G.B. Pattnaik, J.
1. The order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (opp. party No. 5) in M. V. Revision No. 10/89. annexed as Annexure-3. is being challenged by the petitioner, a Company Incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carrying on business of road transport.
2. The petitioner had been operating on the route Aska to Durgapur. Opp. party No. 2. State Transport Authority. Orissa, issued an advertisement on 1-9 1986 is respect of the inter- Stata route of Aska to Durgapur covering a length of 654 Kilometres out of which 469 Kilometres is within Orissa and 185 Kilometre is within West Bengal. In accordance with the reciprocal agreement between the two States, the routs was notified Under Section 63(3-B) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). An advertisement was issued Under Section 57(2) of the Act on 1-9-1986 inviting applications from intending operators by 1-10-1986. The advertisement was published in the daily newspaper 'The Samaja'. In response to the advertisement applications were received within the date fixed. But the petitioner could not make any application for permit though it had been operating in the route for quite some time. When the applications received were processed and objections were invited in accordanca with Sections 57(3) of the Act, the petitioner filed objection on 29-11- 1986. Objections could be made till 10-12-1986. The petitioner then filed an application for grant of permit on the route in question on 2-12-1986 and along with the same filed an application for condonation of delay indicating the reasons for the delay in making the application. The State Transport Authority rejected the application filed by the petitioner for permit without considering the application for condonation. The petitioner, therefore, filed an appeal which was registered as M. V. Appeal No. 9/87- The State Transport Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 20-4-1989 allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to opp. party No. 3 for fresh disposal in accordance with law The Tribunal called upon opp. party No. 3 to consider the question of condonation of delay after giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The aforesaid order has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ application. After the matter came back on remand, the same was heard at length. Opposite party No. 3 considering the grounds of delay condoned the same by order dated 2-8-1989 and directed that the application of the petitioner for the route in question would be considered along with other applicatons. The aforesaid order has been annexed as Annexure-2. Opp. party No. 4, Udavanath Pani, challenged the said order in a revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal Under Section 64-A of the Act which was registered as M. V. Revision No. 10/89. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal disposed of the revision by order dated 15th of Janunary,1990.annexed as Annexure-3, which is being impugned in this writ application. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that even though there is no bar for condoning the delay in making of an application for permit, but even if the delay is condoned, the application filed beyond time cannot be considered along with the applications filed within time and, therefore, the direction of the Transport Commissioner-cum-Chairman, State Transport Authority, under Annexure-2 is unsustainable. The Tribunal having set aside the order under Annexure-2 by the impugned order under Annexure-3, the petitioner has approached this Court.
3. Mr. Murty appearing for the petitioner contends that once delay is condoned, there is no further embargo on that application being considered and consequently, the application has to be considered together with all other applications for deciding the suitability of the applicant for the route in question and in this view of the matter, the Thibunal committed an error in directing that the application filed beyond time cannot be considered with other applications filed within time. Mr. Murty further contends that a combined reading of Sections 29(2) of the Limitation Act and Section 57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act leads to the irresistible conclusion that delay in filing application for permit can be condoned if sufficient cause is established and, therefore, the Chairman, State Transport Authority, having rightly condoned the delay, the revisional authority committed an error in interfering with the same.
Mr. Rath, the learned counsel appearing for opp. party No. 4, on the other hand, contends that under Sub-section (2) of Section 57, time for making an application for permit having been provided for, if no appli- cation is made within that period, it is not open for the authority to condone the delay and entertain application beyond the period, In that view of the matter the revisional authority rightly set aside the application of the petitioner.
4. In view of the rival stand of the parties, two questions really arise for consideration ;
(i) Whether an. application filed under Sub-section (2) of Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of permit on a route beyond the period prescribed in the notice would at alt be entertained for consideration even if the authority is satisfied about the sufficiency of the reasons for delay. ?
(ii) Even if the delay can be condoned and the application is entertained, would it be considered along with all other applications, or separately, as has been directed by the revisional authority ?
5. Before examining the aforesaid two questions, another feature that has been brought to our notice is that the Orissa Road Transport Company has lost its identity and does not survive any more. The Company has merged with the Orissa State Road Transport Corporation, a Corporation formed under a statute and' therefore, notwithstanding the said merger, no amendment has been made to the writ application. If the petitioner-Company has lost its identity and no more exists, the writ petition at its instance cannot be entertained and the writ application is liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone. To our query, Mr. Murty appearing for the petitioner is not in a position to give any reply to the same. In the aforesaid premises, the writ application is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.
6. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 57, it has been provided that an application for permit has to be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or if the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such applications, on such dates. In the case in hand, the State Transport Authority had fixed a date in the advertisement as the last date for obtaining of application and the petitioner did not file its application by the last date on the ground that it was not aware of the advertisement. In the case of Manjeri Public Conveyance, Manjeri P. O. v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram and Ors., AIR 1977 Kerala 64, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court construed this question by examining Section 67(2) and 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Judge came to hold that as the R. T. A. had appointed a date for receipt of application in the notification in accordance with power vested in him under Sub-section (2) of Section 67, any application received after the date fixed in the notification cannot be considered along with applications made in accordance with the notification, as otherwise, there is no meaning in appointing dates by the notification. This question again cropped up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of M/s. Pradeep Roadways Sangaria v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Rajasthan. Jaipur and Ors., AIR 1978 Rajasthan 156, and examining the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 57. it was held that if the R. T. A. fixes the time for presentation of application and makes it clear that the application presented beyod the time shall not be considered, then such a direction has a compulsive force and cannot be ignored and. therefore, the application presented beyond the appointed date in terms of the notification cannot be considered. ln view of the aforesaid decisions with which we respectfully agree. the petitioner's application filed beyond the period prescribed by the S.T.A. in its notice inviting applications, could not have been considered on merits and the revismnal authority rightly has interfered with the order of the appellate authority. But it is not necessary to further delve. into the matter in view of our conclusion on the question that the petitioner having lost its existence and identity, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. We have also carefully examined the impugned order of the revisionsl authority and we do not find any error of Law apparent on the face of that order requiring correction by this Court in a writ of certiorari.
This writ application accordingly fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
R.K. Patra, J.
7. I agree.