1. The present application has been filed under Section 12-B of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 seeking compensation for alleged unfair trade practices of the respondent. The applicant purchased a drilling machine from the respondent as will be evident from reading of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the application which may be reproduced as below : "4. The applicant as interested in setting up a borewell drilling machine which could drill in any surface with 6/6 1/2" drill bores.
The representations of the respondent had assured the applicant that the drilling rig mode ITH-10 Rotary-cum-DTH Drilling Rig bearing Machine No. 1-88138 manufactured by M/s. Ingersoll-Rand (I) Ltd. with power pack mounted on board of the Rig of 540 CFM/150 PSI I.R. Screw air and coupled with M/s. Kirloskar Cummins Ltd. Engine Model NTA-495-C (4 Cylinder fitted with Turbo) fitted on Ashok Leyland Truck with Hydraulic operated 10 ft. mast, drill rod diameter was 3 1/2" outside diameter by 10 ft. length, with DHD-160 valveless hammer including all the necessary drill tools and compressor manufactured by their Company, was ideally suitable for the applicant's use. They had also represented that lot of other buyers were also using similar machine. Representations were also made orally and in writing that the said machine was capable of drilling in any surface with 6"/6 1/2" diameter bores and with a speed of over 45 ft. per hour. The applicant had accordingly calculated the capacity of the drilling based on these representations and had worked out the financial implications thereof and based on these analysis it decided to purchase the drilling machine of the aforesaid specification from respondent.
5. That the respondent had initially given a quote for the said machine vide quote dated 4.8.1987. However, vide its letter dated 23.12.1987 the respondent had revised the price upwards. The quotation dated 23.12.1987 is annexed hereto as Annexure A-1. Even in the quotation representations were made regarding the capacity of the said drilling machine.
6. That based on the quotation, the applicant had purchased the said machine. Invoice was also issued by the respondent. The total price of Rs. 20.90 lakhs was paid by the applicant to the respondent.
Further as per the respondents requirements, the applicant had also purchased the Ashok Leyland 164" base with full width for a price of Rs. 3.50 lakhs. Thus a total amount of Rs. 24.40 lakhs was spent by the applicant in purchasing the complete drilling machine with truck chassis.
7. That this amount was spent by the applicant on the basis of the financial calculations done and in anticipation of profits which would be generated through the borewell drilling business. However, this profit could only be generated on the assumption that the capacity of the drilling machine would be as promised and the drilling machine would function, without any problems, as per representations made by the respondent." 2. The respondent has filed reply to the application where preliminary objection is taken that the application for compensation is hopelessly time barred as the transactions pertain to the alleged defects in the drilling machine supplied by the respondent as far back as in the year 1988. The learned Counsel for the applicant vehemently argued that the machine is defective and the defects continue to persist till date and he has filed this compensation application within a reasonable time.
The present application for compensation according to him is maintainable. We are not inclined to accept this argument as the Supreme Court has settled a point of limitation in the judgment reported as II (2000) SLT 140=1 (2000) CPJ 13 (SC)=(2000) 2 Supreme Court Cases 628, in the matter of Corporation Bank & Anr. v. Navin J.Shah. Paragraph "12. We may further notice that there is another strong reason as to why the claim made by the respondent should not have been granted.
The transactions in question took place in the years 1979 and 1981.
The difficulties in realisation of the amounts due from the consignee also became clear at the time when the claim was made before the Corporation and the claim had been made as early as on 19.12.1982. The petition before the Commission was filed on 25.9.1992 that is clearly a decade after a claim had been made before the Corporation. A claim could not have been filed by the respondent at this distance of time. Indeed at the relevant time there was no period of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act to prefer a claim before the Commission but that does not mean that the claim could be made even after an unreasonably long delay. The Commission has rejected this contention by a wholly wrong approach in taking into consideration that the foreign exchange payable to Reserve Bank of India was still due and, therefore, the claim is alive. The claim of the respondent is from the Bank. At any rate, as stated earlier, when the claim was made for indemnifying the losses suffered from the Corporation, it was clear to the parties about the futility of awaiting any longer for collecting such amounts from the foreign Bank. In those circumstances, the claim, if at all was to be made, ought to have been made within a reasonable time thereafter.
What is reasonable time to lay a claim depends upon the facts of each case. In the legislative wisdom, three years' period has been prescribed as the reasonable time under the Limitation Act to lay a claim for money. We think that period should be the appropriate standard adopted for computing reasonable time to raise a claim in the matter of this nature. For this reason also we find that the claim made by the respondent ought to have been rejected by the Commission." In view of the above, we do not find any ground to entertain the present application at this belated stage. The same is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable.