G.B. Patnaik, J.
1. In these writ applications common questions of law and fact are involved and, therefore, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioner, a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, and wholly owned by Government of India, assails the levy of tax in respect of vehicles belonging to the petitioner under the provisions of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act as contract carriage, inter alia, on the ground that the said vehicles could not have been held to be 'contract carriages' as these were meant for carrying the children of the employees of the Company as well as the employees of the Company and the forums below committed gross error of law and jurisdiction in treating the vehicles as contract carriages and levying the demands in question Not only the Taxing Authority levied the demands on a finding that the vehicles are contract carriages, but also the appellate authority as wail as the revisional authority affirmed the same and hence these writ applications.
3. Mr. Murty appearing for the petitioner contends that on the findings arrived at by the Taxing Officer which has been affirmed by the appellate and the revisional forums, the ultimate conclusion that the vehicles were being used as contract carriages is unsustainable. He further contends that the forums below committed gross error in arriving at the conclusion that the vehicles were being used for hire or reward on the basis of certain documents which do not support the conclusion and, therefore, the said conclusion is liable to be interfered with by this Court, Mr. Murty further contends that the tax demanded having been paid under protest, the petitioner is entitled to the refund of the payment in question.
4. The stand of the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Department, on the other hand. is that the forums below having examined the materials produced before them and having reached a conclusion that the vehicles were being used for carrying passengers for hire Or reward and, therefore, were being used as contract carriages, the said conclusion is immune from interference by the High Court in a writ of certiorari. According to the learned counsel neither there is any error of jurisdiction, nor is there any patent error of law with the orders of the forums below which could be corrected by issuance of a writ of certiorari.
5. In view of the rival stand of the parties it is necessary for us to examine the orders of the forums below to find out whether these orders contain any error of law apparent on the face which can be corrected by issuance of a writ of certiorai. The power of this Court in a writ of certiorari to correct any error committed by inferior tribunals has now been settled by a series of decisions of the apex Court. The jurisdiction of this Court is a supervisory one and in exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction what can be corrected is an error of law apparent on the face of the order. As to the correct meaning of the expression 'an error apparent on the face of the order', the Supreme Court has held in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishan and Ors. AIR 1964 SC. 477, in the following words :
'......What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even In disregard of it, of is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law. the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error, but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari.
In the aforesaid case, the apex Court was examining the orders of the inferior tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act in relation to grant of permits under the provisions of the Act. The aforesaid case has been followed and reiterated in several subsequent decisions of the apex Court. (See, Abdul Rehaman and Ors. v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Ors. AIR 1978 SC 949 and Harbans Lal v. Jagmohan Saran, AIR 1986 SC, 302). Bearing in mind the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the apex Court, we would now examine the orders passed by the forums below.
6. The Registering Authority and Taxing Officer examined the provision contained in Section 2 (7) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which defines 'contract carriage, the documents produced by the Traffic Inspector in support of the vehicle-check report which indicated that the owner was realising hire charges at different rates from the persons traveling in the vehicle from Sunabeda to Koraput and vice versa and negativing the stand of the owner came to hold that the vehicle cannot be treated as an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellate authority re-affirmed the findings of the Taxing Officer on a re appreciation of the evidence on record and relied upon the fact that 42 employees of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited with their family members were traveling on payment of Rs 10/- each when the vehicle was checked. He ultimately came to the conclusion that where vehicles have been found to be used for hire or reward, the owner is bound to pay the tax not as a public service vehicle but as a contract carriage. After analysing the entire materials on record, the appellate authority came to hold that in the instant cases, there is overwhelming evidence which shows that the buses were used for hire or reward and various receipts under which collection of hire charges had been made establish the aforesaid fact. He also relied upon an order of the concerned officer dated 27-2-1988 wherein there has been a revision of hire charges to be levied for use of the vehicles for private purposes. The revisional authority again re-considered the matter and re-affirmed the findings arrived at by the original authority as well as the appellate authority. The revisional authority rightly relied upon the very caption of the order which indicates 'Revision of charges to be levied for private use of Company's Vehicles'. Mr. Murty, the learned counsel for the petitioner argues with vehemence that Annexure-3,the order issued by the company dated 27-2-1988, is not susceptible of a construction that the vehicles were meant for use by outsiders and the conclusion of the forums below relying upon the self-same circular must be held to have constituted a patent error. But on examining Annexure-3, we are unable to accept the contention raised by Mr. Murty for the petitioner. Not only the caption of the order indicated 'revision of charges to be levied for private use of Company's vehicles, but also paragraph-5 of Annexure-3 clearly stated that the charges for the vehicles given for use by outside parties (other than H.A.L. employees or other recognised bodies of HAL) like State Govt. authorities and other like institutions etc. will be 50 per cent additional over the rates indicated in paragraph-1 and further when the vehicles are given for private use by outside parties, they should deposit the full amount o1 expected use in advance before the vehicle is moved out of the garage. In view of the aforesaid stipulations contained in Annexure-3, we are of the considered opinion that the forms below rightly came to the conclusion that the vehicles were not used for carrying the students of the employees of the owner, but also were being used for the purposes of hire or reward. The contention of Mr. Murty, therefore, cannot be accepted.
In the case of Indian Telephone Industries, Dooravani-Nagar, Bangalore andOrs. v. Regional Transport Officer, Bangalore and Ors. AIR 1S75 Karnataka 211, where an omnibus had been maintained by the owner of a factory for transporting the employees of the factory from their houses to the factory, it was held that it was not a contract carriage within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, cannot be taxed as a contract carriage. But the aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the petitioner since the vehicles here were found to have been used by persons other than the employees of the Company as well as their children for the purposes of . hire or reward.
In the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotiva Co. Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer and Regional Transport Officer, Poona and Anr. AIR 1979 SC 343, the question that came up for consideration was whether realising a nominal charge from the employees of the Company would make the transport vehicle a public service vehicle carrying passengers so as to attract Section 3 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. Their Lordships after analysing the different provisions of the Act came to the conclusion that tax would be leviable only if passengers are carried in a public service vehicle. But since the vehicles were meant to transport the employees of the Company and no other member of the public could be carried in the said vehicles, it was held that it cannot be said to be a public service vehicle and, therefore, the levy of tax under Section 3 is not sustainable. But in view of the findings of the forums below that the vehicles in question with which -we are concerned in the present cases were not intended as a mode of transport for the children of the employees of the petitioner or the employees themselves, but on the other hand, were meant for being used by private personnel on payment of charges, the aforesaid decision also cannot be pressed into service by the petitioner.
In the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., AIR 1989 Rajasthan 124, this question also came up for consideration and provision of Section 3 of the-Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Taxation Act was considered. The learned Judges cams to hold that where company provided free transport facility to its employees and their children for travel from home to the work site or the school and back by utilising buses hired by them from bus owners and these buses were used only in this manner and were not used by the bus owner or the Company for any other purpose, the liability for 'payment of passengers' tax under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Taxation Act cannot be attracted, as the vehicles had not been used as public service vehicles. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition of law, but this decision can also have no application in view of the findings arrived at by the forums below to the effect that the vehicles used had been used for carrying passengers for hire or reward.
7. As has been stated earlier, the conclusions of the forums below having been arrived at on a proper construction of the relevant materials on record and there being no error of law apparent on the face of those orders, The ultimate decision of the taxing authority as affirmed by the appellate and the revisional forums holding the the buses are liable to pay the tax under the provisions of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act cannot be interfered with by this Court in a writ of certiorari. In the premises, as aforesaid, we do not find any merits in these writ applications which are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
R.K. Patra, J.
8. I agree.