Judgment:
I.M. Quddusi, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed with a prayer for quashing the impugned order of punishment dated 21.10.2000 (Annexure-6) passed by the Deputy General Manager & Discipline Authority, UCO Bank In departmental proceeding awarding punishment against each charge in terms of the UCO Bank Officers Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations 1976, relevant portion of which is reproduced as under:
In exercise of powers conferred upon me in terms of Regulations 6 of the UCO Bank Officers Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations read with Regulation 4 of the above said regulation, I award the following penalties on the CSOE in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority.
(1) Charge No.1-Proved-The Basic Pay of Sri M.S. Dixit (PFM No.20207) is reduced by two stages for a period of one year in the time scale applicable to him and during the period of such reduction Sri Dixit will NOT earn any increments of pay and on the expiry of such period the reduction shall not have the effect of postponing his future increments.
(2) Charge No.2-Proved- The Basic Pay of Sri M.S. Dixit (PFM No.20207) is reduced by two stages for a period of one year in the time scale applicable to him and during the period of such reduction Sri M.S. Dixit will NOT earn any increments of pay and on the expiry of such period the reduction shall not have effect of postponing his future increments.
(3) Charge No. 3-Proved-Censured.
(4) Charge No. 4-Proved-Censured.
(5) Charge No. 5-Proved-Censured.
(6) Charge No. 6-Not Proved-Exonerated.
(7) Charge No. 7-Not Proved-Exonerated.
(8) Charge No. 8-Not Proved-Exonerated.
(9) Charge No. 9-Not Proved-Exonerated.
All above penalties will have concurrent effect.
2. The brief facts of the petitioner's case is that he was initially appointed as Officer Grade-D i.e. in the Scale-I Cadre on 12.11.1976 and subsequently he was promoted to Scale-ll Cadre on 1.1.98 and is continuing as such till date. During incumbency of the petitioner as Manager of College Square Branch, Cuttack from 27.9.1988 to 8.7.1995, the opposite party, basing upon the statement of allegations regarding the act of commission of omission made by the petitioner, framed nine articles of charges. After receipt of the statement of allegations of article of charges, the petitioner requested the authorities to permit him to inspect the incriminating materials but in that regard no response was made from the opposite party-bank authorities. Being aggrieved the petitioner filed O.J.C. No. 6909 of 1999, which was disposed of on 28.6.1999 by directing the opposite parties to permit the petitioner to inspect the relevant records/register to enable him to submit his written statement. In spite of specific order passed by this Court, the authorities did not allow the petitioner sufficient opportunity to inspect the document. Further it has been submitted that the alleged incident relates to the year 1995 and the proceeding was initiated in the year 1997 that too just a few days before the name of the petitioner got recommended for promotion to the next scale and since the departmental proceeding was pending against the petitioner, he could not enjoy the promotional benefit even though his case was a fit case for promotion to next scale against which the petitioner filed OJC. No. 13561 of 1999. By order dated 28.7.2000, the said writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the opposite parties to conclude the inquiry and take a decision thereon within a period of eight weeks from the date of appearance of the petitioner before the concerned authority. The petitioner was also directed to appear before the concerned authority on the 9th of August, 2000 and cooperate in the conduct of the proceedings and the days of adjournment taken by the petitioner shall be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of eight weeks and it was also directed that on failure of the authorities to conclude the inquiry and take a decision thereon within the said period, as directed, the departmental proceedings in question shall stand quashed. Thereafter, on 14.10.2000, the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order. Hence the writ petition.
3. The instant writ petition came up for hearing before this Court on 28.11.2005 which was dismissed with the following order:
28.11.2005
No counsel for the parties appears due to cessation of Court work by the High Court Bar Association.
Petitioner, Madhusudan Dikshit, appears in person and prays for being given a patient hearing.
No counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties.
After patiently hearing the petitioner and perusing the materials on record, we find that the punishment inflicted on him is not shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled. Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that no interference in the matter is called for.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
B.P. Das, J.
Sd/-
A.K. Samantaray, J
4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed SLP (C) No. 4770 of 2006 before Hon'ble Supreme Court. As the special leave was granted, the SLP was converted into Civil Appeal No. 5227 of 2006, which was disposed of vide order dated 27.11.2006 with the following order:
We have heard counsel for the parties.
Special Leave granted.
The High Court has disposed of the writ petition finding that the punishment inflicted was not shockingly disproportionate to the charge levelled and hence no interference was called for. We also notice that the matter was disposed of on a day on which the counsel for the parties did not participate in the proceeding due to cessation to work by the High Court Bar Association. What has been argued before us is that the inquiry report was not supplied to the appellant, Counsel for the respondent also does not dispute this factual assertion and therefore, the Writ Petition has to be considered in the light of this fact as well.
We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court to dispose it of afresh in accordance with law.
Since the promotion of the appellant has been withheld on account of the punishment inflicted, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter as soon as possible.
The appeal is accordingly, disposed of.
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B.P. Singh, J
Sd/-
Tarun Chatterjee
In view of the above direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court heard the matter again but confined it to the contentions that the inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner, which was not disputed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the learned Counsel for the respondent.
5. In paragraphs 13 and 14 of the writ petition, it has been mentioned that reasonable opportunity was not granted to the petitioner as the report of the inquiry was not supplied to him and he was not in a position to make a representation. In the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan : AIR 1991 SC 471, the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph-15 was specifically held as follows:
15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges for some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42nd amendment. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of copy thereof. The Forty-Second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position.
It has been further stated in the said case that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter.
6. In the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc. v. B. Karunakar etc : AIR 1994 SC 1074, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in respect of Mohd. Ramzan Khan case, has laid down that since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and; therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject. Article 311(2) makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The Article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded, and when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment. Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself effectively, and he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him and whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him.
7. In view of the settled position of law and the undisputed fact that the inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner, he was deprived of making a representation, Which amounts to denial of the reasonable opportunity, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc. v. B. Karunakar etc (supra).
8. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of punishment dated 21.10.2000 (Annexure-6) is quashed. It will be open for the disciplinary authority to reconsider the matter and take a fresh decision on the basis of the inquiry report only after furnishing a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner and providing opportunity to make a representation. No order as to costs.
B.P. Ray, J.
9. I agree.