as stated in paragraph 15 of Secretary, Regional authority v. D. P. Sharma, AIR 1989 SC 509. The expression 'has been' may denote a transaction prior to enactment of the statute in; question or a transaction after the coming into force of the statute. The statute at hand had come into force in 1975 and the dues in question relate to s period much subsequent to the coming into force of the Act and so, even if it be held that the expression has been in the present case related to a matter coming into effect after the Act was enacted, the same would not make Section 17 (2) inoperative in the present case. In this connection, we may also refer with profit to a Bench decision of this Court in Md. Dawood v. State of Orissa, 72 (1991) CLT 663, wherein it was held that the phrase 'has been' can have retrospective operation also. So, because of the use of the word 'has' in Section 17 (2) of the Act, it cannot be held that the section could have been put into operation only in case of default in payment of the current tax.
10. Apart from the plain language of the aforesaid provisions, which would militate against the contention of Shri Dash, we have another stronger reason not to accept the submission advanced by the learned counsel. The same is relatable to the approach to be adopted while construing a provision like the one at hand. In this connection, we may first refer to the observations made by Viscount Simon, L. C. in Nokes v. Den Caster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., 1940 A. C. 1014 which were to the following effect :
'If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislature, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the better construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purposes of bringing about an effective result.'
The aforesaid observations were relied upon in Haryana State v. Pusa Ram, AIR 1978 P. and H. 171, to give a wider meaning to the word injury in Clause (1) (a) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 so as to include injury to property also.
11. It is also a settled rule of interpretation that a statute has to be so construed which would give effect to the purpose of the legislature, to achieve which object it is open to the judiciary even to modify the language used, if necessary, as stated in paragraph 17 of Union of India v. Filip Tiago Da Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981. In the recent case of K. Veeraswamy v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 656, it was opined by the majority that the construction which promotes the general legislative purpose underlying the provision in question is to be preferred to a construction which would not. If the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would defeat the purpose of the Act, the Court would be justified in disregarding the literal meaning and adopt a liberal construction which effectuates the object of the legislature. See paragraph 45). In this context, the decision of the House of Lords in Shah v. Barnet London Borough Council, (1983) 1 All E. R. 226, may also be noted because in that case permissiblity of adopting a purposive interpretation was recognised, which requires effort to find out the purpose or police behind the enactment.
12. Now, we have no doubt that the purpose behind empowering police officer and other officers of which Section 17 (1) of the Act speaks of to seize a motor vehicle in the contingency mentioned in Sub-section (2) would be lost to a great extent if the exercise of the power were to be confined to the cases of default in paying the current tax. The legislature might have rea|iS3d the necessity of empowering named persons to seize a motor vehicle relating to which tax had not been paid as a method of realising the tax. The mode of recovery of arrear tax visualised by Section 14 of the Act being cumbersome, a speedier method might have well been thought necessary and as the arrear tax relates to a motor vehicle, the legislature in its wisdom might have thought it appropriate to authorise seizing of such vehicle to put pressure on fie owner to pay the arrear tax. We would not be justified in adopting a construction which would defeat this wholesome object. If it were to be held that Section 17 (2) of the Act would not operate in case of arrear dues, it may as well be that such dues would remain unrealised, because in a particular case it may so happen that by starting proceeding as contemplated by Section 14 (1) of the Act .the dues are not realised. The result of this would be that the arrear dues would remain unrealised for all time to come which would go against the larger public interest. Therefpre, a liberal construction of Section 17 (2) of the Act is required to effectuate the object of the legislature.
13. Because of all the above, we would reject the contention of Shri Dash that the vehicle in question could not have been seized in exercise of the power conferred by Section 17 (2) of the Act. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.
B.N. Dash, J.
14. I agree.